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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters that study issues related to unemployment
and retirement decisions of workers.
The first chapter examines the impact of additional pension benefits on the retire-
ment timing of low-income female workers in Germany. Using administrative pension
insurance records from Germany, it studies the impact of a pension subsidy program
on retirement decisions of recipients. The kinked schedule of the policy allows me to
identify the causal effect using a regression kink design. The estimation suggests that
100 euros in additional monthly pension benefits induce female recipients to claim
pensions earlier by about 10 months. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests
that the ratio of the behavioral cost to the mechanical cost of this subsidy program
is 0.3, which is smaller than that of other anti-poverty programs.
The second chapter studies the total labor supply effects of Unemployment In-
surance (UI) for older workers — both at the extensive and the intensive margin. It
documents sharp bunchings in UI inflows at age discontinuities created by UI eligibil-
ity for workers in their 50s. Using a combination of regression discontinuity designs
and bunching techniques, we quantify the magnitude of these responses exploiting
vi
a variety of thresholds, kinks, and notches induced by the UI and retirement insti-
tutions. We estimate the total effect using a dynamic life-cycle structural model.
Results suggest that the impact of UI extension on non-employment durations for
older workers is almost twice as large as the impact for younger workers.
The third chapter examines the impact of receiving written advance notification
of layoff on labor supply of displaced workers by exploring the California Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act. The California WARN Act,
implemented in 2003, expands the requirements of the federal WARN Act. It provides
protection to workers in smaller firms and at smaller layoff events. Using the Displaced
Worker Supplement to the Current Population Surveys from 1996 to 2018 and a
differences-in-difference method, I find that the displaced workers affected by the
mini WARN Acts are 3% more likely to claim unemployment insurance. Conditional
on claiming UI, they are less likely to exhaust UI.
vii
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1Chapter 1
The Effect of Pension Subsidies on
Retirement Timing of Older Women:
Evidence from a Regression Kink Design
1.1 Introduction
Retirement income adequacy is an important concern for vulnerable groups, such
as female workers, who are at much greater risk of old-age poverty than older men.
In Germany, the pension benefit of an average woman is only about half that of
an average man. This issue is of particular importance during times of reducing
public pension replacement rates due to the aging population.1 Furthermore, low-
income workers are disproportionately affected by the recent pension reforms that
penalize claiming pension early.2 One way to ensure workers have adequate incomes
in old age is via income support programs. Many developed countries have provided
safety nets for pensioners with low benefits. However, policymakers face an important
trade-off: how to provide income support to elderly people without hurting incentives
1 For example, the net pension replacement rates for future retirees with low wages in Germany
are among the lowest in OECD countries. "German workers earning half the average wage and
retiring after a full career may expect a net replacement rate of 53% in the long term against 75% on
average across the OECD. For average-wage workers, replacement rates will also be below average,
at 50% compared to 63% in the OECD" (OECD [2015]).
2 Studies have found that the sick and the poor could not adjust their labor supply in responses to
recent pension reforms by working longer and had to suffer the early retirement penalties (Hupfeld
[2009], Hanel [2010]).
2to work.3 Therefore, it is important to understand the extent to which additional
pension benefits affect low-income workers’ retirement timing.
However, this question is understudied. It is partly due to the difficulty of isolating
exogenous variation in the parameters of the public pension system, including benefit
levels, pension eligibility age, penalties for claiming pension early, etc. In this paper, I
explore a specific feature of the German pension system, which allows me to identify
the effect of additional pension benefits on retirement decisions in an environment
in which the statutory pension eligibility age is unchanged. Existing papers that
analyze the change in labor supply in response to policy changes, such as recent
pension reforms, tend to overestimate the effects of changes in pension benefits (Song
and Manchester [2007], Coile and Gruber [2007], Duggan et al. [2007], Staubli and
Zweimüller [2013]). For instance, pension reforms are often in the form of raising
pension eligibility age accompanied by financial penalties for claiming pension early.
The estimated overall impacts may be a combination of labor supply response to
a change in lifetime income and response to a change in the focal reference point
- the statutory pension eligibility age (Blundell et al. [2016], Cribb et al. [2016],
Seibold [2017]). For example, Seibold [2017] has documented that workers’ responses
to discontinuities in lifetime budget constraint at statutory retirement ages are much
larger than responses to other budget constraint discontinuities, which do not link to
statutory ages.
In this paper, I explore a pension subsidy program for low pay workers in Germany,
implemented in 1992. I exploit the very sharp kink in the schedule of benefits as a
function of predetermined past contributions to implement a regression kink design.
This empirical design allows me to identify the causal effect of additional pension
3Studies (Börsch-Supan and Schnabel [1998], Friedberg [2000], Eissa and Hoynes [2006], Eissa
and Hoynes [2004], Schmieder et al. [2012a] ) have shown the disincentive effects of similar welfare
programs, such as disability insurance, the earned income tax credit and unemployment insurance.
3benefits on retirement decisions. In detail, I use administrative data from the Research
Data Centre of the German Pension Insurance to study a pension subsidy program
for low pay workers (Mindestentgeltpunkte bei geringem Arbeitsentgelt, SGB VI §
262 ) introduced by the 1992 Pension Reform Act in Germany. Several features
of this pension subsidy program make it a good instrument. First, it provides a
source of exogenous variation in pension benefits. This is because the subsidy size
is predetermined by contributions before 1992 and past relative wage position. It
provides an exogenous variation in subsidy sizes without manipulation behaviors.
Second, the subsidy size has a kinked relationship with average wage income before
1992. This enables me to implement the regression kink design as the empirical
method. This approach has never been used to study the effect of additional pension
benefits, to the best of my knowledge. Lastly, the change of pension benefits does
not associate with a change in statutory retirement age. In other words, statutory
pension eligibility age and other parameters of the pension system remain unchanged
around the kink. This allows me to isolate the impact of changes in pension benefits.
The baseline sample consists of female subsidy recipients in West Germany who
retired between 1994 and 2014. On average, the subsidy increases pension benefit
by around 16%, and this creates an average implicit tax of approximately 8%. The
estimation suggests that e100 additional monthly pension benefits induce female
recipients to claim old age pension earlier by around ten months and the hazard
rate to claim a pension at age 60 increases by 17%. The impacts on the age of
exiting employment have the same magnitude but is noisy. The hazard rate to exit
employment at age 60 increases by 14%. Because it is common for workers not to
transition directly from full-time employment to retirement in Germany. I also assess
the impacts of pension subsidies on workers’ behaviors regarding using unemployment
insurance (UI) and marginal employment as stepping stones to retirement. I find
4that more pension incomes reduce low-income female workers’ time spent in marginal
employment during the bridge years. More pension incomes also increase recipients’
probability to use UI as a pathway to retirement and prolong their time spend in UI
during the bridge years. The policy takeaway is that while additional pension benefits
induce low-income female workers to claim pension earlier, it has little impact on
the probability to exit regular jobs, which are jobs with mandatory social security
contribution obligations. Therefore, additional pension benefits have low impacts on
the contributions to the public pension system. A back-of-the-envelope calculation
suggests that in order to increase the mechanical transfer to lifetime pension income
by 1 euro, the government has to raise an additional 0.3 euro. It implies that the ratio
of behavioral cost to mechanical cost of this subsidy program is 0.3. This number is
smaller than that of other anti-poverty programs such as extending unemployment
benefits and progressive taxation.
This paper complements and extends earlier work. First, I build on past work
on the effects of pension generosity on retirement decisions (Stock and Wise [1990],
Krueger and Pischke [1992], Snyder and Evans [2006], Puhani and Tabbert [2011],
Gelber et al. [2017a], Lalive et al. [2017]). It is undeniable that pension provision
affects retirement decision making. Prior research has found pension subsidy schemes
often reduce incentives to work, either in the form of a flat-rate minimum pension
(Jiménez-Martín et al. [2007]) or as earning-tested income support programs for pen-
sioners (Gruber and Wise [2004], Feldstein and Liebman [2002]). However, there
are limited studies that credibly measure the causal impact of additional pension
benefits. In the U.S., most of the evidence is based on an unanticipated decline in
social security wealth for the US "notch" cohort born in the period 1917-1922. Both
Krueger and Pischke [1992] and Snyder and Evans [2006] look at this variation. While
Krueger and Pischke [1992] did not find significant impacts on employment, Snyder
5and Evans [2006] found that the affected cohorts are 5% more likely to work at older
ages. In Germany, Puhani and Tabbert [2011] estimated the impact of a large pension
cut for low-skilled workers using a regression discontinuity method. They found no
significant response in retirement age. My paper provides further information on the
impact of additional pension benefits on retirement timing. The sizes of estimators
obtained in this paper are different from the above-mentioned studies but within a
reasonable range. Second, this paper complements other efforts to elicit evidence on
the labor supply of a particular population group - low-income older women (Hanel
and Riphahn [2012], Lalive and Staubli [2015], Finkelstein et al. [2016], Gelber et al.
[2016]). This group is of particular interest because women are more exposed to
old-age poverty than men. Women on average have lower pension incomes because
women experience more career interruptions and part-time work than men due to
their childcare duties. Moreover, compared to men, women’s labor supply elastic-
ities are larger and women on average live longer. Therefore, older women’s labor
supply responses to additional pension benefits are more likely to have a larger finan-
cial consequence. Lalive and Staubli [2015] shows that a 3.5% deduction in pension
wealth caused by raising the full retirement age in Switzerland strongly affects older
women’s labor supply. Affected female workers delay pension claim by 6.6 months in
their paper. The magnitude of my result is slightly smaller than their finding. Lastly,
this paper is related to literature on pension reforms (Hanel [2012], Manoli [2016],
Engels et al. [2017]). For example, Engels et al. [2017] and Manoli [2016] exploit the
kinked schedule as the reforms increase the early retirement age gradually by birth
cohorts, and implement regressions kink designs, in the setting of Germany and Aus-
tria, respectively. Both papers found large responses in the age of exiting jobs and
the pension claiming age.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the core features of German
6pension system and the details of the subsidy program. Section 3 presents the data
and sample selection. Section 4 provides a simple conceptual framework. Section 5
explains the RKD setup and tests the RKD assumptions. Section 6 presents graphical
evidence and reduced form evidence. I estimate both the changes in slopes of the
treatment variable - subsidy size and the changes in slopes of the outcome variables
around the kink. The RKD estimators are then obtained by dividing the change in
slopes of outcome variable by the change in slopes of pension subsidies. I also present
impacts on activities during the bridge to retirement periods. Heterogeneous impacts
and robustness checks are also presented. Then I discuss the fiscal costs and policy
implications of this subsidy program and conclude.
1.2 Institutional Details
1.2.1 Features of Public Pension Scheme in Germany
The statutory public scheme in Germany is an earnings-related points system
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. Participation is mandatory, except for civil servants
and the self-employed. The pension system is financed with contribution payments,
which are normally shared equally by employers and employees. In 2016, the total
mandatory contribution rate was 18.9%. On average, the public pension replaces
around 50% of pre-retirement wage, net of tax and contribution. In 2016, the average
monthly pension benefit of the insured was e951 for men and e636 for women.
The statutory retirement age for a regular old-age pension remains at 65 through-
out my sample period, with the only prerequisite being 5 years of contributions.4
Several alternate pathways make retiring before 65 an option.5 Notably, women born
4The age for regular old age pension increased gradually from 65 to 67 since 2012. It will reach
age 67 in 2030.
5 There are four main early retirement pathways. They are old-age pensions for long-term insured,
old-age pensions for women, old-age pensions due to unemployment (and, later, part-time work) and
old-age pensions for severely disabled persons (Börsch-Supan and Wilke [2004]).
7before 1951 are eligible to claim pension at early retirement age (ERA) 60 via the
old-age pension for women. The eligibility requirement for this pathway is 15 years
of contributions of which at least 10 years must have occurred after age 40. Almost
all recipients of this subsidy program are eligible for this pathway. The ERA via the
women pension pathway stays at 60 during the sample period.
Moreover, workers know the expected pension benefits they will get when they
retire. It is because letters with detailed pension information were sent to workers
every 3 years from age 55 before 2005. Since 2005, letters have been sent annually
to workers who are 27 years old and have contributed to the public pension for at
least 5 years. Dolls et al. [2018] have shown that those letters inform workers their
pension entitlements in a salient fashion. Therefore, workers do take into account the
additional pension benefits when they make retirement decisions.
1.2.2 Pension Benefits
In Germany, pension benefit level is closely tied to employment. The main de-
terminant of pension benefit is the sum of individual accumulated earnings points
(Entgeltpunkte, EP). They are also referred to as pension points. Essentially, for
each year of contribution, a worker will accumulate some earnings points EPiτ , which
are decided by the worker’s relative wage position compared to average wage of all
the insured. For example, a worker whose wage is half of the average wage during
this contribution year τ will accumulate 0.5 point in this year.
PBit = [(
∑
τ
EPiτ + Subsidyi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Personal Pension Base
)× PVt]× AFit , where EPiτ = wiτ
w¯τ
The worker’s personal pension base is the sum of the EPs accumulated over time plus
additional EPs credited by the subsidy program. For example, an average wage earner
8with 15 contribution years accumulates 15 EPs. This personal pension base is scaled
up by the pension value PVt at the time of claim, which is determined aggregately
by factors such as average wage of all insured, the contribution rate and demographic
changes. For example, one EP was equivalent to e30 per month in 2015.
Personal pension base times pension value gives the total amount of pension ben-
efit. This benefit level is then adjusted by an access factor AFit.6 This access factor
penalizes early pension claim. Workers who claim pension at ERA face a 0.3% pen-
sion reduction per each month they retired in advance of the full retirement age. For
female workers claiming old-age pension for women in our sample, only cohorts born
after 1940 are affected by the access factor.
In sum, pension benefits increase with contribution year and relative wage income.
On average, one additional year of full value contribution increases the gross replace-
ment rate by around 1.17%. Therefore, workers with low wages or a short working
history will have a low pension benefit in the German pension system.
1.2.3 Pension Subsidies to Low Pay Workers
The pension subsidy to low pay workers (Mindestentgeltpunkte bei geringem Ar-
beitsentgelt) essentially provides a built-in subsidy that offers additional EPs to work-
ers with low lifetime contribution (SGB VI § 262 ). It was introduced by the 1992
Pension Reform Act in Germany. Along with reforms aiming at prolonging working
life and raising the statutory retirement age, the primary policy consideration of this
subsidy program is to ensure adequate old-age income for low wage workers. This
pension subsidy program is large. According to the Research Data Centre of the
German Pension Insurance, in December 2015, 14% of old age pensioners — 4% of
6 Pension benefit is also adjusted according to the type of pension. This factor is one for old-age
pension, and less than 1 for disability pensions. In my sample, almost all workers claim old age
pension.
9all male pensioners and 26% of all female pensioners — are recipients of this sub-
sidy program. The total payments for this subsidy program were approximately e3
billions in 2015.
The target group of the subsidy constitutes workers with a relatively long work
history and relative low wage income. To be more specific, there are two eligibil-
ity criteria. First, a worker should have at least 35 creditable years, which include
contribution periods and parental years given to mothers with children.7 The time
of raising a child up to age 10 counts into the creditable years. The package is 10
years for one child, 15 years for two children and 20 years for more than two children.
Therefore, the 35 years with pension rights is a relatively lenient criterion for mothers.
Second, the average monthly EP of full-value contribution years before January 1992
and average monthly EP of full-value contribution years at retirement must both be
less than 0.0625 — equivalent to 0.75 EPs annually.8 This criterion guarantees that
only workers with a wage position of less than 3/4 of an average earner can be the
recipients. Once those two conditions are satisfied, a worker will be entitled to this
subsidy.
The subsidy size is exogenous and predetermined. It depends on the total EP
accumulated before 1992 and the average EP of full-value contribution periods before
1992. In the data, subsidy size is on average 3.19 EPs with a standard deviation of
1.77. It amounts to an increase of benefit by 90 euros per month, which is equivalent
7 The creditable years consist of active contribution periods, credited periods and consideration
periods. Active contribution periods (Beitragszeiten) are usually corresponding to regular employ-
ment or self-employment when a fixed percentage of wage is contributed to the pension system.
Credited periods (Beitragsfreie Zeiten) includes periods such as maternity leave and vocational
training periods. During those periods, EPs are accumulated even though no contribution was
made. During consideration periods (Berücksichtigungszeiten), workers accumulate no additional
EPs. The time of raising a child up to age 10 counts into the consideration periods.
8 The contribution periods consist of full value contribution periods (Vollwertigen Beiträgen)
and reduced contribution periods (Beitragsgeminderte). Full value contribution periods are periods
when compulsory contributions are paid in according to the social security regulation. Reduced
contribution periods including periods due to unemployment, sickness and vocational training.
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to 17% increase in pension income. The exact formula is
Subsidy = min
(
0.5×
∑
t<92
EPt , 0.75Tpre92 −
∑
t<92
EPt
)
(1.1)
, where Tpre92 is the years of full-value contribution before 1992. The subsidy equals to
either 50% of total EP accumulated before 1992 or the difference between 0.75Tpre92
and total EP before 1992, depending on which one is smaller. Essentially, the subsidy
increases
∑
t<92EPt by 50%, but after the subsidy, the average annual EP before
1992 (denoted as aep92 from here onward) cannot exceed 0.75. It creates a kinked
schedule of subsidy in relationship to aep92. Figure 1 shows the policy schedule
according to Equation 1. This kinked schedule enables me to causally identify the
impact of this subsidy program. We can see from the figure, the slope of the subsidy
changes discontinuously at the kink point; this is where I base on the identification.
See Appendix 1.1 for an example illustrating the calculation of pension benefit and
subsidy amount.
Equation 2 shows that average subsidy per years before 1992 has a slope of 0.5
before the kinked point 0.5 and a slope of -1 after the kink point. Figure A1a shows
the policy schedule according to Equation 2.
Subsidy
T92
=

0.5aep92 , aep92 ≤ 0.5
0.75− aep92 , 0.5 ≤ aep92 ≤ 0.75
0 , aep92 > 0.75
(1.2)
To illustrate graphically, Figure 2 plots actual total subsidies measured in 2010 euro
against ape92 for the main sample. Figure A1b plots the average subsidy per years
before 1992 against ape92. The actual subsidy exhibits the kinked relationship pre-
dicted by the formula. The maximum of average subsidy per year before 1992 in the
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data is 0.25 as the policy suggests. However, there are two deviations from the policy
schedule. First, compared to the policy, the slope of average subsidy per year before
1992 is flatter to the left of the kink. Second, the observed kink is at 0.45 rather
than 0.5. Those deviations are measurement errors coming from constructing ape92
in the data. This is because the majority of the sample are female workers who have
had childcare periods, which involve complex accounting. When I look at sub-sample
of workers who were employed during their entire working history, I could obtain an
actual kink very close to 0.5. For more details see Appendix 2.1.
It is worth noting that this subsidy program will phase out eventually for workers
who started contributing after 1992.9 Low wage workers, like recipients who started
work after 1992, will not receive any subsidy. As the gender pension gap widens, pol-
icymakers in Germany have started to consider a new subsidy program for younger
cohorts. Therefore, understanding the impact of this program has immediate signifi-
cance.
1.2.4 Bridge to Retirement: Unemployment Insurance and Marginal Em-
ployment
It is plausible that older workers do not transit directly from full-time employment
to retirement. They may use unemployment insurance, marginal employment, and
other social support programs as stepping stones into retirement (Inderbitzin et al.
[2016b], Manoli [2016], Engels et al. [2017]).
The German unemployment insurance (UI) system provides about 60% income
replacement to eligible workers who lose their job.10 The maximum benefit duration
9 The 1992 reform introduced parental pension credits for mothers who gave birth after 1992
during the first 3 years of childcare. At the time of the reform, the parental pension credits policy
is considered as a compensation for the fact that this subsidy for low pay workers will phase out
eventually. See Thiemann [2015] for more on parental pension credits.
10 Replacement rates for UI were relatively stable over the period (67-68% for an individual with
children and 63-60% for an individual without children).
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for older workers ranges from 18 months to 32 months during our sample period,
depending on the age and the previous working history.11 Time spend on UI in-
creases future pension benefits. Workers who exhausted UI benefits were eligible for
unemployment assistance (UA) benefits with an effective average replacement rate of
around 30%. Eligible workers can stay in UA until 65.12 Time spent on UA does not
increase pension benefits. The generosity of the unemployment insurance benefits and
the lenient job search requirement for older workers make UI an attractive pathway
to bridge to retirement.
Another alternative activity is marginal employment. The most popular type
of marginal employment in Germany is the mini job, which is commonly called a
"400 euro" job. It is because the jobs paying less than e400 per month are exempt
from both social security contributions and income taxation.13 Unemployed workers
whose UA benefits are lower than e400/month have incentives to engage in marginal
employment before pension becomes available. Additionally, it is possible to claim
pension benefits while working in mini-jobs.14 Gudgeon and Trenkle [2017] points out
that the majority of exclusive mini jobbers are women and older workers.
1.3 Data and Sample Selection
The dataset employed in this paper is based on the anonymized Scientific Use
File (SUF) of the Insurance Account Sample (Versicherungskontenstichprobe, VSKT)
of the German Federal Pension Register. The main dataset is assembled from 11
years of cross-sectional SUFVSKT (2002, 2004 to 2014). SUFVSKT contains 5% of
11 SeeBörsch-Supan and Wilke [2004] and Gudgeon et al. [2017] for more details in the institutions
12 From 2005 on, UA was replaced by unemployment insurance benefits 2 (UIB 2), a completely
means-tested program. Both UA and UIB 2 are unlimited in duration.
13 This threshold was e325 before 2003 and e450 after 2013. During most of our sample period,
it stayed at e400 per month.
14 Pension benefits claimed before age 65 face earnings test. If pensioners work in jobs that pay
more than 400 euros per month, their pensions are fully withdrawn.
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all individuals with an active public pension insurance account, who were between
the ages of 30 and 67 at time of data collection. Each cross-sectional SUFVSKT
contains around 50 to 60 thousand individuals, among which around 7 to 8 thousand
are subsidy recipients. The SUFVSKT includes time-invariant information of the
insured person at the time of data collection, such as accumulative pension points,
gender, birth month, number of children and age claim pension. It also contains
monthly biographical information from age 14 up to the data collection year for
each insured person, such as social employment status that are relevant for pension
benefit calculation and pension points. However, information on years of education
and occupation are not accurately measured. Additionally, it is not possible to observe
martial status and link spouses in the data.
1.3.1 Sample Construction
The sample is restricted to female subsidy recipients who are at least 63 years
old at the sample year, who have at least 35 service years and have never worked
in East Germany.15 I only look at females in the analysis. It is because more than
80% of the recipients are female around the kink. There aren’t enough observations
to analyze the causal impacts on male workers. Moreover, individuals who worked
in East Germany are excluded because they have a different set of rules regarding
pension benefits and contribution, which is not comparable to that of West Germans.
Besides, I exclude people who are civil servants and self-employed, because they face
different pension systems. I further restrict the sample to workers who are older
than cohort 1952 and have at least 15 years of contribution. It is to ensure that
all individuals in the sample are eligible to retire at age 60 via old age pension for
15 See Appendix for more details on the sample construction
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woman.16 Because most female workers have claimed pension by age 63, the observed
retirement age in the sample is closer to the actual retirement age by restricting the
sample to workers who are at least 63 years old at the sample year.17 The final
sample contains 6,021 individuals, covering cohorts from 1935 to 1951. It amounts to
3.7 million person-month observations.
1.3.2 Summary Statistics
In 2015, around 25.5% of all female pensioners was subsidy recipients. More than
80% of subsidy recipients are female. Two-thirds of the recipients have never worked in
East Germany. The recipients’ distribution of post-subsidy monthly pension benefits
is centered around e750. The majority of the recipients’ monthly pension benefits
are in between e500 and e1000. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of some key
variables for the baseline sample of female workers, female recipients around the
kink and female non-recipients who have at least 35 pension years. The baseline
specification focuses on the window of recipients whose aep92 are from 0.25 to 0.65,
0.2 EPs around the kink 0.45. There are 5,218 individuals in this window. The average
size of the subsidy is 3.19 EP with a standard deviation of 1.77, which is equivalent to
90 euros per month and around 17% of the monthly pension benefits.18 The recipients
in the baseline sample on average have 24 EPs and 42 years of the creditable period,
within which 17 EPs and 32 years are from full-value contribution. They on average
worked 19 years before 1992. Compared to the non-recipients, the recipients only
differ significantly regarding average EP and total EPs. It is in line with the design of
16 Old age pension for women is one of the early retirement pathways in Germany. For cohorts
older than 1952, women can retire as early as age 60 by claiming old age pension for women if they
have at least 15 years of contribution. Women who were born in 1952 and later can no longer retire
at 60.
17 We test for robustness to sample construction in section 7. We use a sample of female subsidy
recipients who are at least 60, 61, 62 and 64 years old at the sample year.
18 All monetary values are CPI adjusted and expressed in 2010 euro.
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the subsidy program. There are no significant differences in the outcomes variables,
such as retirement age and age of last employment, or other individual characteristics,
such as the number of children and age of first birth. The non-recipients had worked
fewer years before 1992 and had higher EPs. The recipients around the kink are the
ones whose aep92 are from 0.4 to 0.5. Their average subsidy size is around 3.76 EPs
with a standard deviation of 1.9, which is slightly higher than the sample average.
1.4 Conceptual Framework
Here I describe a simple life cycle model to illustrate how the subsidy plays a role.
All individuals maximize lifetime utility subject to their lifetime budget set. I assume
individuals earn a constant (after tax and pension contribution) wage w at regular
jobs and v at marginal employment and at retirement receive total pension pb. Let
T be the last period of life, C be total consumption, Y be lifetime income, TE be
the year of exit from the labor force, TR be the year claim pension and workers start
work from period 0. I assume no discounting and that T is known with certainty.
Here I assume T is 80. The lifetime budget constraint takes the following form:
C = Y = w × TE + v × (TR − TE) + pb× (T − TR)
, where pb is the pension benefit per year and pb = w
w¯
×TE×AR+ b. b is the subsidy
amount. I denote the pension replacement rate for each year of contribution as p,
where p = AR
w¯
. Therefore, pb = p ∗ w ∗ TE + b. I also ignore the adjustment due to
early claiming.
For simplicity, I make two assumptions: 1) If one leaves a job before early retire-
ment age 60 (TE < 60), then TR = 60. Worker claims pension immediately as pension
becomes available at early retirement age. In the sample, among the individuals who
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leave employment before 60, half retire at 60. 2) If one leaves their job after age 60,
then the worker claims a pension immediately (TE = TR). In the sample, among the
individuals who exit employment after age 60, 70% claim immediately. Illustrated in
Figure 3, we can see a kink in lifetime budget set at age 60. The solid black line in
Figure 3 is the budget without subsidy, and the blue dashed line is the budget with
subsidies. These two lines intersect at the age of death (T = 80). In other words, if
a worker passes away without claiming any pension benefits, then additional pension
benefits have no impact on lifetime consumption.
The effect of the subsidies is a combination of wealth effect and substitution effect.
Additional pension benefits not only shift the budget set upwards but also change the
slope of the budget set. To be more specific, subsidies shift up in parallel for all exit
ages before 60. Workers who exit employment before 60 when there is no subsidy
will exit earlier due to the wealth effect. After age 60, subsidies change both the level
and slope of the budget set.19 Both wealth and substitution effects make workers
who would exit employment after 60 when there is no subsidy exit earlier. The slope
slightly changes because the trade-off of delaying exiting employment by one period
changes. The gain of one additional year of regular employment includes a year of
wage income and an increase of total pension income due to one more year of con-
tribution. The cost is the one year of the forgone pension benefit. Pension subsidies
increase the cost and make work less attractive. No matter where the individual was
located on the budget line when there was no subsidy program, additional pension
benefit will induce them to exit earlier. Moreover, I expect the impact on age of
claiming pension is relatively larger than the impact on age of exiting employment.
The earliest age a worker can claim a pension is 60, therefore in absence of the subsidy,
TR can not be smaller than 60. Because the change in lifetime budget with subsidy
19 In Appendix, I show the detailed expression of lifetime budget and the equation of its slope.
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after age 60 creates a stronger incentive than the change in segment before age 60, I
expect the the impact on age of claiming pension is relatively larger and the impact
of age of exiting employment relatively smaller and noisier. It is also worth noting
that for workers who left employment before age 60 in absence of the subsidies, their
relevant segment of lifetime budget line (before age 60) levels up without changing
the slope. The incentives are coming from pure wealth effect for those individuals.
Furthermore, the impact of subsidies should be larger for workers who transit
from the mini jobs to claiming a pension than for the ones who transit from regular
employment to claiming a pension. This because wage income w at regular jobs is
higher than wage income at the mini jobs v. Moreover, one more year of work in
marginal employment will not increase the pension benefits.
1.5 Empirical Methodology
1.5.1 Regression Kink Design
The kinked schedule of this subsidy policy allows me to identify the causal effect of
pension subsidies on retirement timing. Specifically, I use a Regression Kink Design
to estimate the local average treatment effect, following Landais [2015], Card et al.
[2015c] and Card et al. [2017].
RKD examines the induced change in the slope of the relationship between the
outcome of interest (Y ) and the assignment variable (r) at the exact location of the
kink in the policy formula. The average treatment effect of subsidy B on Y at the
kink (r = 0) is expressed as
E(
dY
dB
|r = 0) = limr0→0+
dE(Y |r)
dr
|r=r0 − limr0→0− dE(Y |r)dr |r=r0
limr0→0+
dE(B|r)
dr
|r=r0 − limr0→0− dE(B|r)dr |r=r0
(1.3)
Equation 3 shows the RKD estimand. Here, the slope change in the outcome
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variables is scaled by the slope change in the pension subsidy with respect to aep92.
Because the observed relationship between pension subsidy B and r varies from the
policy rule, I adopt a fuzzy RKD approach. I obtain the estimates of both the numer-
ator and denominator by running parametric polynomial regression as the following:
Yi|(r = 0) = αy + [
p=p¯∑
p=1
ρpr
p
i + βpr
p
i × 1(ri ≥ 0)] + θyXi + i , where |ri| ≤ h (1.4)
Bi|(r = 0) = αb + [
p=p¯∑
p=1
τpr
p
i + γpr
p
i × 1(ri ≥ 0)] + θbXi + i , where |ri| ≤ h (1.5)
where r is the assignment variable. It is aep92 centered around kink 0.45. 1(ri ≥ 0) is
an indicator for aep92 being above the kink, p is polynomial order, h is the bandwidth
size. For our baseline estimation, we set p as 1 and h as between 0.25 and 0.65. Y
are the outcome variables, such as age claiming a pension, age of exiting employment,
the hazard rate to claim a pension at 60, etc. B is the pension subsidy, which are
measured per month of additional pension income in 2010 euros The change in the
slope of Y around the kink dY
dr
|r = 0 is given by β1, the change in slope of B around
the kink dB
dr
|r = 0 is given by γ1.
1.5.2 RKD Assumption
The key assumption for a valid inference in a fuzzy regression kink design is to
make sure there are no manipulations. The workers to the left and the right of the
kink are comparable. One test for no manipulation is to test whether the density
of the assignment variable is smooth at the kink point. Intuitively, smoothness in
density rules out the possibility that the induced changes in Y are not due to changes
in B, but rather due to sample selection or changes in other predetermined covariates.
Figure 4 shows the number of individuals observed in each bin of average EP from
full-value contribution before 1992. The bin size is 0.01525 aep92, which is equivalent
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to e40 in annual wage income. We observe a small dip in density of the recipients to
the left of 0.45. Additionally, the density shows a quadratic relationship with aep92
with the mode of the density around the kink point. McCrary tests are performed to
formally test for discontinuities in both density and the derivative of density. The Mc-
Crary tests suggest that there is no statistically significant discontinuities in density.
However, the derivative of density changes discontinuously at the kink.
The fact that the subsidy program was announced in 1992 and the assignment
variable is average EP from full-value contribution before 1992 makes it very difficult
for workers to manipulate the system. It is very unlikely that an individual sort
themselves to one side of the kink. Furthermore, Figure A2 has shown that the shape
of the density is not unique for female subsidy recipients but rather a pattern that
is common for all female workers in the pension system. The red squares show the
distribution of female workers in the west which is bell-shaped and centers at the
kink. The blue triangles show the distribution of male workers in the west, which is
also bell-shaped, but centers at 0.6 EP to the left of the kink.
A second test for no manipulation is to check whether the slopes of the control
variables are smooth around the kink. Table 2 presents the regression results in
the form of Equation 4, where the changes in slopes of the predetermined covariates
are estimated. I look at individual characteristics, such as the number of children,
the age of first birth and age of first employment. Social economics status (SES)
is also investigated. Months spend in unemployment insurance (UI), unemployment
assistant (UA), childcare and sickness leaves before 1992 and before age 50 are tested
for nonlinearity at the kink. The p values of all covariates are larger than 0.05. This
suggests that the covariates evolve smoothly at the kink. Figure 5 visually shows the
means of those covariates in each bin of aep92 and the slopes at two sides of the kink.
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1.6 Effect of Subsidies on Labor Supply
1.6.1 Graphical Evidence
Figure 6 shows the relationships between aep92 and subsidy size, age claiming
pension and hazard rate to claim a pension at age 60 around the kink. The bin sizes
are the same as Figure 4. The estimated changes in slopes of the outcome variables
obtained by reduced-form regressions are listed in the figures. There is a clear kinked
relationship between aep92 and age claim pension. The slope becomes flattered at the
left of the kink. Visually, we can see that additional pension benefits induce workers
to claim pension earlier. Around the kink, the retirement age is 61.5 on average. If
we assume retirement age decreases linearly as aep92 increases, the age claim pension
would be 62 years old if the subsidies do not exist – that is the average pension claim
age for workers 0.2 EP away from the kink. There is also a clear kinked relationship
between aep92 and hazard to claim pension at age 60. The slope becomes flattered at
the left side. At the kink, the hazard to claim pension at 60 is around 45%.
Figure 7 investigates the relationships between aep92 and age of exiting employ-
ment and hazard rate to exit employment at age 60. I define age exit employment
as the age of the last job, including both regular jobs that contribute to the pension
system and marginal employment. It suggests that the age of exiting employment
doesn’t show a clear change of slope around the kink. The change in slope of hazard
to exit employment at 60 is relatively more sizable than age of exiting employment.
It is consistent with the predictions made in the conceptual framework. If a large
proportion of recipients would have left employment before age 60 in absence of the
subsidies, then we expect to see a small impact of subsidies on the age of exiting
employment. It is because the incentives are coming from pure wealth effect for those
individuals. Two-thirds of recipients in the sample leave employment before age 60.
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Therefore, it is not surprising that the change in slope of age to exit employment is
nosier than that of pension claim age.
1.6.2 Effect of Subsidies on Age of Claiming Pension
In Table 3, I present fuzzy RKD estimates of the responses concerning the loca-
tion of aep92 along with the first-stage estimates. The results are from local linear
regressions with a bandwidth of 0.2 EP around the kink for the baseline specification
of Equation 4 and Equation 5. In each column, I report the estimated change in slope
of Y around the kink and the estimated change in slope of benefit level B around the
kink. Here, subsidies are measured in 2010 euros, and the unit is e100 per month.
The local average treatment effects are reported in row 3 as dY
dB
. The standard errors
are obtained using delta method.20 Columns 1 to 3 measure the impacts on pension
claiming age. Columns 4 to 6 measure the impacts on the hazard rate to claim pen-
sion at age 60. Columns 1 and 4 show results of linear regressions without controls.
Columns 2 and 5 show results of linear regressions with controls, such as the number
of children, the age of first employment and SES before 1992, etc. Columns 3 and 6
further add cohort fixed effects to the regression. The cohort fixed effects take into
account incentive changes caused by raising the statuary retirement age, which was
implemented gradually by cohorts. The average values of subsidy size, retirement age
and hazard to claim at age 60 are also reported in Table 3. Recipients around the
kink on average receive e108/month of subsidy, and they on average claim pension at
age 61; the hazard to claim pension at 60 is 42%. The coefficients do not vary much
across specifications. My preferred specification is the one with controls and cohort
fixed effects. The RKD estimates suggest that an extra e100 of pension benefit per
month makes the recipients retire earlier by 0.8556 years, which is around 10 months.
20 I have also calculated standard errors using bootstrap method. The results are similar.
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An extra e100 of pension benefit per month makes recipients 17% more likely to
claim pension at age 60.
To better understand how the subsidies affect workers’ labor market decisions at
older ages, we further look at the hazard rate of claiming pension at different ages.
Figure 8a plots estimated change of hazard to claim pension from age 50 to age 65,
when there is a e100 increase of pension subsidy per month. Figure 9a plots the
survivor curve in blue dots when there is a e100 increase of pension subsidy per
month. I observe that most of the actions happen at statutory retirement ages - age
60, 63 and 65. It is reasonable given the institutional setting of the German pension
system.21 Subsidies increase the hazard of claiming old age pension at age 60 and 63
significantly and decrease the hazard of claiming pension at age 65 but the impact is
not statistically different from zero.
1.6.3 Effect of Subsidies on Age of Exiting Employment
Individuals facing additional pension wealth potentially could also adjust their
decisions to exit employment. In the sample, half of the recipients leave employment
before age 60. In Table 4, we present fuzzy RKD estimates of impacts on age of
exiting employment. The regression specifications are the same as Table 3. Consistent
with the graphical evidence in Figure 7, the estimated impacts on age of exiting
employment are not significant. The magnitude of RKD estimate of the impact on
age of exiting employment is close to the impacts on pension claim age but much
nosier. In responses to additional pension benefits, hazard to exit at 60 increased
by 14% with a significance level of 0.05. Figure 8b plots the change of hazard to
exit employment when there is a 100 euro more pension subsidy per month. It has
a similar pattern as the impact on hazard to claim pension. Apart from hazard to
21 The liquidity effects of public pension cause this kind of behavior.
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exit at age 60, the hazard to exit at age 57 declines slightly when there is a higher
pension. The impact is 2% at 10% significance level.
1.6.4 Bridge to Retirement
In Germany, it is common that older workers do not transit directly from full-time
employment to retirement. On average, 43% of the female recipients enter to pension
claiming via regular employment; 5% of them enter via marginal employment; 30%
of them enter via unemployment. In this section, I investigate the impacts of having
additional pension benefits on worker’s activities during those bridge years. Table A7
shows that conditional on claiming pension benefits at time t+1, the probability of
being in different activities at time t change as pension benefits change. The results
suggest that workers are more likely to use UI as a pathway to early retirement when
pension benefits are higher.
First, I investigate the impact on age of last regular jobs. Table A2 shows that the
effects of pension subsidy on age of last regular jobs is noisy, but with a magnitude
close to zero. Then, I examine the impacts on transitions from regular employment
and from unemployment to other social economic statuses for women aged 50- 59.
Table 5 displays estimates of impacts on the conditional probability to transit from
employment. Conditional on participation in regular employment at time t-1, e100
more pension benefits increases the probability to transit from jobs to unemploy-
ment insurance by 0.84%. The probability to stay employed, transit to marginal
employment or to other residual activities between age 50 to 59 are not statisti-
cally significant. Conditional on participation in unemployment insurance at time
t-1, e100 more pension benefits per month increases the probability to transit from
unemployment to other residual activities by 0.25%. The impacts on probability to
transit to other status are not significant.
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Additionally, given that workers claim pension earlier but do not change age exit-
ing regular employment at a large magnitude, It would be interesting to understand
how workers alter their behaviors during those bridge years. On average, the gap
between the age of last regular employment and age of pension claim is around 8
years: 16 months in UI, 9 months in UA, 5 months in marginal jobs and 3 months in
sickness and the rest time are coded as self-insured. Figure 10 plots the distribution
of months spent in marginal employment and unemployment with respect to aep92.
Table 6 shows the regression results. The estimates suggest that e100 additional
pension per month induces workers reduce the time spend in marginal jobs during
the bridge years by about 4 months. It is reasonable because the gain of delaying
pension claim for one period is relatively smaller for workers engaged in marginal
jobs. The forgoing wage is lower and the time spent in mini jobs won’t increase their
pension entitlements. A wealth effect induce those workers to quit working earlier.
e100 additional pension benefits per month induce workers to increase their time
spent on UI by 4 months. However, the estimator is not significant. Combining this
finding with the impacts on probability to enter unemployment between age 50 to 59
and impacts on probability to enter pension via unemployment, I infer that overall
additional pension benefits induce workers to bridge via UI earlier. Workers are more
likely to use UI as a pathway to retirement and they stay in UI longer.
1.6.5 Interaction with Pension Reform
The early retirement pathway through old age pension for women stayed at age
60 for our sample. The full retirement age without any actuarial adjustment has
increased from 60 to 65 by cohorts in monthly steps. In other words, beginning with
cohort 1940 January, there is a penalty for claiming old age pension for women at age
60. The penalty to retire at age 60 increases gradually from 0 up to 18% in monthly
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steps from cohort 1941 to 1944. I am interested in the impacts of the penalties for
claiming pension early on the results. For the affected cohorts, the penalty essentially
discounts the value of each euro of pension benefit. Therefore, I expect to see a smaller
effect on retirement age for the younger cohorts who face early retirement penalties.
I separate the sample into three groups: 1) group with no penalty: cohort 1935 to
1940; 2) transition group: cohort 1940 to 1944; 3) maximum penalty group: cohort
1945 to 1951. Table A5 shows the results. The hazard rate to claim pension at age 60
is slightly smaller for the younger cohort and insignificant. It is consistent with the
fact that each unit of subsidy is worth less if the pensioners choose to claim pension
at 60. On the contrary, the impact of subsidies on retirement age is larger for younger
cohorts.
1.6.6 Heterogeneity and Robustness
Heterogeneous Behaviors
In this section, I look at heterogeneous responses for subgroups by pension subsidy
size, health status, and family attachment. Table A3 shows estimates for recipients
with higher than average subsidies and recipients with lower than the average subsi-
dies. The regression results suggest that the impacts are only significant for workers
whose subsidies are higher than the average, which is e80 per month. It is partly due
to the fact that the change in slope of subsidy size around the kink is not statistically
significant, for workers with lower than the average subsidy. However, the difference
between the impact for high and low subsidy groups is not statistically significant.
The main factor that changes the magnitude of subsidies along aep92 is years worked
before 1992. Table A3 also shows estimation results when we separate the sample
into groups with more years worked before 1992 and fewer years worked before 1992.
The results are similar as separating the sample by subsidy size. The results suggest
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that when subsidy size is lower than a certain threshold, workers’ labor supply is not
responsive. It would be interesting to measure the continuous impact of subsidy on
retirement behavior.
Health status is a key factor that affects retirement decisions. Poor health makes
it hard to stay in employment and makes workers more likely to claim pension earlier.
Workers with poor health also value leisure more. I proxy healthiness using a dummy
for never spending any time on sickness leave before age 50. The estimation result
suggests that unhealthy workers claim pension earlier by around 1 year and healthy
workers claim pension earlier by around 8 months. The difference in impacts on
pension claim age, however, is not statistically significant. The difference in estimated
impacts of hazard to claim pension at 60 of those two groups is significant at 10%
level.
Lastly, I separate women by the number of children. It is because the labor force
attachment of women is largely affected by their child-bearing activities. Mothers
with more children are less likely to be strongly attached to employment. I expect
mothers with more than one child are more responsive to additional pension income.
Row 4 in Table A3 confirms this hypothesis. The impact of additional income to
women with no child or with only one child is an order of magnitude smaller than
the impacts to mothers with more than one child.
Estimates by Polynomial Order and Bandwidth
Several exercises further establish the robustness of the estimates. Table A4 re-
ports the results of the estimation of equation 4 for a linear, a quadratic, and a cubic
specification. For all three specifications, bandwidth is 0.2 around the kink, same as
all baseline analyses. Aikake Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information
criterion (BIC) and AIC with a correction are reported as well. The estimates are
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quite sensitive to polynomial orders; however, the difference among AIC, BIA and
AICc are small across specifications. According to those criteria, the linear speci-
fication fits slightly better than the other two specifications. One explanation for
the sensitivity to polynomial order could be that high-order polynomial regression
takes on extreme values to the weights. Gelman and Imbens [2017] suggests that
high-order polynomial regression is a poor choice in regression discontinuity analyses.
For causal inference, they recommend local linear or quadratic polynomials for RD
design. In the case of regression kink design, Card et al. [2017] have shown that the
quadratic estimator is typically larger than the mean squared bias for the linear esti-
mator with the same bandwidth selection and bias correction. In this paper, the mean
squared bias, obtained by Monte Carlo simulations based on data generating process
that closely resemble the sample, also suggests that linear specifications dominate
quadratic models.
Figure 9 shows the point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for the ef-
fect of a e100 increase in monthly pension benefits on age of claiming a pension and
hazard rate to claim pension at age 60. All the estimations use the linear specification
with controls and cohort fixed effect. The blue dotted line shows the number of obser-
vations. The four red vertical dash-dot lines correspond to four different bandwidth
selections: the Imbens and Kalyanaraman [2012] bandwidth for fuzzy RKD ( Fuzzy
IK ), the bias-corrected estimates per Calonico et al. [2014] (Fuzzy CCT), the "rule-
of-thumb" bandwidth based on Fan et al. [1996] (FG), and the baseline bandwidth
used in the baseline analysis. The four bandwidths are 0.114, 0.102, 0.28 and 0.2,
respectively. Even though 0.1 is the optimal bandwidth suggested by both Fuzzy IK
and Fuzzy CCT , the result is compromised by the small sample size at this band-
width. I find that the results are significant and relatively stable over bandwidths
between 0.125 and 0.25, which is equivalent to e325 to e650. Once the observation
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number falls below 3000, the results are very sensitive to the choice of bandwidth.
Placebo Kinks and Placebo Forcing Variable
As Card et al. [2015c] and Landais [2015] point out, one main concern with the
RKD identification assumptions is the functional dependence between the assignment
variable and the outcome variable. In order to further test that the estimated impact
on pension claim age is not caused by the quadratic functional form but by the kinked
schedule in subsidy, I run some placebo tests. First, I test for existence and location
of the kink. Figure A3a shows the R-square and adjusted R-square of the baseline
model when the kink is placed at "placebo" locations around the kink. Following
Landais [2015], I run regressions of Equation 4 for a series of virtual kink points and
look for the kink that maximizes the R-square. In Figure A3a, we can see that both
R-square and adjusted R-square increase sharply as one moves closer to the actual
kink point and then decrease when moves away from the kink point. I also perform
a permutation test in the spirit of Ganong and Jäger [Forthcoming]. Figure A3b
shows that the estimate with the kink placed at the actual kink point is statistically
significantly larger in magnitude than the distribution of estimates with placebo kinks.
Moreover, I use average EP after last employment as a placebo forcing variable
instead of aep92. The average EP after last employment is a good proxy for lifetime
earnings but not directly correlated with aep92. Figure A4 shows scatter plots using
mean EP 5 years after last regular employment, with 4 years, 3 years, 2 years and
1 year after last regular employment as the placebo forcing variables. Figure A4
suggests that the subsidy amount and outcome variables have no obvious kinked
relationship with the placebo forcing variables. Table A5 presents the RKD results
by using those placebo forcing variables. It shows that none of the dY
dB
estimates are
significant across all the placebo specifications.
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Lastly, I use female recipients in West Germany who credited less than 35 years
to the pension system as the counter-factual sample. Those female workers are not
eligible for the subsidy. Figure A5 shows scatter plots of age claiming pension and
hazard to claim pension at age 60 using the counter-factual sample. It shows that
without the subsidy the slope of the age claiming pension doesn’t change at the kink.
1.7 Implications and Discussions
The primary objective of this subsidy program was to provide additional income
support to older workers at retirement. However, as I mentioned earlier, this pro-
gram is being phased out gradually. Low-income workers who never contributed to
the pension system before 1992 won’t benefit from this subsidy program. The av-
erage subsidies of female workers in West Germany declined from e33 /month for
cohort 1935 to e20 /month for cohort 1948. Over time, the average subsidy size
also decreased from e50 /month to below e10 /month from 1996 to 2014. The red
dashed line in Figure 11a and Figure 11b shows these declining patterns. From a
policy perspective, It would be interesting to know what the retirement age of female
workers would be if the subsidy amount stays at a high level. In other words, how
much the phasing out of this subsidy program account for the increase in pension
claim age for female cohorts between 1935 and 1948, and for female workers from
year 1996 to 2014. The blue dash-dot line in Figure 11a and Figure 11b displays the
profile of actual retirement age for female cohorts between 1935 and 1948, and for
female workers from year 1996 to 2014. The RKD estimates suggest that a one-euro
increase of pension benefit induces workers to claim pension earlier by 0.00856 years,
which is around 3 days. Based on this estimate, I draw the profile of retirement age
if the subsidy level remained at the average level of the 1935 cohort in Figure 11a;
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and if the subsidy level remained at the average level of year 1996 in Figure 11b.
The corresponding changes in retirement age are shown as the grey area between the
black solid line and blue dash-dot line. We can see that the phasing out of subsides
can account for some of the increasing trend in age of claim pension over the past
decade.
1.7.1 In Comparison with other studies
It would be useful to compare the magnitude of the estimates in this paper with
other studies. Due to the limitations of the data set, I could not take the family
structure, spouse income, and other income sources into consideration. Husbands and
wives may determine their labor supplies jointly. Wives who have access to husbands’
income and other income sources are less responsive to the availability of subsidy, and
vice versa. It needs to be taken into account when interpreting the estimation results.
If we assume that the household income is in a range of 1 to 3 times of the female
recipient’s income, then we obtain an estimate of the elasticity of retirement age with
respect to income in a range of -0.025 to -0.008. That is, a 1% increase of pension
income decreases pension claim age by 0.08% to 0.25%. And the elasticity of hazard
rate to enter old age pension at age 60 with respect to pension income is in a range of
0.075 to 0.025. That is, 1% increase of pension income increases the hazard to claim
pension at 60 by 0.025% to 0.075%.
Compared to the elasticities measured using incentive changes caused by actuarial
adjustments (Hanel [2012], Engels et al. [2017]) , the estimate in this paper is much
smaller in magnitude. For example, Hanel [2012] reports a semi-elasticity of propen-
sity to enter disability retirement with respect to the implicit tax rate 2.10. Engels
et al. [2017] find retirement age increases by 6.5 months when facing a 18% penalty
to retire at age 60. Regarding the impacts of income transfer due to wealth/income
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effect (Costa [1995], Marie and Castello [2012], Gelber et al. [2017b]), the magnitude
of results in this paper is closer to the size of findings in those papers. For example,
Marie and Castello [2012] measures labor supply response to a 36% increase in the
generosity of disability insurance and find the labor force participation rate declines
by 8%. Gelber et al. [2017b] find the annual employment rates decrease by 1.3% per
$1000 of additional lifetime DI benefits. Assuming the pension recipients have 20
years of pension duration, I translate the increases of 100 euro per month to an in-
crease of 24,000 in lifetime income. This result suggests that retirement age decreases
by 0.4 months per e1000 of additional lifetime pension income and the hazard to
claim pension at age 60 by 0.7%.
1.7.2 Fiscal implications
Policymakers are interested in the fiscal implication of providing one additional
euro of pension benefit per month per worker. Here, I separate the fiscal cost into
two parts, mechanical cost (MC) and behavioral cost (BC). The ratio of behavioral
cost to mechanical cost (BC/MC ratio) is a context-robust measure of disincentive
cost, which helps to compare the disincentive effect of this pension subsidy to low pay
workers with other redistribution programs.
The mechanical cost would represent the increases in government spending if there
were no behavioral responses. If we assume the duration of pension benefit to be 20
years, which is the length of the period between retirement and death, then the
mechanical cost for one additional euro of pension benefit per month is e240 per
worker. The behavior cost can be broken into four parts. The first part is the increase
in pension benefit payment due to the change in age claim pension. Take the average
monthly pension e600 as the baseline – the government will pay e60 per worker for
the induced 3 days of the earlier claim. The second part is the increase in UI benefit
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payment caused by the change in UI claim behavior. Recall that one additional euro
of pension benefit per month increases the duration spent in unemployment between
exiting regular employment and claiming pension by around 1.3 days. Take into
account that average daily UI benefit is roughly 67% of the average wage, 1.3 more
days in UI increases government spending by e26. Additionally, on average, 30% of
the subsidy recipients bridge retirement via UI/UA. Therefore, the expected value of
the second part of the behavioral cost is e8. The third part is the decrease in revenue
due to less contribution to the public pension system. The reduction in contribution
comes from two sources: first, a change in age of exiting regular employment, second,
a change in time spent in UI. The change in contribution due to change in regular
employment is close to zero. This is because the impact on age of exiting regular
employment has a magnitude close to zero (Table A2 ). The change in contribution
due to change in time spend in UI is e8 multiplied by pension contribution rate 18%.
The third part of the behavioral cost is approximately equal to e1.5. The last part
is the decrease in revenue due to decline in taxation. This part of behavior cost is
close to zero. It again is because the impact on age exit regular employment has a
magnitude close to zero. To sum up, the total behavioral cost for one additional euro
of pension benefit per month is around e70 per worker.
The resulting BC / MC under the assumption made above is approximately 0.3.
It implies that in order to increase the lifetime income of the low-income pensioners
by 1 euro, 1.3 euros have to be raised by the government, either via taxes or pension
contribution.22 Compared to the BC / MC ratios of other anti-poverty programs such
as unemployment benefits and income tax credit, the BC / MC ratio of providing
additional pension benefit to low income workers is smaller. For instance, Schmieder
22 If we only take the fiscal cost on the public pension system, then BC is e62, MC is e240, the
BC/MC ratio is 0.26.
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and von Wachter [2017] report an average BC/MC ratio of UI benefit extensions of
1.35.23 Saez et al. [2012] also define the a term in the same spirit as the BC/MC
ratio - "marginal efficiency cost of funds" 24. Saez et al. [2012] report an average
BC/MC ratio of raising top tax rate of 0.76. Using the formula in Saez et al. [2012]
and Saez [2001], I calculated the BC / MC ratio of a tax cut for low income workers
using an elasticity estimate of 0.5 (Eissa and Hoynes [2006]).25 The BC/MC ratio of
a tax cut for low-income workers is approximately 0.75. The BC / MC ratio suggests
that compared to other anti-poverty programs that aim to redistribute income to
workers in danger of old age poverty, the pension subsidy program has a relatively
small disincentive effect.
While the BC / MC ratio expresses the fiscal costs of increasing pension bene-
fits, it is difficult to provide the welfare implication of the pension subsidy program.
The social value of increasing pension benefit by e1 depends on the gap between the
marginal utility of subsidy recipients relative to the marginal utility of other pension
contributors. Evaluating the social value is beyond the scope of this paper. Addi-
tional lifetime income can change the marginal utility from many perspectives. One
potential positive impact of additional lifetime income, for example, is the increase
in life expectancy. Snyder and Evans [2006] use an exogenous cut in Social Security
benefits in the US for the notch cohorts to identify the causal impacts of income on
23This is obtained under the assumption that nonemployment affects the social planner’s budget
by both income tax and UI payroll tax. If only the UI payroll tax is considered, BC/MC ratio of UI
benefit extensions is on average around 0.35.
24 The "marginal efficiency cost of funds" is expressed as 1− BCBC+MC
25Consider a small tax cut dτ > 0 for income below z∗, the mechanical decrease in tax revenue is
(z∗−z)dτ , and the behavioral responses is increase in tax revenue. BC = τ1−τ ∗ ∗z ∗dτ . Therefore,
the BC/MC ratio is τ1−τ ∗ ∗ zz∗−z . In Germany, the first e677 earned each month by a single worker
is tax-free. Afterwards, the income tax increases from 14 % to 42 % incrementally. Let’s assume z∗
to be e1200 per month, and mean income of workers earn less than e1200 per month and above
e677 per month is e900. The tax rate for low-income workers before a tax cut τ is assumed to be
20%. Plugging those numbers and the estimated labor supply elasticity in Eissa and Hoynes [2006]
(0.5), we obtain the BC/MC ratio of a tax cut for low-income workers to be 0.75
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mortality. They have found the notch cohort, who faced approximately $50 cut in
pension per month, have a statistically significant 2% higher mortality. Additionally,
in Germany, long-term health care is a part of the pension entitlement; claiming pen-
sion earlier could improve the longevity of workers who frequently experience health
shocks (Coile [2004b]). Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that the subsidy
recipients of this program might have a longer and healthier life after retirement due
to additional pension income.
1.8 Conclusion
Facing population aging and financial challenges from the public pension system,
many governments have reformed their public pension schemes to encourage longer
working life. Those pension reforms, however, typically affect low-income workers
disproportionately and widen pension income gap. As the issue of old age poverty
surfaces, policymakers start to consider income support programs for the lowest wage
earners to ensure adequate income in old age. This paper provides a clear and trans-
parent setting to study the effect of additional pension benefits for low wage female
workers. I explore a specific feature of the German pension system, which allows
me to identify the effect of additional pension benefits on retirement decisions in an
environment in which the statutory pension eligibility age is unchanged.
Using administrative pension insurance records from Germany, I investigate the
impact of the impact of a pension subsidy program for low pay workers, implemented
in 1992, on retirement decisions of the female recipients. I exploit the very sharp
kink in the schedule of benefits to implement a regression kink design. I found that
a e100 increase of monthly pension benefit induces workers to retire earlier by about
10 months and the hazard rate to claim a pension at age 60 increases by 17%. The
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impact on age of exiting employment have the similar magnitude but is noisier. The
hazard rate to exit employment at age 60 increases by 14%. Additionally, conditional
on participation in regular employment at time t-1, e100 additional monthly pension
benefits increases the probability to transition from jobs to unemployment insurance
by 0.84%. And it increases the conditional probability to transition from unemploy-
ment to non-activities between age 50 to 59 by 0.25%. Moreover, I look at months
spent in marginal jobs after exiting regular jobs until claiming a pension. A e100
increase of pension benefit per month reduces the time spent in marginal jobs by
about 4 months. The main policy implication of this paper is that while an income
transfer to pension benefit to low-income workers induces early pension claim, it has
little impacts on the probability to exit regular jobs, which have mandatory social
security contribution obligations. Therefore, this pension subsidy program I study
in this paper has little impacts on contributions to the public pension system. A
back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests the ratio of behavioral cost to mechanical
cost of this subsidy program is 0.3, which is smaller than other anti-poverty programs
such as extending unemployment benefits and progressive taxation.
Although the findings of this paper are relevant to understanding the impact
of pension benefits on retirement timing, the policy solutions to old age poverty
require more studies. As this pension subsidy for low workers phases out, will the
potential recipients be better off or worse off under the new parental pension credits
policy? Could the existing means-tested basic income program independent of age
be a sufficient safety net for low-income workers? Those questions are beyond the
scope of this paper. Additionally, it would be interesting to investigate the impact
of additional pension benefits on the mortality rate or the private saving patterns.
However, the data set does not allow me to explore the consequences regarding those
outcomes. Nonetheless, the causal estimates in this paper will help policymakers to
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evaluate recommendations aiming at alleviating old age poverty.
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Figure 1·1: Subsidy Size as a Function of Average Monthly Earning
Points before 1992
Slope at the Left: 10 
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Notes: Figure 1 plots the subsidy size for recipients who have contributed for 20
years before 1992. The subsidy size is measured in earnings points. The average
year worked before 1992 of the baseline sample years is 20 years. The theoretical
slope of total subsidy measured changes from 10 to -20.
Source: Author’s own construction according to SGB VI § 262
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Figure 1·2: First Stage: Observed Subsidy Schedule
Slope at the Left: 1.950 (0.150) 
Slope at the Right: -3.674 (0.116)
Change in Slopes: -5.624 (0.241)
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Notes: Figure 2 plots the observed subsidy size for the recipients. It shows that the
relationship between aep92 and subsidy size is consistent with the policy schedule
in Equation 1. The monthly subsidy is measured in 100 euros. The reduced form
regression without controls reports an estimated change in slopes of subsidy around
the kink of -5.6. The corresponding slope change when subsidy is measured in
earnings points is -19.9, from 6.9 to -12.9.
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Figure 1·3: Illustration of lifetime budget constrain
Notes: Figure 3 plots the lifetime budget constraint. The black solid line is the
lifetime budget constraint of workers who are not subsidy recipients. The blue
dashed line is that of recipients. Here I make the assumption that if workers exit
employment before age 60, they will claim a pension immediately when they are 60.
Source: Author’s own construction
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Figure 1·4: Density around the Kink
McCrary Tests:
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Slope at the Right: -461 (5.4)
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Notes: Figure 4 shows the density bin plot of aep92 in 0.05125 (∼ 40 ein 2010) bins
as a function of distance to the observed kink point.
41
Figure 1·5: Predetermined Covariates around the Kink
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Notes: Figure 5 shows the scatter bin plots of aep92 in 0.05125 (∼ 40 ein 2010)
bins as a function of distance to the observed kink point for the predetermined
covariates. These distributions are smooth around the kink. Table 2 has listed the
p-values for changes in slopes of covariates around the kink.
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Figure 1·6: Scatter Plots of Age of Claiming Pension around the
Kink
Slope at the Left:  -4.595 (0.798) 
Slope at the Right: 0.149 (0.629)
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(a) Bin plots: Age of claiming pension
Slope at the Left:  0.855 (0.160) 
Slope at the Right: -0.0458 (0.133)
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(b) Bin plots: hazard to claim pension at age 60
Notes: Figure 6 shows the scatter bin plots of aep92 in 0.05125 (∼ 40 ein 2010)
bins as a function of distance to the observed kink point for the main outcome
variables: age of claiming a pension and the hazard rate to claim a pension at age
60. The black solid lines are the linear fitted lines. The reduced-form regression
results without any controls are reported in the figure.
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Figure 1·7: Scatter Plots of Age of Exiting Employment around the
Kink
Slope at the Left:  -5.613 (2.366) 
Slope at the Right: -1.263 (1.798)
Change in Slopes:  4.349 (3.679)
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(a) Bin plots: age of exiting employment
Slope at the Left: 0.626 (0.203) 
Slope at the Right: -0.0149 (0.177)
Change in Slopes:  -0.641 (0.336)
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(b) Bin plots: hazard to exit employment at age 60
Notes: Figure 7 shows the scatter bin plots of aep92 in 0.05125 (∼ 40 ein 2010)
bins as a function of distance to the observed kink point for the main outcome
variables: age of exiting employment and the hazard rate to exit employment at
age 60. The black solid lines are the linear fitted lines. The reduced-form regression
results without any controls are reported in the figure.
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Figure 1·8: Hazard analysis from Age 50 to age 65
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
Ch
an
ge
 o
f H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 (%
)
50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
Age
(a) Change of hazard to claim pension with 100 euro pension
subsidies
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(b) Change of hazard to exit employment with 100 euro pen-
sion subsidies
Notes: Figure 8 shows the estimated percentage change of hazard rate to claim a
pension and the estimated change of hazard rate to exit employment at ages from
50 to 65 when there is an increase of pension benefit by e100 per month.
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Figure 1·9: Survive analysis from Age 50 to age 65
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(a) Change in survirval rate in terms of age of claiming pension
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(b) Change in survirval rate in terms of age of exiting employment
Notes: Figure 9 shows the estimated percentage change of hazard rate to claim a
pension and the estimated change of hazard rate to exit employment at ages from
50 to 65 when there is an increase of pension benefit by e100 per month.
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Figure 1·10: RKD estimates by bandwidth
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(a) Retirement age
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(b) Hazard to claim pension at age 60
Notes: Figure 10 shows the point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals (on
the y-axis) for the impact of a e100 increase in monthly pension benefits on age
claiming pension and hazard rate to claim a pension at age 60. The estimations
are obtained using linear specifications with controls and cohort fixed effect. The
four red vertical dash-dot lines correspond to four different bandwidth selections:
the Imbens and Kalyanaraman [2012] bandwidth for fuzzy RKD ( Fuzzy IK ),
the bias-corrected estimates per Calonico et al. [2014] (Fuzzy CCT), the "rule-of-
thumb" bandwidth based on Fan et al. [1996] (FG), and the one used in the baseline
analysis. Those four bandwidths are 0.114, 0.102, 0.28 and 0.2, respectively. They
correspond to 260, 295, 517, 647 euros per month. The number of observations is
shown by the blue dotted line. The figures suggest that the point estimator becomes
robust to bandwidth selection when the number of observation exceeds 3000.
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Figure 1·11: Scatter Plots of Bridge Activities around the Kink
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(a) Bin plots: months in marginal employment
Slope at the Left: 17.53 (9.872) 
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(b) Bin plots: months in unemployment
Notes: Figure 11 shows the scatter bin plots of aep92 in 0.05125 (∼ 40 ein 2010)
bins as a function of distance to the observed kink point for the outcome variables:
months spent in marginal employment and months spent in unemployment during
the bridge years. The black solid lines are the linear fitted lines. The reduced-form
regression results without any controls are reported in the figure.
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Figure 1·12: Policy Implications
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(a) Change of pension claiming age by cohort
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(b) Change of pension claiming age by year
Notes: Figure 12 shows the counter-factual retirement age for female workers if
subsidy size remained at the same level as the 1935 cohort and in 1996, respec-
tively. The average subsidy size is calculated by the author using VSKT data. The
pension claim ages for female workers in West Germany by cohort and by year are
obtained from the report "Rentenversicherung in Zeitreihen (Pension insurance in
time series)"
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Baseline sample Around kink
Variables Mean s.d. N Mean s.d. N
Subsidy related characteristics
Subsidy in EP 3.19 1.77 5218 3.84 1.92 1720
Subsidy in Euro/Month 90.29 50.31 4994 108.74 54.26 1643
Subsidy Share 17% 1% 5218 20% 1% 1720
Years worked before 92 19.74 6.65 5218 19.43 6.46 1720
Mean annual EP 0.55 0.11 5218 0.53 0.08 1720
Mean annual EP pre92 0.47 0.1 5218 0.45 0.03 1720
Mean wage pre92 1228 255 5218 1169 75 1720
Wage before pension claim 899 768 4416 872 723 1456
Mean wage 1 year before 1350 543 4787 1302 496 1580
last regular employment
Pension related characteristics
Total Pension benefits 673 189 4994 665 179 1643
Total EP 24.11 6.75 5218 23.83 6.41 1720
EP from contribution periods 16.58 5.24 5218 15.76 4.35 1720
EP from contribution periods pre92 9.58 4.22 5218 8.80 3.03 1720
EP from consideration periods 20.91 5.74 5218 20.73 5.32 1720
Pension years 41.64 3.8 5218 41.64 3.82 1720
Contribution years 32.4 6.44 5218 32.09 6.26 1720
Consideration years 6.28 4.53 5218 6.57 4.36 1720
Yrs of full-value contribution 30.34 7.42 5218 30.12 7.3 1720
Yrs of full-value contribution pre92 19.43 6.46 5218 19.08 6.37 17207
Outcome variables
Age of claiming pension 61.57 2.33 4994 61.47 2.29 1643
p60 0.38 0.48 5218 0.40 0.49 1720
p63 0.06 0.23 5218 0.06 0.24 1720
p65 0.19 0.39 3886 0.18 0.38 1259
Age of exiting regular employment 56.83 7.45 5218 56.71 7.58 1720
Age of exiting employment 56.83 7.45 5218 56.71 7.58 1720
Individual characteristics
Number of kids 2.03 1.08 5218 2.1 0.99 1720
Age of first employment 19.18 5.51 5218 19.25 5.57 1720
Age of first birth 22.95 3.72 4912 22.83 3.61 1720
Birth Cohort 1943 3.75 5218 1943 3.74 1720
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Table 1.2: Changes in Slopes of Covariates around the Kink
Covariates Coeffi. s.d. p-values mean at kink s.d.
Fixed Characteristics
Number of kids -0.551 (0.470) 0.241 2.00 (1.06)
Age when having 1st child -0.450 1.712 0.793 22.90 (3.73)
Age of first employment 4.990 2.570 0.052 19.03 (5.37)
Years of consideration periods -0.803 (2.008) 0.689 6.21 (4.51)
Durations of SES before 1992
Months of UI 1.493 (1.724) 0.387 1.311 (4.027)
Months of UA 10.39 (6.176) 0.093 5.726 (13.68))
Months of Childcare -4.097 (28.03) 0.884 94.62 (62.99)
Months of Sickness -0.375 (2.131) 0.860 1.849 (4.686)
As a share of total years before 1992
Share on Employment -0.140 (0.076) 0.065 0.590 (0.187)
Share on UI 0.004 (0.005) 0.401 0.003 (0.010)
Share on UA 0.028 (0.016) 0.083 0.015 (0.035)
Share on Childcare 0.0127 (0.073) 0.861 0.242 (-0.164)
Share on Sickness -0.002 (0.005) 0.745 0.005 (0.011)
Characteristics before age 50
Months of UI 3.339 (3.906) 0.393 3.102 (8.481)
Months of UA 7.507 (5.975) 0.209 5.456 (13.46)
Months of Childcare -3.775 (28.16) 0.893 95.05 (63.22)
Months of Sickness 0.177 (2.429) 0.942 2.269 (5.333)
Table 1.3: Impacts of pension subsidies on pension claiming age
Pension claiming age Hazard rate at 60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First-stage
∆ dB
dr
(1) -5.6240∗∗∗ -5.6296∗∗∗ -5.3798∗∗∗ -5.6240∗∗∗ -5.6296∗∗∗ -5.3798∗∗∗
(0.2940) (0.2808) (0.1993) (0.2940) (0.2808) (0.1993)
Reduce-Form
∆ dY
dr
(2) 4.7437∗∗∗ 5.0352∗∗∗ 4.6032∗∗∗ -0.9004∗∗∗ -0.9833∗∗∗ -0.9202∗∗∗
(1.3559) (1.3287) (1.3416) (0.3158) (0.3053) (0.3104)
RKD estimator
dY
dB
(2)
(1)
-0.8435∗∗∗ -0.8944∗∗∗ -0.8556∗∗∗ 0.1601∗∗∗ 0.1747∗∗∗ 0.1710 ∗∗∗
(0.2361) (0.2323) (0.2436) (0.0548) (0.0533) (0.0567)
Means at the kink
Subsidy size 108.74 108.74 108.74 108.74 108.74 108.74
Outcome variable 61.47 61.47 61.47 0.42 0.42 0.42
Sample means
Subsidy size 90.29 90.29 90.29 90.29 90.29 90.29
Outcome variable 61.57 61.57 61.57 0.39 0.39 0.39
Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Cohort Fixed Effect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 4994 4994 4703 5218 5218 4912
R2 0.0092 0.0363 0.0569 0.0071 0.0696 0.0958
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Subsidies are measured in
e100. The results are from local linear regressions with a bandwidth of 0.2 EP around the kink for
the baseline specification. The standard error for RKD estimator is obtained from delta method.
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Table 1.4: Impacts of pension subsidies on employment exiting age
Employment exiting age Hazard to exit at 60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First-stage
∆dB
dr
(1) -5.6240∗∗∗ -5.6296∗∗∗ -5.3798∗∗∗ -5.6240∗∗∗ -5.6296∗∗∗ -5.3798∗∗∗
(0.2940) (0.2808) (0.1993) (0.2940) (0.2808) (0.1993)
Reduce-Form
∆dY
dr
(2) 4.3494 4.2372 4.8460 -0.6410 -0.7022∗ -0.7679∗
(4.4284) (4.4111) (4.1229) (0.4095) (0.3894) (0.3880)
RKD estimator
dY
dB
(2)
(1)
-0.7734 0.7527 -0.9001 0.1139 0.1247 0.1427∗
(0.7928) (0.7894) (0.7718) (0.0719) (0.0686) (0.0717)
Means at the kink
Subsidy size 108.74 108.74 108.74 108.74 108.74 108.74
Outcome variable 57.53 57.53 57.53 34.83% 34.83% 34.83%
Sample means
Subsidy size 90.29 90.29 90.29 90.29 90.29 90.29
Outcome variable 57.75 57.75 57.75 32.03% 32.03% 32.03%
Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Cohort Fixed Effect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 5218 5218 4912 5218 5218 4912
R2 0.0023 0.0120 0.1183 0.0046 0.1284 0.1558
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.Subsidies are measured in e100. The results
are from local linear regressions with a bandwidth of 0.2 EP around the kink for the baseline specification. The
standard error for RKD estimator is obtained from delta method.
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Table 1.5: Effect on transition from regular employment and unemployment
Status at t Regular Marginal Unemployment Others
Employment Employment Activities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conditional on participation in regular employment at t-1
RKD estimator
dY
dB
-0.0061 -0.0002 0.0084† -0.0020
(0.0086) (0.0002) (0.0046) (0.0069)
Sample means 0.966 0.0002 0.014 0.019
Observations 473,287
Individuals 5,527
Conditional on participation in unemployment at t-1
RKD estimator
dY
dB
0.0120 0.0011 -0.0158 0.0025∗
(0.0127) (0.0024) (0.0150) (0.0011)
Sample means 0.030 0.0029 0.948 0.0008
Observations 86,765
Individuals 2,622
Conditional on participation in marginal employment at t-1
RKD estimator
dY
dB
0.0006 -0.0051 - -0.0126
(0.008) (0.025) - (0.0235)
Sample means 0.007 0.965 - 0.0190
Observations 15,586
Individuals 556
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.10∗∗ p < 0.05. Subsidies are measured in e100. The
results are from local linear regressions with a bandwidth of 0.2 EP around the kink for the
baseline specification. The standard error for RKD estimator is obtained from delta method.
The sample consists of female recipients from age 50 to 59 in West Germany.
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Table 1.6: Impacts on months spend in other activities between
last regular employment and pension claiming
RKD estimator Marginal Employment Unemployment
(1) (2)
dY
dB
-3.6100∗ 4.3650
(1.7785) (3.3544)
Controls Yes Yes
Cohort Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Observations 4912 4912
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Subsidies are measured in e100. The results are from local linear re-
gressions with a bandwidth of 0.2 EP around the kink for the baseline
specification. The standard error for RKD estimator is obtained from
delta method. Time spent in unemployment include months spent in
both UI and UA.
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Chapter 2
The Labor Supply Effects of Unemployment
Insurance for Older Workers
Coauthored with Johannes Schmieder (Boston University), Simon Trenkle (Insti-
tute For Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany), and Han Ye (Boston Univer-
sity)
2.1 Introduction
Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits are an important policy tool for help-
ing workers smooth their consumption after job-loss. A large literature has studied
the effects of UI extensions on labor supply using quasi experimental methods (see
Schmieder and Von Wachter [2016] for a review). This literature has typically found
that UI extensions have sizable effects on the non-employment duration of individuals
who become unemployed - the intensive margin, while not having an effect on the in-
flow rates into unemployment - the extensive margin. This can be most clearly seen in
papers based on regression discontinuity designs around age or experience thresholds,
where a standard validity check is to show that the density of inflows into UI does
not change at the threshold [Card et al., 2007a, Centeno and Novo, 2009, Schmieder
et al., 2012a, Lalive et al., 2015]. However, this literature is largely based on relatively
young workers in their 30s, 40s and early 50s, who are highly attached to the labor
force. Older workers, in their late 50s and onwards, are much closer to retirement
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and may use UI as a stepping stone into retirement. This may be reinforced by firms
that seek to reduce employment in response to a negative shock, by laying off or even
buying out workers with relatively high outside options, thanks to the possibility of
going into early retirement via an intermittent UI spell. Understanding the labor
supply behavior of older workers is particularly important given the common goal of
extending the work life of the elderly and reducing the burden on the social security
system.
In this paper, we study the labor supply effects of UI extensions for older workers
in Germany using social security data from 1975 to 2013. Numerous reforms to
Germany’s UI and retirement system over this period altered both the payoffs to
entering UI at different age thresholds and the search incentives of the unemployed.
Workers in their late 50s responded sharply to these policy changes. We observe
increases in inflows to UI at various age thresholds where maximum UI duration
eligibility increases, as well as sharp bunching of UI inflows at precisely the age that
allows workers to claim their pension immediately after UI expiration. UI inflows
respond as expected to a series of UI extensions and pension rule changes.
These extensive margin responses to UI policies are quantitatively meaningful.
The age at which workers can enter unemployment and subsequently receive a pension
without any uninsured period can be thought of as a kink in a lifetime budget set
relating income to exit age. We quantify the bunching in UI inflows at the bridge-
to-retirement kink under several different policy regimes. The bunching in inflows is
large and yields estimates of the elasticity of exit age with respect to the net return
to work that are comparable to other settings in which individuals choose when to
retire without having to go through UI [Brown, 2013]. Furthermore, we quantify the
intensive-margin effect of UI extensions at 12 different age cutoffs that discontinuously
extend UI for workers in their 40s and 50s using regression discontinuity designs. Our
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evidence suggests that the intensive margin effect is at least as large for workers
in their early and late 50s as it is for workers in their 40s. Using a simple, back
of the envelope calculation, we show that ignoring the extensive margin effect can
lead to significantly downward biased estimates of the non-employment effects of UI
extensions for workers in their 50s – possibly less than half of the true effect.
We emphasize that credible estimates of the total non-employment effect of UI
extensions for older workers cannot be simply derived from any combination of the
preceding bunching and regression discontinuity estimates without implausibly strong
assumptions. Instead, we argue that one needs to specify and fit a dynamic labor sup-
ply model that captures transitions between employment, unemployment with search,
and unemployment as retirement. Such a model is beyond the scope of this chapter,
which we conclude with a short discussion of our future plans to make progress on
this structural front.
Germany provides a particularly interesting context for studying UI extensions for
older workers, since there has been a tremendous amount of policy variation over the
past decades. In the early 1980s, the maximum potential benefit duration (PBD) of UI
was capped at 12 months regardless of age. Throughout the 1980s, maximum PBDs
increased dramatically for older workers, reaching up to 32 months of UI benefits for
the oldest group. Between 1999 and 2007, Germany reversed track. Maximum PBDs
were reduced for older workers and Germany began the process of eliminating early
retirement at age 60 following unemployment. This increase (and later decrease) in UI
generosity is matched by a sharp increase (decrease) in the unemployment rate among
older workers. Previous authors, such as Buchholz et al. [2013], have attributed this
to a variety of policy changes aimed at reducing the labor supply of older workers,
but these papers have not attempted to isolate the impact of UI.
While Germany provides many compelling advantages for studying the effects of
57
UI for workers it also offers a number of challenges. The main complication is that
in addition to UI there are a large number of other policies that changed over the
past decades and that may affect inflows into UI and unemployment durations. Some
of these changes are about regular and early retirement rules and are relatively easy
to understand, but there are also many rules based on collective labor agreements
(CLAs) that are on the sectoral level or even specific to individual firms. Such CLAs
may themselves take policy induced age discontinuities into account, for example by
encouraging workers to exit firms at those age thresholds with severance packages.
In this case one can view CLAs as a mechanism of how age discontinuities lead to
extensive margin responses. On the other hand, CLAs may also lead to bunching
at age thresholds that are not directly related to retirement or UI institutions. This
complicates our setting and we consider a variety of approaches to obtain meaningful
estimates in light of such confounding.
Our setting also raises interesting methodological issues. While several papers
have estimated regression discontinuity designs in the presence of manipulation of
the forcing variable [see for e.g. Card and Giuliano, 2014, Gerard et al., 2015, Barreca
et al., 2016, Hoxby and Bulman, 2016], this manipulation has typically been treated as
a nuisance, with researchers attempting to avoid bias using techniques like excluding
observations close to the threshold (donut-hole regressions). However, whether and
when to enter UI is itself an important outcome and in practice individuals (together
with firms) can influence this decision. When UI is used as a pathway to retirement,
it essentially constitutes a labor supply decision in the face of a budget set defined by
wage rates, the UI system and retirement rules. The UI system create kinks in this
budget set and individuals choosing to enter UI as a step towards retirement should
bunch at these kink points. We could thus use bunching techniques to back out labor
supply elasticities for these workers, based on the amount of bunching around such
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kinks [Saez, 2010, Kleven, 2016].1
While bunching can help recover extensive margin decisions, it complicates iden-
tification of intensive margin effects. Ideally, we would use the discrete changes in po-
tential benefit duration at the age thresholds to estimate intensive margin responses.
Yet, extensive margin responses at or around these thresholds lead to direct violation
of the RD assumption that there is no manipulation of the running variable and indi-
viduals on both sides of the cutoff are therefore comparable. We use three approaches
to circumvent this challenge and obtain plausible estimates of intensive margin re-
sponses: First, we use donut-hole regressions to exclude the range where most of the
bunching occurs. This is most credible when the bunching is not too extreme and
there does not appear to be an overall shift in the density outside of a sharp window
around the threshold. Second, we include a series of individual level controls to help
absorb selection effects. Third, we estimate intensive margin responses at slightly
younger age thresholds, where bunching is less of an issue, in particular a threshold
at age 54 during the 1990s.2
Our paper is related to a large literature on retirement decisions. Several method-
ologically related papers have analyzed bunching in retirement age to derive labor
supply elasticities, for example Brown [2013] looks at bunching at the regular retire-
ment age for teachers and Manoli and Weber [2014] analyze permanent exits from
the labor force around tenure thresholds in Austria that lead to discrete increases in
severance payments. Unlike these papers we look specifically at entry into UI, rather
1Note that not all bunching around UI age discontinuities is necessarily related to early retirement.
It may also be that firms postpone lay-offs or workers postpone claiming UI benefits until they reach
the threshold. This is likely to be most important at ages further away from the retirement age,
such as the age threshold at age 54 in the 1990s and the threshold at age 55 in the 2000s.
2We can also estimate intensive margin responses on a sample of individuals who later return
to the labor market, which likely obtains a lower bound of the intensive margin response for these
workers. Finally, we can follow the approach in Gerard et al. [2015], who explicitly provide a
framework to estimate bounds in RD settings in the presence of sorting.
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than exits from the labor force.
A handful of papers examine the effects of UI extensions on older workers [for ex-
ample Kyyrä and Ollikainen, 2008, Bennmarker et al., 2013]. Riphahn and Schrader
[2017] and Dlugosz et al. [2014] show that the shortened UI benefits for older German
workers following a 2006 reform increased employment. A small literature explicitly
examines interactions of the UI system with retirement decisions. For example, Lalive
[2008a] analyzes the effect of UI extensions for older workers around a discontinuity
at age 50 in the Austrian UI system as well as at a border discontinuity and finds
relatively large disincentive effects, especially for women. He also shows that women
seem to respond on the extensive margin to the change in UI generosity. Using par-
tially the same variation as Lalive, Inderbitzin et al. [2016a] show that much of this
was due to early retirement responses. Kyyrä and Pesola [2017] show that postponing
eligibility by two years for a retirement-via-UI pathway in Finland increases employ-
ment by 7 months. Similarly, Kyyrä and Wilke [2007] show that increasing the age
threshold of early retirement via UI benefits from 53 to 57 in Finland significantly
reduced unemployment durations. Hairault et al. [2010] provide some evidence based
on French survey data, that job search behavior of the unemployed depends on the
distance to retirement age.3 Several papers analyze the interaction between various
retirement rules and labor supply in Germany [see Giesecke and Kind, 2013, Boersch-
Supan et al., 2004, Boersch-Supan and Hendrik, 2011, among others]. We focus on
quantifying the overall effect of UI extensions on labor supply for older workers, ac-
counting for both extensive and, the well documented [Card et al., 2007a, Schmieder
et al., 2012a], intensive margin behavior.4
3Coile and Levine [2007] find that UI generosity has little impact on retirement in the U.S.
4While our focus is to quantify the overall effect of UI extensions rather than discussing optimal
policy, our analysis can be viewed as an important input into welfare computations. For papers on
the optimal design of UI for older workers see, for example: Hairault et al. [2012], Michelacci and
Ruffo [2015], and Inderbitzin et al. [2016a].
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Finally, our work suggests that German firms play a role in regulating how worker
inflows into UI respond to UI extensions. Jaeger et al. [2017] study job destruction
following improvement in workers’ outside options using variation in UI benefits in
Austria, finding that low surplus jobs are destroyed. A few studies have estimated the
sensitivity of layoffs of older workers to monetary incentives with some finding little
sensitivity [Behaghel et al., 2008, Johnston, 2017], but not others [Schnalzenberger
and Winter-Ebmer, 2009].
This paper proceeds in four steps. We first provide a very general decomposition
of the effect of UI extensions on time out of work in the presence of intensive and
extensive margin labor supply responses, which highlights the importance of imposing
additional structure to fully estimate these responses. In Section 2.3, we present the
institutional background and describe the core features of the German unemployment
insurance and retirement institutions. In Section 2.4, we present graphical evidence
of bunching in UI inflows at the bridge-to-retirement kink and at the age cutoffs that
discontinuously increase PBDs. In Section 2.5 we present reduced form evidence of
both intensive and extensive margin responses. To do so, we estimate RDs at all
the older age cutoffs available to us, using various approaches to handle sorting at
these cutoffs. We also estimate bunching masses and age-of-exit elasticities at all
kinks in the budget set for older workers entering UI, as if every worker were indeed
choosing their exit age strategically. Under strong assumptions, we perform a back
of the envelope calculation showing that ignoring the extensive margin effects of UI
extensions on workers aged 50-60 produces downward biased estimates of the non-
employment effect of UI extensions. Section 2.6 concludes by offering a path forward
towards more credible estimates that properly account for the document extensive
margin effect of UI extensions.
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2.2 The Effect of UI Extensions on Total Time out of Work
To fix ideas and terminology, we present a simple framework that describes how
potential UI benefit duration affects time out of work in the presence of extensive
margin responses. There is a mass of workers N , who enter the workforce at age
1 and reach a mandatory retirement age at TR. Let potential UI duration be P .
In practice this can be a function of the age of entry into UI, but for simplicity of
exposition we take P to be constant. In each period t (meaning at each age), a worker
is either working or not working. We do not distinguish between unemployment and
non-employment and use the terms interchangeably. The fraction of workers entering
unemployment at age t is denoted as gt(P ). If an individual becomes unemployed, the
duration of non-employment is defined as the time between entering unemployment
and either starting a job again or when the individual retires. We denote the expected
non-employment duration of individuals becoming unemployed at age t as Dt(P ).
The expected total time out of work (T u) for an individual is given by T u(P ) =∑TR
t=1 gt(P )Dt(P ).
Without specifying micro-foundations of this labor market, we can write the rela-
tionship between inflows and durations on benefit durations as reduced form functions
and decompose the effects of an increase in potential benefit into intensive and ex-
tensive margin components. A change in P can thus be decomposed into:
dT u
dP
=
TR∑
t=1
gt
∂Dt
∂P︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive Margin
+
TR∑
t=1
Dt
∂gt
∂P︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive Margin
(2.1)
The first term represents the standard intensive margin effect of UI extensions on
non-employment durations that most of the UI literature has estimated. The second
term represents the changes in inflows into unemployment.
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The central question of this paper is how to credibly estimate this total effect for
older workers. This is challenging to estimate using purely reduced form techniques.
Note that ∂gt
∂P
is never likely to be 0. In practice, if P increases D, employment falls,
changing the pool of people at risk of becoming unemployment. Hence, future gt
might decrease, violating ∂gt
∂P
= 0 for some t.
It is instructive to consider two simple cases. Let us assume that such effects on
the pool of at-risk people are negligible and that we are focused on younger workers.
Schmieder et al. [2012a] show that younger workers do not significantly alter their
entry probabilities into UI in response to changes in P . In this case ∂gt
∂P
≈ 0. In such
cases dTu
dP
can be recovered from RD estimates of the intensive margin effect at age
cutoffs in P [as in Schmieder et al., 2012a].5
Now consider a case at the other extreme, with extensive but no intensive margin
effects. Suppose older workers only use UI as a bridge-to-retirement, and never be-
come unemployed except by their own choice. Once they exit they stay non-employed
until the age at which they can claim their pension (TR). So at each age, the expected
non-employment duration is fixed and not dependent on P : ∂Dt
∂P
= 0. However, sup-
pose that these workers time their exit date (into UI) and that this responds to P .
For example, suppose there is a mass N˜ of workers that time their entry to maximize
unemployment coverage before retirement by entering UI at age TR − P .6 Suppose
that the mass of entries at all ages is otherwise constant. Then an increase in P to
Pˆ would decrease total non-employment duration by DTR−P × N˜N at age TR − P and
5Note also that if one is interested in more complicated changes in potential benefit durations
(that is not just an increase at a single age level k), then it is still relatively straightforward to
estimate the intensive margin effect by aggregating estimates of ∂Dk∂Pk at different age levels.
6This could be the case if we think of workers as maximizing lifetime utility over consumption and
leisure subject to their budget constraints. Depending on institutional parameters, such a lifetime
budget constraint might exhibit a kink at the ‘bridge-to-retirement-via-UI’ age of TR − P , as we
will show is the case in Germany. Extending P moves this kink, and hence moves UI exit mass. If
this were the correct model, we could calibrate its key parameters using bunching techniques in a
manner similar to Brown [2013] and then simulate dT
u
dP .
63
increase non-employment duration by DTR−Pˆ × N˜N at age TR − Pˆ . The total non-
employment effect of the increase in P in this pure, extensive margin setting would
thus be given by dTu
dP
= (DTR−Pˆ −DTR−P ) N˜N = (Pˆ − P ) N˜N .
In practice, neither of these cases fully captures the complexity of reality. Older
workers are likely to still have strong intensive margin responses to changes in P , and
some older workers, even at later ages, will find themselves unemployed not by their
own choice. Note further, that a simple two type model (one representing each case
above) is problematic in its artificiality – in practice workers may choose to transition
between states as a function of P . We opt here to present reduced form evidence on
each margin and, in future work, to estimate a dynamic life cycle model by matching
it to these reduced-form generated moments.
2.3 Institutional Background and Data
2.3.1 Unemployment Insurance
The German unemployment insurance system provides income replacement to
eligible workers who lose their job. Prior to 1985, eligible workers were entitled to at
most 12 months of benefits. Replacement rates for UI were relatively stable over the
period of study (1980–2015) (67-68% for an individual with children and 63-60% for
an individual without children).7 Beginning in 1985, numerous reforms changed PBDs
in a manner that tied the maximum PBD to recipients’ exact age at the beginning of
their UI spell.8
7Individuals who exhausted UI benefits prior to 2005 and whose net liquid wealth fell below a
certain threshold were eligible for unemployment assistance (UA) benefits with an effective average
replacement rate of around 30%. In principle, replacement rates were between 50% and 57% but
lower in practice due to deductions like spousal income. See Schmieder et al. [2012a] for a discussion.
From 2005 on, UA was replaced by unemployment insurance benefits 2 (UIB II), a completely means
tested program. Both UA and UIB II are unlimited in duration.
8See Hunt [1995] and Fitzenberger and Wilke [2010] for an analysis and discussion of these
reforms.
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Reforms in 1985 and 1987 increased maximum PBDs for workers above age 42.
The most generous PBD – up to 32 months – became available to workers aged 54 and
above following the 1987 reform. Reforms in 1999 and 2006 gradually decreased the
generosity of the system. In 1999, age thresholds were increased, and then, beginning
2006, maximum PBD was reduced from 32 to 18 months for workers above age 55,
while everyone else could only receive 12 months. There was a modest reversal of this
trend in 2008 when workers above 58 could attain a maximum PBD of 24 months.
Figure 2·1 plots maximum PBD by age for older workers in each different institu-
tional regime.9 Appendix Table B.1 provides details about each reform. These policy
changes provide highly useful empirical variation, both at the age thresholds, and
by changing incentives on when to enter unemployment if using unemployment as a
bridge-to-retirement, as we elaborate on in the next section.
2.3.2 Pension System and Early Retirement Via Unemployment
Germany has a generous pay-as-you-go public pension insurance with high ef-
fective replacement rates. Participation is mandatory, with the exception of civil
servants and the self-employed, which are not covered by our data. Pension benefits
depend on workers’ earnings, years of contributions, an adjustment factor, and the
type of pension claimed. Benefits are roughly proportional to lifetime income at an
average replacement rate of 50% [Deutsche Rentenversicherung, 2016].
The statutory retirement age (SRA) for a regular old age pension remained at 65
throughout our sample period, with the only prerequisite being 5 years of contribu-
tions. Several alternate pathways made receiving a pension before 65 an option. The
five main pathways to retirement were regular old-age pensions, old-age pensions for
long-term insured, old-age pensions for women, old-age pensions due to unemploy-
9We omit the short 1985 regime in the interest of brevity and because it appears that some
individuals who entered UI in 1985 retroactively benefited from the UI extensions in later years.
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ment (and, later, part-time work) and old-age pensions for severely disabled persons
[see for e.g. Boersch-Supan and Wilke, 2005]. Appendix Table B.2 documents the
earliest possible retirement age for each of these pathways over the past 4 decades,
while Appendix Table B.3 documents all relevant reforms. We focus primarily on the
pathway into retirement via unemployment.10
The unemployment pathway (UI pathway) provided eligible workers with an op-
tion to retire at the age of 60. The eligibility requirements for this pathway were:
1) at least 15 years of contributions, at least 8 of which must have occurred in the
past 10 years, and 2) being unemployed for at least 1 year after the age of 58 and a
half. The generosity of UI benefits, combined with lenient job search requirements for
older workers, made old-age pensions due to unemployment attractive. Workers 58
and older could receive unemployment benefits without actively looking for a job or
other obligations.11 For the first 3 cohorts we will focus on, the unpenalized/normal
retirement age (NRA) as well as the earliest possible retirement age (ERA) via the
UI pathway was age 60. This means persons satisfying the requirements could retire
at 60 with no penalty other than the loss of additional years of pension contributions.
This system incentivizes workers considering early retirement to time their entry
it to UI around the age that allows workers to transition directly from UI to pension,
without any uncovered period. We note that entering UI voluntarily is highly feasible
in Germany and at most lightly penalized.12 Put differently, the possibility of using
UI as a bridge-to-retirement introduces a kink in a lifetime budget constraint relating
10While early retirement due to disability is also quantitatively important, Riphahn [1997] argues
that in practice they are not close substitutes and that retirement due to disability is in fact usually
associated with a health shock.
11This so-called “58er-Regelung” was formally introduced end of 1985 and in place until end of
2007.
12A worker may be sanctioned if he or she quits a job voluntarily. These sanctions take the form
of losing the first few weeks of benefits and vary from a 4-12 week penalty over the study period.
These sanctions, which are not always applied, are insufficient to offset the appeal of using UI as a
pathway into retirement.
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lifetime income to year of exit into UI. Individuals retiring before 60 − P , with P
being the maximum UI PBD, are forced to spend time reliant on a spouse or on
unemployment assistance (UA/UIB 2) before their pension, whereas individuals who
leave at or after 60 − P can take the full UI duration and transfer directly into
pensions. This reduces the value of an extra year of work after the kink, decreasing
the slope of the budget constraint. In general, the size of the kink is exacerbated by
the generosity of the UI system, the size of the drop comparing UI to UA/UIB 2, and
how generously time on UI is counted towards pension contributions.13 We will show
that UI entries react to this kink at age 60− P .
The NRA and ERA via the UI pathway remained at 60 until a 1992 reform.
Cohorts born between January 1937 and December 1941 saw their NRA increase in
steps by birth month from 60 to 65. While they could continue to retire at the ERA
of 60, they now faced an actuarial adjustment in the form of a 0.3% pension reduction
per each month they retired in advance of the NRA.
Cohorts born in or after 1946 saw their ERA for the UI-pathway increase in steps
by birth month from 60 to 63, ending with cohorts born in December 1948. This
meant that these cohorts could no longer claim their pensions at age 60, even with a
penalty. Cohorts born after 1952 (after our sample) saw this pathway into retirement
via UI entirely abolished.
Figure 2·2 plots the evolution of stylized lifetime budget constraints for select
cohorts experiencing different UI and pension regimes. Appendix ?? contains detailed
descriptions of how these budget sets are constructed. We assume workers earn a
constant after tax wage of e30,000 and live 80 years. For simplicity, we assume that
the max PBD is fixed over time for each cohort at the level that prevailed when they
13In practice, unemployment counts as an 80% contribution year calculated on pre-unemployment
wages.
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were close to the kink.14 In panels (a)-(c), representing the 1924, 1929, and 1935
cohort respectively, the the NRA and ERA for retirement via unemployment was age
60, but maximum PBD varied. In panel (d), representing the 1941 cohort, the ERA
remained at 60 but the un-penalized NRA was increased to around 64, with slight
variation by month of birth. This amounted to a financial penalty for retiring at age
60 of approximately 18% of gross lifetime pension benefits. In panel (e), representing
the 1949 cohort, the ERA was increased to 63 and the NRA was 65.15 The penalty
for retiring at age 63 via unemployment was 7.2%. In panel (f), representing the
1952 cohort, the pathway into retirement via unemployment was abolished, leaving
the earliest possible retirement age as 63 for long-term insured workers with over 35
years of qualified contributions. The un-penalized NRA for long-term insured is 65.5,
making the financial penalty for retiring at 63 9%.
Note further that the large, discontinuous increases in PBD at the various age cut-
offs in the PBD duration schedule (see Figure 2·1) could also induce selection into UI.
This could occur for both people who only plan to temporarily be on unemployment
and among people planning to retire.
Throughout the rest of this paper, we focus primarily on the first kink induced
by using UI as a bridge-to-retirement, but we also discuss the notches at the PBD
age cutoffs. In practice, agents might also use UI as a bridge to the long-term con-
tribution retirement age of 63 or the regular retirement age of 65.16 Since we cannot
credibly calculate whether or not a person is eligible for the long-term contribution
rate, examining bunching at these kinks is challenging. Note also, that changes in
other pathways may create alternative substitutes for workers aiming to retire early.
14The dashed line shows the realized lifetime budget set that takes into account all the UI policy-
induced changes and age cutoffs.
15Retiring at 63 via the long-term insured pathway is slightly more costly.
16Individuals cannot receive UI past 65, and cannot receive UI and pensions simultaneously.
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Appendix Table B.3 summarizes the reforms for all of the different pathways over our
study period.
2.3.3 Data
We use rich administrative data from the German Social Security system, assem-
bled by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) into the Integrated Employment
Biographies data file (IEB) [see also Card et al., 2013, Jäger, 2016, Schmieder et al.,
2012a]. This data contains information on all employment periods covered by social
security and on all periods of UI receipt between the years 1975 and 2013. The em-
ployment information covers approximately 80% of the regular workforce, with the
self-employed and civil servants being the most common exceptions. The data on UI
receipt stem from administrative UI records and contain information on the exact
duration of UI-receipt and the amount of daily benefits.
This version of the paper focuses on men, since early retirement rules differ for
men and women. Results for women are available upon request and yield a quali-
tatively similar picture. We select all male UI-entries between 1980 and 2010 who
qualify for their age-specific maximum PBD based on their working histories. This
leaves a five year window before the first year in the data (1975) and a three year
window after the last (2013), allowing us to calculate UI eligibility for all individuals
and unemployment durations for up to three years after UI entry. Since some of the
requirements for maximum PBD eligibility, such as the duration over which claims
could be accumulated, changed over the study period, the restrictions set on this du-
ration differ slightly over time. We summarize these restrictions in Appendix Table
B.4. Additionally, we exclude mining and steel construction from our analysis, since
both sectors are known to have specific early-retirement rules for at least some of the
periods. For other specific subgroups which face some, but less clear or pronounced
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early retirement rules we do not exclude cases a priori, but address them through-
out the analysis. For the selected individuals, we construct detailed biographical
information such as experience tenure or past exposure to unemployment.
2.4 Graphical Evidence
This Section documents the behavior of older individuals entering UI over three
decades. We present evidence of sizable extensive margin UI responses at the bridge-
to-retirement kink and show that UI inflows react to UI and retirement policy changes.
Specifically, we document spike in UI inflows at each bridge-to-retirement age: at 59
when the ERA was 60 and maximum PBD was 1, at 58 when maximum PBD was
extended to 2, and at age 57 and 4 months when maximum PBD was extended to 32
months. As the NRA increases this bunching is reduced, and eventually as the ERA
increases it dissipates. The next Section quantifies the bunching mass and estimates
regression discontinuities at each of the PBD age cutoffs to quantify responses on the
intensive margin.
We will also see evidence of clear bunching at various other thresholds, not all
of which corresponds to kinks or notches in our stylized budget sets. For example,
beginning with the 1929 cohort, we see bunching into UI entries at age 55. While
some of this could be round number bunching or bunching at reference points, much
of this is driven by specific collective labor agreements at the firm or sectoral level
that specified retirement packages and ages. Indeed, this type of bunching is almost
entirely absent in the years leading up to and including 1982, consistent with the tim-
ing of the first major CLAs specifying retirement ages (see Trampusch et al. [2010]).
Our sample drops the mining and steel sectors which have clearly defined CLAs, but
inevitably picks up other sectors and firms with CLAs. During Germany’s high un-
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employment years, many firms reduced employment through CLAs that bought out
older workers. Age 55, and to a lesser extent age 56, was a common cutoff used in
these CLAs. The importance of these CLAs fades throughout the late 90s and early
2000s. In robustness exercises, we consider alternate samples and ways to address any
confounding. Generally, the bunching at the kink into retirement exceeds bunching
at these alternative thresholds. Nevertheless, the data points to an active role for
firms, together with workers, in governing responses to UI extensions. Regardless of
the source, it will be clear that changes in UI durations generate extensive margin
responses that should be taken into account when designing policy.
Figure 2·3 shows the number of individuals entering UI by age for 6 select cohorts
in our sample, each chosen to represent a different institutional regime. We opt to
display these annual cohort-level graphs to keep retirement rules constant within-
figure. In practice the retirement rules vary by month of birth (see Appendix Table
B.3), but fixing year of birth is a good approximation and increases sample sizes.
When constructing cohort-by-cohort figures, the state of the economy is not fixed
at one point in time, so we also plot the prevailing unemployment rate at the time
for reference. Furthermore, since UI rules changed over time (and not by cohort) UI
entrants at different ages in the same cohort can have different PBDs (see Appendix
Table B.1).17 Graphs of UI entrants by calendar year offer different trade-offs but
ultimately yield a similar picture and are available upon request. Figures 2·4 and
2·5 complement Figure 2·3 by plotting mean UI benefit receipt duration and mean
non-employment duration (capped at 36 months) by age for each cohort. We now
17From the perspective of a single cohort, UI can change for two reasons. It can change at known
age cutoffs (represented by the dashed red lines in Figures 2·3 – 2·5), for example the 1941 cohort
would have turned 54 in 1995, amid a UI policy regime that had maximum PBD of 26 months for
workers entering UI below age 54 and 32 for workers above age 54. These age-cutoffs would be known
to the individual years before turning 54. Alternatively, UI can change for workers above a certain
age in a cohort due to a policy change in the future. These policy changes would not necessarily be
know the the individual in advance.
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discuss each cohort in turn.
Benchmark: 1924 Cohort. Figure 2·3 Panel (a) shows UI inflows for the 1924
cohort. Note that UI entries pre-age 59 track the official West German male un-
employment rate at the time (the dashed line).18 When this cohort was less than
61 years old, their PBD was 12 months.19 Cohorts born before 1937, including this
cohort, could retire early and without penalties at age 60 following a year of unem-
ployment insurance. Since the maximum PBD was 12 months for this cohort, the
‘bridge-to-retirement’ pathway, in which individuals will be covered by UI or pensions
without gaps, has individuals entering unemployment at age 59. This is indicated by
the red and blue shaded areas under the figure (see also Figure 2·2 panel (a)).
We observe clear bunching in UI entries at age 59, precisely the age at which in-
dividuals can transition into retirement immediately following UI expiration. There
is no comparable bunching elsewhere. Figure 2·4 panel (a) shows average UI benefit
duration for the individuals in Figure 2·3 Panel (a). The average UI benefit receipt of
11.8 months around age 59 is very close to the maximum PBD of 12 months, support-
ing the idea that entrants are predominantly using UI as a bridge-to-retirement. UI
durations increase at older ages, in step with the UI reforms in those years, and ex-
hibit declining patterns before the retirement age for the long-term insured at 63 and
the standard retirement age at 65. Figure 2·5 panel (a) plots average non-employment
duration (capped at 36 months) for the individuals in Figure 2·3 Panel (a). This peaks
at age 59, averaging 35.4 months, again supporting the idea that most entrants at
this age retire. Together, this is clear evidence of sizable, extensive margin responses
18We seasonally adjust reported UI rates using X-13 ARIMA - SEATS.
19On January 1 1985, UI was extended to 18 months. This means that when the person born on
Dec 31st 1924 turns 60 and a day, they would be eligible for 18 months of PBD. By age 61, everyone
in the 1924 cohort is eligible for 18 months of PBD. This ‘entire-cohort eligibility’ point is indicated
by the change in the lower, grey-shaded bars, which also show the later UI reforms.
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to UI policy. This view is reinforced below, where we examine UI entries for later
cohorts facing longer PBDs and hence kinks at different, earlier ages.
1929 Cohort. Figure 2·3 Panel (b) shows UI entries for the 1929 cohort. This cohort
faces the same potential retirement ages as the 1924 cohort, but has longer PBDs in
their late 50s. Specifically, those who enter UI at age 58 have 24 months maximum
PBD. This shifts the ‘bridge-to-retirement’ age to 58, and indeed, we see extensive
bunching at around age 58, while we continue to note some excess mass at 59.
This figure also clearly shows bunching in UI entries at other, non-kink points,
particularly at age 55 and 57. As discussed, these likely represent firm-specific collec-
tive bargaining agreements to release or buy out workers once they turn 55. This also
suggests that the bunching at the bridge-to-retirement age is driven by joint decisions
between firms and workers.
Panel (b) of Figures 2·4 and 2·5 show average UI benefit receipt and average
non-employment durations for this cohort. Figures 2·4 (b) reveals that average UI
duration at the kink is 23.0 months, very close to the full 24 around the 58 cutoff.
There are also clear spikes in UI durations at age 55 and 57, mirroring bunching in
UI entries at those ages. Figure 2·4 Panel (c) shows that average non-employment
duration at the bridge-to-retirement age reaches 34.3 months.
1935 Cohort. The 1935 cohort continues to face the same potential retirement ages
as the prior cohorts, but even more generous UI. Workers entering UI at or after age
54 had a maximum PBD of 32 months. Accordingly, Figure 2·3 Panel (c) shows that
UI entries exhibit strong bunching at precisely age 57 and 4 months, or 32 months
before the early retirement age of 60. We continues to see some excess bunching at
age 58 and 59, as well as some at 55 and 56. Panel (c) of Figures 2·4 and 2·5 confirm
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once again that people entering at the bridge-to-retirement age take UI for close to
the maximum duration (29.7 months) and have a 35.3 month average capped non-
employment duration. These figures also show discrete jumps at age 54 and 55 in
average UI duration and non-employment duration. The jump at age 54 is consistent
with the July 1987 reform that extended maximum PBD from 24 to 32 months (26
months) for workers above 54 (between 49 and 54). The jump at 55 in both figures
continues to reflect the fact that layoffs after age 55 differ in composition and likely
reflect firm-level CLAs.
1941 Cohort. This is the first cohort for which retirement rules change. The 1941
Cohort could still retire at age 60 following a year of unemployment, but a 1992
reform introduced actuarial adjustments for retirement before age 65. These were
introduced gradually by month and year of birth for cohorts born between January
1937 and December 1942, resulting in an approximate 18% penalty for anyone in the
1941 cohort retiring at 60. The maximum PBD remained at 32 months for workers
above age 54. Figure 2·3 Panel (d) reveals that we continue to see bunching at age 57
and 4 months, but it is now more muted relative to entries below this age. Moreover,
consistent with the larger penalties, we see in Figure 2·4 panel (d) that average UI
benefit duration no longer reaches 32 months at this bridge-to-retirement age, but
instead averages just 25.3 months. Similarly, average non-employment durations are
also lower, around 30.5 months, suggesting that some workers are returning to work
instead of retiring at the penalized ERA. Spikes at age 55 and 56 continue to be
visible in entries, UI receipt, and duration. Interestingly, this figure displays what
looks very much like a discrete jump in the level of UI entries after age 55.
Additionally, this cohort faced a stable PBD schedule in their 50s, with a known
age cutoff at 54 (for which maximum PBD jumped from 26 to 32 months). We see
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some bunching at this cutoff, which could arise from people expecting long unem-
ployment timing their entry into UI or from those considering very early transitions
to retirement. The sorting around this age cutoff poses a challenge to standard RD
estimates of the effects of PBD extensions on non-employment duration, as we discuss
further below.
1949 Cohort. The 1949 cohort faced both reduced PBD if retiring at later ages and
a stricter retirement law. Individuals born in 1949 could no longer retire early via
unemployment at 60, but instead could only draw pensions at age 63 at the earliest.
They had to wait until age 65 to draw pensions without actuarial adjustments (7.2%
for retiring at 63). Figure 2·3 Panel (e) shows some bunching at 61, consistent with
an early retirement age of 63 and the 2 years maximum allowable PBD, but it is not
extensive. Importantly, now that the bridge-to-retirement at 60 has been removed,
we now no longer see bunching between ages 57 and 59. We continue to see some
age-55 bunching. Panel (e) in Figures 2·4 and 2·5 shows that average UI durations at
the new bridge-to-retirement reach 13.7 months, well below 24, and non-employment
durations average 33.2 months.
1952 Cohort. This cohort is no longer allowed to retire early via unemployment,
although if they are eligible for the long term old age pension, they could retire at
age 63. Unfortunately, we run out of data past age 59 (as we need 3 years post-2010
to calculate non-employment durations). Nevertheless, the distribution of UI entries
continues to look relatively smooth. The 1952 cohort would have known about the
age 58 PBD cutoff extending maximum PBD from 18 months to 24 months starting
in 2008 (i.e. when they turn 56). As with the 1941 cohort at age 54, we see evidence
of sorting into UI to take advantage of this UI extension. We continue to see some
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bunching at age 55.
Overall, we observe clear bunching into UI at the bridge-to-retirement age. The
bunching mass responds to UI extensions. We have also seen evidence of sorting into
UI at earlier age cutoffs where PBDs are extended discontinuously, including age 54
and 58. Bunching at other points in the distribution related to CLAs, suggest that
firms play an important role. While we cannot easily identify the extent to which
responses come from workers or firms, it is clear that a full accounting of the effects of
UI extensions on non-employment need to take into account this extensive margin to
avoid downward bias. In the next section, we take a first pass at understanding the
potential magnitude of this bias by quantifying the bunching mass and by comparing
it to RD estimates of the intensive margin effect.
2.5 Quantifying Intensive and Extensive Margin Responses:
A Back of The Envelope Calculation
We have seen that PBD extensions alter inflows into in UI, which implies that the
total effect of PBD extensions on time out of employment for older workers cannot
be estimated solely from intensive-margin estimates (recall Equation 2.1). Yet, the
extent of any such bias remains unclear. In this section we quantify the bunching mass
at each kink and show that it is quantitatively meaningful. Next, we use Regression
Discontinuity Designs to estimate the intensive margin effects of PBD extensions for
older workers. We perform a simple, ‘back of the envelope’ calculation to show that
the bias from ignoring the extensive margin is likely severe. We discuss the drawbacks
and assumptions behind this calculation and how future work can improve upon this.
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2.5.1 Estimating Extensive Margin Responses using Bunching Estima-
tors
In this subsection, we estimate the amount of bunching at each retirement-via-
UI kink in Figure 2·3.20 The amount of bunching can be viewed as a reduced form
parameter, while converting it into a labor supply elasticity requires additional struc-
ture.
In order to estimate bunching mass at each kink we need to fit a counter-factual to
the data. We use two approaches. First, we use the polynomial approach suggested in
Chetty et al. [2011]. In this approach, we exclude a region around the kink and fit a
seventh degree polynomial to the data, including dummies for the excluded bins. The
normalized bunching mass is then given by the difference between the actual density
and the counter-factual distribution, divided by the average of the counter-factual
over this bunching region.21 Column (1) of Table 2.2 shows this normalized bunching
mass; the footnote lists the chosen excluded regions.22 As one would expect, the
normalized bunching mass is largest for the 1935 cohort and smallest for the 1949
cohort. Since this counter-factual approach relies heavily on the shape of the counter-
factual [Blomquist and Newey, 2017], we also use an alternative approach. For this
second approach, we take advantage of the fact that UI entries closely track the male
unemployment rate (UR).We scale the UR by the ratio of the mean number of UI
entries between age 49 and the kink to the mean UR in this area, and use this re-
scaled UR as a counter-factual. This approach yields a similar qualitative picture,
20There are 5 estimates because our data does not extend far enough yet to observe the kink for
the 1952 cohort.
21We choose to count the bunching mass as the mass between the cutoff and the right excluded
point. Including the imprecision on the left of the cutoff is also an option and would lead to larger
estimates.
22The exclusion region is chosen visually. For the first three cohorts we simply exclude a region
slightly to the left of the cutoff up to age 60. The most difficult and potentially arbitrary choice is
for the 1941 cohort, which displays a discrete jump in UI inflows at age 55. We opt to exclude all of
the region post-age 55, but only count entries post-age 57.33 in the bunching mass.
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but suggests less bunching for the 1929 cohort and significantly more in 1935 and
1941 cohorts (see Table 2.2 column (2)).
To get a sense of how these magnitudes compare to other contexts, we make the
strong assumption that all workers around this age behave as if they were following a
simple lifetime labor supply model, as in Brown [2013]. That is, we assume workers
choose their entry date strategically to maximize utility over lifetime consumption
and leisure subject to a lifetime budget set. As long as workers abilities are drawn
from a continuous distribution, the distribution of UI entries will be smooth. The
introduction of a kink in the budget set results in bunching at the kink point, and
the amount of bunching allows estimation of a labor supply elasticity, using by now
standard techniques [see e.g. Saez, 2010, Kleven, 2016]. We refer the reader to Ap-
pendix ?? for the details and to Appendix ?? for how we construct the budget set.
Under this model, the normalized bunching mass allows us to recover the elasticity
of exit age with respect to the net return to an extra year of work. These estimates
are contained in Table 2.2. The elasticity estimates for the first four cohorts range
from 0.026–0.069 (0.026–0.101 under the UR-counterfactual). While sensitive to the
exact specification of the counter-factual, these fall squarely in the range of Brown
[2013]’s estimates for Californian teachers timing their retirement as a function of
pension benefits.23 It is striking that we are seeing retirement-via-UI responses that
are comparable to standard retirement decisions that do not pass through UI. This
should be understood in context, and is likely a function of the lack of serious penal-
ties for entering voluntarily and the relatively low requirements whilst on UI as an
older worker.24
23Brown [2013]’s preferred estimate is 0.04. She examines the retirement behavior of Californian
teachers whose normal retirement age is 60 and whose average pension replacement rate is 59%.
24It also lines up with findings in other contexts, such as Kyyrä and Pesola [2017].
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2.5.2 Estimating Intensive Margin Responses using Regression Disconti-
nuity Estimators
In order to understand how these large bunching responses might bias our stan-
dard, intensive-margin estimates of the non-employment effects of UI extensions, it is
helpful to have estimates of the intensive-margin effect in this context. Fortunately,
the PBD step schedules shown in Figure 2·1 allow clean Regression Discontinuity
(RD) estimates of this effect [as in Schmieder et al., 2012a]. These estimates require
that there is no sorting into UI around the age cutoffs. This is satisfied at younger
ages, but not at the oldest ages.
Here we estimate RDs pooling all years under each UI regime, starting with the
1987-1999 period (see Appendix Table B.1).25 This gives us 12 age cutoffs at which we
can estimate the non-employment effect of UI extensions. In practice the age cutoffs
provide between an extra 3–6 months of PBD, and we will divide each estimate by the
number of months PBD was extended to get the marginal non-employment effects of
an extra month of PBD.
At each age cutoff we estimate the following RDD specification:
yi = δ 1(ai ≥ A) ∆PBD + f(ai) +Xiβ + εi (2.2)
yi is non-employment duration (capped at 36) for individual i, ai is the age at
time of UI entry (measured on the daily level) and 1(ai ≥ A) is an indicator function
which equals one when individuals age is above the age cutoff A where benefits are
extended discontinuously by ∆PBD months. In this specification, δ measures the
effect of a one month increase in PBD. The function f(ai) is set to be a linear function
with different slopes on each side of the cutoff in the baseline specification. Xi is a
25We omit the period 1986-1987 due to it being a short transition period. There is no first stage
in this period.
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vector of additional controls. We use a local polynomial regression with rectangular
kernel and cluster standard errors on the daily level. We set the bandwidth to two
years, but restrict it to one year on the right hand side for the 49 and 54 years cutoff
during the 1987-1999 period due to other discontinuities at 50 and 55.
This specification is well-identified for the age cutoffs where UI entries and other
pre-determined outcomes are smooth around the cutoff. This is case for all of the
younger ages [Schmieder et al., 2012a]. Sorting at the cutoff is a concern for some of
the older cutoffs (this can be seen, for example, at the age 54 cutoff in Figure 2·3 panel
(d)). The degree of sorting varies between cutoffs and is usually most pronounced
within the first 1 to 2 months around the cutoff. We apply an imperfect solution to
address this concern by excluding 2 months on each side of the cutoff – the donut
hole – in all our regressions. Second, we add detailed individual controls such as
education, tenure and other pre-unemployment characteristics to help address some
of this selection.26
The results of each RD estimation are depicted in Figure 2·6 and reported in
Table 2.1. The results at the cutoffs at or below age 50 are relatively insensitive to
the inclusion of controls and average 0.089 meaning an extra month of PBD results in
an extra 0.089 months – or about 3 days – of non-employment [as in Schmieder et al.,
2012a].27 We obtain a similar estimate, if slightly higher, at age 52 and 54. Results
for the oldest cutoffs are biased upwards by sorting. Given the sorting it is difficult
to draw strong conclusions, but the evidence suggests that the intensive-margin, non-
employment effect of UI extensions may increase slightly for workers in their mid-50s
relative to workers in their 40s. While these patterns alone are of interest, the policy
26We are also exploring using a method due to Gerard et al. [2015], that allows explicitly to apply
RDDs in situations where the running variable is manipulated.
27Note that there are differences in sample restrictions between this paper and that in that here
we restrict to men who tend to be less responsive to UI, omit some industries, and have different
pre-unemployment sample restrictions.
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relevance of these results is compounded by the presence of extensive margin effects.
2.5.3 Back of the Envelope Calculation
Estimating the total non-employment effect of UI on older workers requires ac-
counting for both the intensive and extensive margin. A credible estimate of this
effect needs to allow for individuals to transition between states of job search and
unemployment without search, as well as between entering and not entering UI, as a
function of PBDs. There is no simple way to credibly combine bunching and regres-
sion discontinuity estimates to arrive at this number. If one were to, for example,
specify a two-type model where one type always times their entry into retirement via
UI and the other type never does but can become unemployed randomly, one could
make progress. But the assumption that individuals can be so easily categorized is
unrealistic. Moreover, modeling this behavior purely from the individual perspective
is at odds with the evident role that firms play in both generating un-desired layoffs
and agreed-upon exits. A fully fledged dynamic model of labor supply, combined with
a role for firms, is well beyond the scope of this chapter. However, it is the subject
of ongoing work.
Here, we instead perform a simple calculation to highlight the importance of the
extensive margin under admittedly stark assumptions. Taking the 1935 cohort as a
baseline, we consider the effect of reducing maximum unemployment duration by 8
months from 32 months to 24 months for workers aged 50 to 60. We assume that
this would shift the entire bunching mass at the 57.33 kink rightward to age 58,
without otherwise affecting UI entries. This is somewhat consistent with the fact
that the bunching mass is relatively similar for the 1929 and 1935 cohorts (under the
polynomial counter-factual). We consider two scenarios for how the bunching mass
might respond to this change: in the first, we assume each individual belonging to
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the entire bunching mass from 57.33 to 60 delays entry by the full 8 months, in the
second we assume only individuals in the reduced bunching mass between 57.33 and
58 delay entry, and the rest do not move at all.28
We imagine that all non-bunchers (aged 50 to 60) are fired involuntarily and opt
to search for jobs. We ignore the idea that involuntary exits closer to the kink might
switch from searching to not-searching. We take the counter-factual polynomial esti-
mate to represent the number of people aged 50 to 60 who respond to this intensive
margin estimate. Further, we assume that, conditional on unemployment, all these
workers respond to a 1 month UI extension by increasing their non-employment du-
rations by 0.089, the average RD estimate for workers aged 40-50.
Under this set up, the intensive margin effect acting on workers aged 50 to 60 is
a reduction of 0.712 months of non-employment. The counter-factual accounts for
65% of workers, so the expected intensive margin effect is -0.463 months. The full
bunching mass accounts for 35% of workers, so the expected extensive margin effect is
-2.795 months. The more conservative bunching mass estimate (in which only those
between 57.33 and 58 respond to the change) accounts for 16% of workers, making the
expected extensive margin effect -1.277 months. The total effect of time out of work
on this 8 month reduction is thus -3.258, or using the conservative version, -1.740.
That is, the total non-employment effect is between 2.44 and 4.58 times as large in
magnitude as the pure intensive margin.
While a number of things would deflate this estimate – including using a larger
estimate of the true intensive-margin effect, using the 1929 counter-factual instead
of the 1935 one, and assuming that some bunchers respond by less than the full 8
28In practice the conservative approach yields a distribution closer to the actual 1929 distribution.
It nevertheless over-estimates bunching between 58 and 60. In addition, the 1935 counter-factual
under-estimates the mass of people in UI between 52 and 56 for the 1929 cohort. Together, this
means that we may be over-estimating the importance of the extensive-margin effect.
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months – it is clear that the extensive margin plays a non-negligible role.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we document the labor supply effects of UI benefit extensions for
workers approaching retirement age. We show that extensive margin responses, that
is UI-induced inflows into non-employment, play an important role, and operate in
addition to the standard intensive margin UI responses for younger workers that
much existing literature has focused on. The combination of intensive and extensive
margin responses, as well as voluntary and involuntary inflows into UI, complicates the
application of standard non-parameteric estimators such as RD designs and Bunching
estimators, but we argue the discontinuities, kinks, and notches induced by the UI
and retirement institutions can still be used to learn about labor supply responses.
Our evidence reveals sizable labor supply responses on both the intensive and
extensive margin. A naive, back of the envelope calculation suggests that using
standard, intensive-margin estimates of the non-employment effects PBD extensions
for workers aged 50 to 60 will severely underestimate the non-employment effects of
UI. However, such a calculation is also naively simplistic. We drew an unrealistic
distinction between types who bunch into UI for retirement and types who only
get fired involuntarily and search for a job no matter what. In practice this is too
simplistic for many reasons. We have no empirical way of identifying these two types
even if they did exist. Moreover, these types are unrealistically separate, with reality
surely being more fluid: individuals might voluntarily leave employment but not go
into retirement and instead look for a job, and individuals involuntarily fired at later
ages might choose to retire after attempting job search.
Additionally, we have suggested that firms may play an important role in regu-
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lating individuals’ inflows into UI after a PBD extension. This does not alter the
fact that extensive margin responses need to be taken into account when estimating
total non-employment effect, but it does mean that UI entry decisions are not easily
separated from firm decisions.
In future work, we plan to obtain a more credible estimate of the total non-
employment effect of UI extensions on older workers by specifying and estimating a
dynamic labor demand model. This would need to model transitions between em-
ployment, unemployment, and retirement and how they are affected by the structure
of UI benefits and parameters of the old age pension system. We believe the data
in Figures 2·3–2·5 provide compelling moments to match using a simulated method
of moments approach. Additionally we will aim to explicitly match our model to
our reduced form RD and bunching mass estimates. We will use our 3 decades of
policy variation to perform valuable out-of-sample simulations. Rather than striving
for maximal realism, we plan to develop a model that allows us to capture the core
mechanisms in an internally consistent way, while at the same time abstracting from
some other features of the data. For example we will not attempt to model realis-
tic wage evolution, retirement savings decisions, or the role of CLAs, among others,
but will instead focus on labor supply decisions of individuals, i.e. whether or not
to retire at any given point in time and how hard to search for a job in the case of
unemployment. We hope to also model the decision as a joint decision with firms,
exploiting firm-level variation in our linked employer-employee data. Model-in-hand,
we will be able to answer questions like how much of the stark decrease in employment
among older workers in Germany throughout the late 80s and 90s was caused by the
UI extensions and how much is likely explained by other factors.
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Figure 2·1: Maximum UI PBDs by Age in Different Time Periods in
Germany
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
M
on
th
s
48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62
Age
(a) PBD, 1980-1984
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
M
on
th
s
48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62
Age
(b) PBD, 1986-June 1987
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
M
on
th
s
48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62
Age
(c) PBD, Jul 1987- Mar 1999
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
M
on
th
s
48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62
Age
(d) PBD, Apr 1999 - Jan 2006
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
M
on
th
s
48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62
Age
(e) PBD, Feb 2006 - Dec 2007
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
M
on
th
s
48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62
Age
(f) PBD, Jan 2008 - 2010
Notes: This table plots maximum potential benefit durations for unemployment
insurance in Germany between 1980 and 2010. We drop the brief 1985 regime in
the interest of brevity. Appendix Table B.1 contains more detailed information on
each institutional regime, including eligibility requirements and benefit levels.
85
Figure 2·2: Stylized Budget Sets by Exit Age for Different Cohorts
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(c) Lifetime Income w/ 32 m PBD, 1935
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hort
Notes: These figures contain lifetime budget sets as a function of exit age (into UI
and eventually retirement). The ERA is 60 for the first 4 cohorts and 63 for the last
two. The NRA (un-penalized retirment age) for retirement via UI is 60 for the first
three cohorts, approximately 64 for the second cohort, and 65 for the last cohort.
We assume PBD are fixed at 1 year, 2 years, 32 months, 32 months, 2 years, and 2
years respectively.
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Figure 2·3: UI Inflows by Age for Different Cohorts in Germany, Men
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(a) UI Inflows, 1924 Cohort
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(b) UI Inflows, 1929 Cohort
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(c) UI Inflows, 1935 Cohort
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(f) UI Inflows, 1952 Cohort
Notes: These figures plot UI inflows by age for different cohorts of West German
Men with full UI eligibility, excluding mining and steal construction. The bin width
is 1/12 of a year.
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Figure 2·4: Mean UI Benefit Receipt by Age for Different Cohorts in
Germany, Men
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(a) Mean UI Benefit Receipt, 1924 Cohort
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(b) Mean UI Benefit Receipt, 1929 Cohort
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(c) Mean UI Benefit Receipt, 1935 Cohort
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(d) Mean UI Benefit Receipt, 1941 Cohort
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(f) Mean UI Benefit Receipt, 1952 Cohort
Notes: Red dashed lines represent ages at which UI benefit duration increases
discontinuously; the black dashed line shows the earliest bridge-to-retirement kink.
The red bar under the figure indicates the period over which an individual would
receive UI before drawing pension (the blue bar). The different shades of grey
represent different maximum PBD eligibility for UI, which can change because of
an existing age-cutoff (the red dashed line) or because of an overall UI policy change
enacted in that year.
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Figure 2·5: Mean Capped Non-Emp. Duration by Age for Different
Cohorts in Germany, Men
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Notes: These figures plot mean non-employment duration (capped at 36 months)
by age for different cohorts of West German Men with full UI eligibility, excluding
mining and steal construction. The bin width is 1/12 of a year.
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Figure 2·6: RD Results: 1 month PBD Extension on Non-
Employment, Men
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(a) Donut-Hole RD Results: Non-Emp. Duration, Men
w/out controls
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(b) Donut-Hole RD Results: Non-Emp. Duration, Men
w/ controls
Notes: These figures contain Regression Discontinuity estimates of the effect of UI potential benefit
durations at each age cut-off beginning July 1987. See Table 2.1 for the estimates. We pool all
years under the same UI regime. We employ a local polynomial regression with a rectangular
kernel and cluster standard errors at the daily level. 95% CI are plotted. All results are divided
by the number of months PBD was extended. The bandwidth is 2 years except for the ’87-’99
age 49 and 54 cutoffs where it is 1 year on the right due to other discontinuities. We exclude 2
months on each side of the cutoff – the donut hole – to partially address sorting. We also include
detailed individual controls. Controls include: pre-unemployment wage, gender, nationality (non-
german), experience, wage/occupation/firm-tenure, education, industry (3-digit), firm-size, month
and year. Sample Restrictions: West German Men With full eligibility, excluding mining and steal
construction.
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Table 2.1: The Effect of PBD on Non-employment Durations
All Exits
(1) (2)
No Controls Controls
Jul 1987 - Feb 1999
Age 42, P: (12-18), ∆P: 6 dydP 0.099 0.059
[0.023]*** [0.022]***
Observations 205478 205478
Mean of Dep. Var. 15.2 15.2
Age 44, P: (18-22), ∆P: 4 dydP 0.075 0.058
[0.038]** [0.035]
Observations 200089 200089
Mean of Dep. Var. 16.1 16.1
Age 49, P: (22-26), ∆P: 4 dydP 0.107 0.010
[0.063]* [0.056]
Observations 118965 118965
Mean of Dep. Var. 17.6 17.6
Age 54, P: (26-32), ∆P: 6 dydP 0.206 0.147
[0.037]*** [0.032]***
Observations 150812 150812
Mean of Dep. Var. 23.9 23.9
Mar 1999- Jan 2006
Age 45, P: (12-18), ∆P: 6 dydP 0.033 0.018
[0.026] [0.025]
Observations 181770 181770
Mean of Dep. Var. 15.2 15.2
Age 47, P: (18-22), ∆P: 4 dydP 0.078 0.055
[0.041]* [0.038]
Observations 170340 170340
Mean of Dep. Var. 16.3 16.3
Age 52, P: (22-26), ∆P: 4 dydP 0.154 0.102
[0.043]*** [0.040]**
Observations 149850 149850
Mean of Dep. Var. 19.9 19.9
Age 57, P: (26-32), ∆P: 6 dydP 0.471 0.321
[0.029]*** [0.022]***
Observations 208831 208831
Mean of Dep. Var. 28.5 28.5
Feb 2006- Dec 2007
Age 55, P: (12-18), ∆P: 6 dydP 0.463 0.212
[0.063]*** [0.056]***
Observations 35124 35124
Mean of Dep. Var. 17.8 17.8
Jan 2008- Dec 2010
Age 50, P: (12-15), ∆P: 3 dydP 0.139 0.117
[0.084] [0.077]
Observations 85107 85107
Mean of Dep. Var. 16.2 16.2
Age 55, P: (15-18), ∆P: 3 dydP 0.251 0.149
[0.088]*** [0.082]
Observations 67199 67199
Mean of Dep. Var. 19.2 19.2
Age 58, P: (18-24), ∆P: 6 dydP 0.300 0.240
[0.047]*** [0.042]***
Observations 62228 62228
Mean of Dep. Var. 22.7 22.7
Notes: This table contains Regression Discontinuity estimates of the effect of UI potential benefit
durations at each age cut-off beginning July 1987.Standard errors are in brackets and clustered on
day level (* P<.1, ** P<.05, *** P<.01)). We pool all years under the same UI regime. We employ
a local polynomial regression with a rectangular kernel and cluster standard errors at the daily
level. 95% CI are plotted. All results are divided by the number of months PBD was extended.
The bandwidth is 2 years except for the ’87-’99 age 49 and 54 cutoffs where it is 1 year on the
right due to other discontinuities. We exclude 2 months on each side of the cutoff – the donut hole
– to partially address sorting. We also include detailed individual controls. Controls include: pre-
unemployment wage, gender, nationality (non-german), experience, wage/occupation/firm-tenure,
education, industry (3-digit), firm-size, month and year. Sample Restrictions: West German Men
With full eligibility, excluding mining and steal construction.
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Table 2.2: Estimates of the Bunching Mass at each Bridge-to-
Retirement Kink
(1) (2)
Estimated Counter-Factual UR as Counter-Factual
Bunching at the Kink Induced by Early Retirement via UI
1924 Cohort
Age 59, P: (12), R: (60) Kink Size (wabove
wbelow
) 0.417 0.417
Normalized Bunching ( B
ho(0)
) 15.826 16.343
Elasticity (e) 0.026 0.026
1929 Cohort
Age 58, P: (24), R: (60) Kink Size (wabove
wbelow
) 0.420 0.420
Normalized Bunching ( B
ho(0)
) 37.914 22.294
Elasticity (e) 0.061 0.036
1935 Cohort
Age 57.33, P: (32), R: (60)A Kink Size (wabove
wbelow
) 0.414 0.414
Normalized Bunching ( B
ho(0)
) 43.033 64.288
Elasticity (e) 0.069 0.101
1941 Cohort
Age 57.33, P: (32), R: (60)A Kink Size (wabove
wbelow
) 0.441 0.441
Normalized Bunching ( B
ho(0)
) 14.540 23.204
Elasticity (e) 0.026 0.041
1949 Cohort
Age 61, P: (24), R: (63)A Kink Size (wabove
wbelow
) 0.447 0.447
Normalized Bunching ( B
ho(0)
) 0.686 0.872
Elasticity (e) 0.001 0.001
Notes: This table contains estimates of the bunching mass at the bridge to retirement kink for
each of the cohorts depicted in Figures 2·3. The bunching mass is estimated in two ways. First,
we fit a 7th degree polynomial to the UI entry data excluding a region around the kink point. For
the 1924 cohort we exclude 0.3 years to the left and 1 year to the right of the age 59 cutoff; for the
1929 cohort we exclude 0.3 years to the left and 2 years to the right of the age 58 cutoff; for the
1935 cohort we exclude 0.3 years to the left and 2.66 years to the right of the age 57.33 cutoff; for
the 1941 we exclude 2.66 years to the left and 2.66 years to the right of the age 57.33 cutoff; for
the 1949 cohort we exclude 0.3 years to the left and 0.66 years to the right of the age 61 cutoff.
The normalized bunching mass is given by the difference between observed and counter-factual N
between the cutoff and the right exclusion region, divided by the average counter-factual in this
region. We also use the unemployment rate as a rough counter-factual by scaling it by the ratio
of the mean number of UI entries between age 49 (or lowest available) and the kink to the mean
unemployment rate. The normalized bunching mass for this is defined analogously. The bin-width
is 1/12 of a year. We also show the point estimate for the elasticity of exit age with respect to the
net return to work. This is estimated as described in Appendix ??.
92
Chapter 3
The Effects of Advance Notice on Displaced
Workers’ Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence
from the WARN Act
3.1 Introduction
It is well established that job displacement has lasting and negative impacts on
workers’ earnings (Fallick [1996], Jacobson et al. [1993], Ruhm [1991], Sullivan and
Von Wachter [2009]). One support program for displaced workers is the mandated
requirement of advance notice. It helps workers to begin job search earlier and avoid
risky investments and smooth consumptions.
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) of 1989 is the
federal mandated requirement in the U.S. It requires employers to provide the dis-
placed workers with written notice 60 days in advance of a plant closing or mass
layoffs. There have been studies in the 1990s investigating the impact of advance
notice on the post-displacement outcomes of the displaced workers, exploring the in-
troduction of the federal WARN Act in 1989. They found that lengthy formal written
notice is associated with shorter jobless spell and higher post-displacement earnings
(Swaim and Podgursky [1990], Nord and Ting [1991], Addison and Portugal [1992],
Ruhm [1994b]).
This paper revisits the question — what is the impact of formal written advance
notice on the labor market outcomes of the displaced workers — by exploiting the
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variation across states in advance notification regulations. Since the 2003, nine states
have enacted stricter advance notice laws similar to the WARN Act. Those state mini
WARN Acts expand the requirements of the federal WARN Act. They provide pro-
tection to workers in smaller firms and at smaller layoff events. Figure 3.1 shows the
gradual adoption of stricter WARN acts by states between 1995 and 2015. Between
2003 and 2011, 9 states passed mini WARN Acts. This state level variation can help
obtain more convincing identification than previous studies. 1
My estimation sample comprises 12 waves of the Displaced Worker Supplement
(DWS) to the Current Population Surveys, from 1996 to 2018. The DWS survey
asks people to recall their job history over the past 3 years and collect information
on one job loss for each individual. The survey has a question on whether or not
the displaced workers have received advance notice and, if the answer is positive,
the worker is asked how long before the job loss he or she received notice. 2 These
questions have been widely used in the literature to proxy for the enforcement of the
WARN Act.
Using the DWS and a differences-in-difference method, I find that the probability
of receiving lengthy advance notice is higher in states and years with stricter WARN
Acts. However, the probability of getting any notice, formal or informal, decreases in
stricter states. Moreover, I find that the displaced workers affected by the mini WARN
Acts are 3% more likely to claim unemployment insurance. Conditional on claiming
UI, they are less likely to exhaust UI. In terms of post-displacement earnings in the
short run, I find the displaced workers affected by the mini WARN Acts have a slightly
higher weekly post-displacement earnings, a lower probability of being employed and
1Studies on the impact of federal WARN Act were built on variants of the conditional indepen-
dence assumption. They assume that the comparison of post-displacement outcomes of the notified
and the non-notified workers indicates a causal explanation, after controlling for all observable char-
acteristics of the displaced workers. Those are very strong assumptions.
2Appendix 3.2 lists the exact Questionnaire questions
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have switched more jobs following the displacement.
This chapter contributes to the literature in three ways. First, the state variations
in WARN eligibilities provide an exogenous increase in the probability of receiving a
written notice two-months in advance. This natural experiment helps me to address
selection issues related to notice provision. For example, Ruhm [1994b] suggests that
when firms have discretion over the ordering of the displacements, firms will choose
to notify workers with relatively dismal post-displacement job prospects. In the fear
of impairing the delivery of production contracts, the firm minimizes the damage by
lowering the incidence of early quitters. Therefore, notified displaced workers are the
ones who are endogenously disadvantaged. In this chapter, I can use the exogenous
adoption of stricter state version WARN Acts as a natural experiment and causally
identify the impact.
Second, this chapter explores a new policy environment and evaluates the effec-
tiveness of state version WARN acts. This is because all the previous studies related
to advance notice were done in the 1990s. As I mentioned earlier, since the 2000s,
many states have implemented stricter laws. From a policy perspective, it is worth
evaluating those state reforms.
Lastly, jobs are generally less protected in the U.S. than those in OECD countries.
The prevalence of "at-will" employment means that employers can often terminate
jobs for any reason and with little notice. For instance, according to the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, from 2013 to 2015, of the 3.2 million long- tenured workers displaced,
only 45% of them received written an advance notice of the job loss.
This paper relates closely to the literature on the effect of advance notice. This
body of literature typically focuses on two post-displacement outcomes of work-
ers: the unemployment duration (Ruhm [1991],Burgess and Low [1992]) and post-
displacement earnings (Ruhm [1994b], Ehrenberg and Jakubson [1988], Nord and
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Ting [1991]). Ruhm [1994b] suggests that formal written notice is associated with a
10% wage premium for the notified displaced workers relative to their non-notified
counterparts. Other studies found no such premium effect (Swaim and Podgursky
[1990]). In terms of unemployment duration, studies have shown advanced notice has
little impact on the unemployment duration. For example, Jones and Kuhn [1995]
conclude that 6 months of advance notice has little impact on long-term unemploy-
ment using Canadian survey data. They suggest that instead of assisting disadvan-
taged workers to reduce their unemployment durations, the notification only benefits
relatively more capable workers. Advance notification helps the more capable ones
by avoiding what otherwise would be a very short period of unemployment. Addison
and Portugal [1992] also found negligible effects of advanced notice on unemployment
spell durations for blue-collar workers.
3.2 Data and Institutions
3.2.1 Data
The primary data source is the Displaced Worker Supplement (DWS) to the Cur-
rent Population Surveys (CPS). The DWS is a biennial survey conducted either in
January or February. The DWS collects retrospective information on job histories of
displaced workers, who had lost or left a job due to layoffs or shutdowns within the
past 3 years of the survey date. 3 It contains information on weekly earnings at the
lost job and current job, unemployment insurance take-up and exhaustion rate and
reasons for the job loss. Most importantly, it asked the respondents two questions
—"Had you been given written notice informing you that you would lose your job?"
and "How long before the job loss did you receive that notice?" (See Appendix C.1).
3From 1984 through 1992, displaced workers are the ones had lost a job in the last five years.
since 1994, displaced workers are the ones had lost a job in the last three years.
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This question has been widely used in the literature to proxy for enforcement of the
WARN Act.
The main sample comprises 12 waves of DWS surveys, from 1996 to 2018. It con-
sists of displaced workers aged 20 to 65 at the survey date and who lost/left their jobs
from 1995 to 2015. I only looked at displaced workers.4 Moreover, I exclude work-
ers laid off due to terminations of self-employment and seasonal contracts. Workers
who expect to be recalled in the next six months are excluded. Workers in military
service are also excluded. Workers with missing pre-displacement characteristics are
also dropped. There are 28,791 displaced workers over the sample period. Among
them, around 3,300 received written notice more than 2 months before the layoff, and
around 9,800 received written notice before the layoff.
3.2.2 The Federal WARN Act
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act was passed on
Feb 4 1998, and came into effect on Feb 4 1989. The WARN Act requires employers
to provide notice 60 days in advance of plant closings and mass layoffs. Specifically,
employers with 100 or more full-time workers are regulated by the WARN Act. There
are two triggering conditions5: 1) the shutdown of an establishment will result in an
employment loss of 50 or more employees during any 30-day period6; 2) A mass layoff
event will result in an employment loss of at least 33% of the workforce for 50-499
4There are two questions related to DWS sample composition — "did you lose a job or leave one
due to your plant or company closed or moved, position or shift was abolished or insufficient work
during the last 3 calendar years", and "what is the specific reason that you no longer work at the
job". If a worker answered "Yes" to the first question, he or she is in my sample (See Appendix
C.1).
5The firm size thresholds and layoff events magnitude cutoffs provide identifications for future
research. I am in the process to get the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics data where
firm size and layoff sizes are precisely measured.
6 This does not count employees who have worked less than 6 months in the last 12 months or
employees who work an average of less than 20 hours a week for that employer. These latter groups,
however, are entitled to notice"-U.S. Department of Labor
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employees, or 500 or more employees. 7 Figure 3.2a illustrates these two triggering
conditions: the y axis is the firm size and the x axis is the size of employment loss.
We can see that only firms with more than 100 employers are required to WARN
their employees. Also, only relatively larger employment losses are covered. The blue
region to the right indicates employment losses with more than 1/3 of the firm size.
From 2013 through 2015, there were 3.2 million workers displaced from jobs they
had held for at least 3 years. According to the Mass Layoff Statistics, around 10% of
the separations are due to permanent worksite closures. Around 95% of mass layoff
events are employment losses of between 50 and 500. This suggests that the WARN
Act protects a non-trivial percentage of displaced workers. However, only half of all
displaced workers received written advance notice, and only 2/3 of displaced workers
from plant closing have received written advance notice. 8
3.2.3 State mini WARN Acts
The California WARN Act California first enacted its own version of the
WARN Act in Jan 2003. Compared with the Federal WARN, the California WARN
Act (CA WARN) protects a larger share of displaced workers. It lowers the triggering
threshold by extending the mandatory notice to smaller size layoff events and smaller
firms. There are two main differences. First, the covered employers are the ones
with at least 75 persons within the preceding 12 months, including part-time workers.
Second, the threshold of employment loss for a mass layoff is much lower in California.
Any event that will result in an employment loss of more than 50 is protected by the
WARN Act, regardless of the percentage of workforce.9 Figure 3.2b illustrates the
7"This does not count employees who have worked less than 6 months in the last 12 months or
employees who work an average of less than 20 hours a week for that employer."-U.S. Department
of Labor
8Source:Worker Displacement News Release
9 Source: California Employment Development Department
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two triggering condition in California and Figure 3.2c compares the CA WARN Act
with the federal WARN Act. Additionally, the CA WARN Act makes the lawsuits
more affordable and accessible for displaced workers. The employer who violates the
WARN requirements in California is liable for more severe financial liabilities than in
other states.
Mini WARN Acts in other States Since 2003, several states enacted more
stringent versions of the WARN Act.10 Different parameters of the WARN Acts vary
by states. For example, New York requires companies with 50 or more employees to
provide a 90-day notice. Meanwhile, New Hampshire requires layoffs of 25 or more
workers to provide notice; however, the notice period is only one week. Compared to
California, New Jersey implements the similar rules but requires a severance payment
equals to one week of pay for each full year of employment when the employer violates
the act. The Iowa WARN Act applies to employers with 25 or more employees but
requires a notice period of 30 days.
Some states, such as Oregon and Minnesota, do not have mini WARN Acts but
have additional notice obligations. Regulated employees in these states must also re-
port to other workforce development agencies. Meanwhile, Maryland, Massachusetts
and Michigan have state-level guidelines which encourage firms to voluntarily provide
advance notice to workers. Depending on compliance, these mini WARN Acts are
not necessarily more protective than the federal WARN Act.
There are also some states with more lenient requirements. For example, in South
Carolina, a notice period of two weeks is required in a plant shutdown only if the
employer requires similar notice from employees in the event of a quit. Tennessee’s
WARN act only applies to employers of between 50 and 99 employees. In Rhode
Island, no notice is required, however an employer that liquidates or merges, sells or
10 See the Legal Appendix for a complete list.
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moves out of state must pay workers their wage within 24 hours of the triggering
event.
For the baseline analysis, I define states with mini-WARN Acts as the ones that
implement mandatory, stricter WARN acts. There are nine such states. They are
California(2003), Wisconsin (2005), Illinois (2005), New Jersey (2007), New York
(2009), Maine (2007), Iowa(2010), New Hampshire(2010) and Hawaii(2011). Figure
3.1 shows the gradual adoption of stricter WARN acts by states between 1995 and
2015. Between 2003 and 2011, 9 states passed mini WARN Acts.
The gradual adoption of mini WARN Acts provides state-level variation in the
probability of being WARNed. The enforcement of the state legislation increases the
share of displaced workers who will be protected by the WARN act. It allows me to
identify the impact of the state laws. In an initial analysis, I separate states into two
groups — states with mini WARN acts and states without mini WARN acts. We
would expect a higher chance of getting notice two-months or more in advance for
displaced workers in states with mini WARN acts after 2003. Figure 3.3a shows the
probability of receiving notice two months or more in advance for those two groups.
I also plot the probability of receiving any notice before job loss in Figure 3.3c. The
patterns are very noisy.
3.2.4 Issues with the Displaced Workers Surveys
One concern with using the DWS is the potential bias due to sample "attrition".
Specifically, what if the person who leaves a job in anticipation of being displaced is
also the one who is not identified as a displaced worker in the DWS. For instance,
Farber [2001] points out that the distinction between quits and layoffs is not always
clear in the DWS. Those early leavers may not consider themselves to have left or
lost a job due to plant closings or mass layoff events. Especially, if the early leavers
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are systematically more likely to receiving written advance notice, then I face sample
selection issues. In this case, the WARNed workers in the DWS might be negatively
selected to begin with, in comparison to the unWARNed displaced workers. For
example, Schwerdt [2011] finds that early leavers face significantly better labor market
prospects than the ultimately displaced workers after a job loss due to a plant closure.
This negative selection will attenuate the estimated impact of the advance notice.
Additionally, if the early leavers are the ones treated by the mini WARN Act, the
first stage impact of the mini WARN Acts on the probability of being WARNed is
downward biased. This is because the workers who benefit from the mini WARN Act
could be the earlier leavers and therefore not included in the displaced worker sample.
Unfortunately, I cannot identify the early leavers in the DWS.
Table C.1 compares the main characteristics of the displaced workers and non-
displaced workers who have left/lost a job within the past three calendar years of
the survey date. It is not surprising that the displaced workers are more likely to
get written advance notice. In particular, 12% of the displaced workers receive writ-
ten notice two months in advance, while only 5% of the non-displaced workers do.
Overall, the displaced workers are older, more likely to be female, to be black, and
are less likely to have a college degree than the non-displaced ones. Moreover, in
terms of pre-displacement job characteristics, displaced workers are less likely to be
union members, much more likely to have lost/left a job due to a plant closing, and
have much lower weekly earnings than the non-displaced workers. In summary, the
displaced workers tend to be disadvantaged compared to other workers who have
lost/left jobs for other reasons.
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3.3 Descriptive Analysis
3.3.1 Summary Statistics
Using the DWS, I divide the displaced workers into two groups based on whether
they have received notice two months in advance or not. The treatment group consists
of displaced workers who have received written notification two months in advance.
I will refer to it as the WARNed group. The control group is the unWARNed group.
This group includes the workers who have received notice less than two months in
advance and the workers who haven’t received any notice in advance. On average,
only 37% displaced workers were given notice of the job loss. Among them, only one
third have received notice more than two months before. This is because the majority
of jobs in the U.S. are "at-will" employment.
Table 3.1 compares the observable characteristics for theWARNed and unWARNed
workers, such as gender, age, marital status, education and job tenure, etc. Except
for the probability of being Black, all observed time-invariant and pre-displacement
characteristics of those two groups are statistically different. It is worth noting that
WARNed workers are older, more likely to be female and married, and with longer
job tenure. Table 3.1 also shows that workers are more likely to be WARNed if they
were laid off due to plant closings, if they had health insurance at the lost job, if they
were members of the union, and were full-time workers and better paid. The unbal-
anced pre-displacement characteristics suggest potential selection issues. I also look
at post-displacement outcomes for those two groups in Table 3.1. On average, the
WARNed workers have higher wages at their new jobs. The unemployment insurance
take-up rates are similar between the two groups; however, conditional on claiming
UI, the WARNed workers are more likely to exhaust the unemployment insurance.
To further investigate the correlations between receiving advance notice and some
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of the workers’ observables, I plot the kernel density of workers’ job tenure, age, and
hourly wage at last job for the WARNed and unWARNed workers, respectively. This
helps compare the differnce in distirbution of the observables. The bottom panel
of Figure C.1 shows that the density curve of the hourly wage. The density of the
WARNed and the unWARNed intersect around 10 dollaers per hour. Higher than this
threshold, the WARNed workers’ wage always dominates their counterparts. In other
words, if wage reflects productivity when the hourly wage is higher than $ 10, the
WARNed workers are preferred in terms of their expected productivity. In addition,
because the proportion of workers who received notice is less than a half, according
to the Bayesian rule,11 the probability of WARNed, conditional on wage is less than
$10 per hour, is lower than the unWARNed. That is for low paying jobs, workers are
less likely to be WARNed. Similarly, workers with less than 3 years tenure are less
likely to be WARNed, and workers younger than 40 are less likely to be WARNed.
3.3.2 Potential Selection Biases
Formally, I investigate the relationship of the observables with the probability
of receiving written notice two months in advance using the following naive linear
regression equation ,
WARNedit = α + γXit + υit (3.1)
I also run a simple OLS for the outcome variables.
OUTCOMEit = α + βWARNedit + γXit + it (3.2)
whereXit is a set of covariates that are observable to the econometricians,WARNedit
11∀w < 10, Pr(wage = w|WANRed) < Pr(wage = w|unWARNed) ⇒
Pr(wage=w)∗Pr(WARNed|w)
Pr(WARNed) <
Pr(wage=w)∗Pr(unWARNed|w)
Pr(unWARNed) , because
Pr(WARNed)
Pr(unWARNed) < 1, therefore,
Pr(WARNed|w) < Pr(unWARNed|w), ∀w < 10.
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is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the displaced workers receive written notice two
months in advance, and equals to 0 otherwise. Column 2 of Table C.2 lists the re-
gression results. Similarily to Table 3.1, female, married, senior and full-time workers
are more likely to receive advance notice. Workers belong to a union and are laid
off due to plant closings are more likely to be WARNed. Workers who had health
insurance at the lost job and had higher weekly earnings at the lost job are selected
into getting notifications. The OUTCOMEit are dummies for UI take-up and UI
exhaustion rates.
Table C.2 also lists the impact of WARN from a naive linear regression. It sug-
gests that being WARNed is associated with a smaller probability of taking up UI and
a larger probability of exhausting UI. However, both within a firm and across firms
selections will bias the estimation. On the one hand, when firms have the discretion
over the ordering of the displacements, firms will choose to notify workers with rel-
atively bleak job prospects (Ruhm [1994]). It is incentive compatible because firms
can minimize layoff damages by lowering the incidence of early quitters — the "leav-
ing the sinking ship" story (Schwerdt [2011]). This kind of negative selection bias
will underestimate the impact reducing unemployment duration. On the other hand,
large and mature firms are more likely to be self-regulated in providing separation
benefits. Displaced workers at those firms are innately more capable and have better
job prospects after the layoffs than their counterparts working at smaller firms. This
kind of positive selection bias overestimates the impact of advance notice on reducing
unemployment duration. Additionally, workers who are older and more experienced
have greater bargaining power. They might be more able to secure better separation
benefits.
Moreover, firms provide written notification are also more likely to offer other
job search assistance, such as more generous severance payments. The UI literature
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has shown better unemployment benefits reduce job search incentives, and therefore
prolong the unemployment duration. It’s difficult to disentangle the impact of written
notice from the impact of other job search assistance.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
In this paper, I explore the fact that the stricter mini WARN Acts are adopted
in different states and years. My main empirical strategy is to examine the labor
market outcomes of displaced workers in state and year under the regime of stricter
WARN regulation, relative to outcomes in years prior to the enforcement of the mini
WARNAct in that state, and relative to the other states without mini WARN Acts
during the same period. I estimate the differences-in-difference of the following form:
OUTCOMEist = α + β ×REGIMEst + γXist + µt + ηs + ist (3.3)
In this equation, OUTCOME is one of the measures of labor market outcomes
that might be affected by the enforcement of mini WARN Acts. REGIME is an
indicator variable for the mini WARN Acts. It equals one if a stricter WARN Act is
enacted in a given state and year and zero otherwise. Xist is the characteristics of
displaced worker i in state s in year t. I also include a year fixed effect µt and a state
fixed effect ηs.
The primary advantage of this research design is that the gradual adoption of the
mini WARN Acts provides exogenous variation across states and year. Additionally, I
use state fixed effects to capture the responses while holding the time-invariant state
labor market situation constant. However, due to the lack of firm size information
in the DWS, this design cannot measure the within-state variation in the WARN
treatment. Ideally, if I had information on the employment loss of each layoff event
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and the firm/establishment size, I could measure the changes in outcome within a
state and across the WARN eligibility cutoffs.12
The identifying assumption of a differences-in-difference setting is that the only
reason for changing outcomes in the state year with stricter WARN acts, relative to
other states in the same year, is the enforcement of stricter WARN act. In this setting,
I can rule out concerns about fixed differences between the treated states and the
untreated states through the state fixed effects; and I can rule out the differential time
trends by state by controlling the interaction of state dummy and year. There are a
couple of potential concerns. First, there might be other concurrent reforms/changes.
For example, it could be that states with high unemployment rates are more likely to
implement stricter WARN acts to provide additional protections to displaced workers.
Poor labor market conditions will prolong displaced workers’ unemployment duration.
In the regression, I control for the state-level unemployment rate to account for this
potential endogeneity.
Second, if the states that reformed their WARN acts are systematically better at
enforcement, the estimated impact might be downward biased. For example, the firms
in California could have already voluntarily de-facto enforced stricter notification
norm before the legal term was enacted. Similarly, states without mini WARN Acts
are not necessarily the ones provide fewer separation protections. Firms could have
already voluntarily de-facto notify the displaced workers two-months in advance of the
job loss. One way to partially account for this concern is to carefully investigate the
dynamics in the probability of WARNed and the outcomes before the enforcement of
the mini WARN Act to see if there is any evidence of de-facto enforcement preceding
the law change. Nevertheless, I cannot fully rule out this "measurement" error.
12I am in the process of applying for the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics data from
the U.S. census bureau. The LEHD contains detailed firm side information and precise measure of
the unemployment duration.
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Lastly, the state-specific labor protection laws may also cause migration from state
to state. Workers might migrate to states with better labor protection laws to avoid
the adversity of unprepared layoffs. In this paper, I ignore this second-order response.
3.5 Main Findings
3.5.1 The Impact on the Probability of Receiving Written Notice in Ad-
vance of Layoffs
Since 2003, some states start to implement stricter WARN requirements. Figure
3.3 plots the probability of receiving written notice two months, at least one month
in advance and receiving any notice for workers laid off in years from 1995 to 2015.
The blue triangle dots are the average probability for states with mini-WARN Acts
and the red diamond dots are the means for states without mini WARN Acts. The
dash-dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals.
We can visually see an increase of the probability of getting two-months advance
notice starting from 2003 and the gap disappears around 2013. There is no visual
difference in terms of getting written notice 1-2 months in advance. The probability
of getting notice less than 1 month in advance or no notice at all are lower in mini-
WARN Act states, but the difference is not significant.
I formally estimate the impact of the mini-WARN Acts on the probability of
receiving written notice, using the following equation:
WARNedist = α + βREGIMEst + γXist + µt + ηs + ist (3.4)
I predict the probability of receiving written notice in advance for individual i in
state s and laid off in year t. The estimation results can be found in Table 3.2. Each
presents a linear model of receiving written notice more than 2 months in advance,
at least one month in advance and receiving written advance notice on the state and
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year dummies, controls (in even-numbered columns) and the REGIME dummy. I find
that the state WARN Acts increases the probability of getting notice more than two
months in advance by 0.08%, with a standard error of 0.008.
Counterintuitively, the displaced workers in states and years with stricter WARN
Acts are less likely to receive advance written notice. In other words, the probability
of receiving any advance notice decreases by 2%. This result is puzzling. One possible
explanation is that the early leavers who are not observed in the DWS are the ones
who benefit from the mini WARN Acts. Therefore, the states and years affected by
the mini WARN Acts have smaller percentages of workers receiving advance notice
due to sample "attrition". Another possible story is that firms under a stricter regime
manipulate the layoff size and avoid losses that are large enough to trigger the ad-
vanced warning condition. Therefore, there are fewer displaced workers protected by
WARN. I cannot test the plausibility of this story in the DWS, because firm sizes
and layoff sizes are not observed.
I further investigate the validity of the first stage results by adding leads and
lags into equation 3.4. Figure 3.5a plots the estimated coefficients and confidence
bands on the probability of being WARNed and each of the 11 dummy variables
which indicate 5 years before the reform, the year of the reform, and 5 years after the
reform. The coefficients for dummy variables for three years before the registration of
mini WARN are significantly positive. The coefficients for the lagged years are larger
but also noisier. Figure 3.5b plots the regression estimates for the outcome variable,
receiving any written notice. The coefficients for the lead years are slightly above
zero but not significant. Overall, the first stage results are very noisy using the fixed
effect regression.13
13 Ideally, I would like to investigate the variation in the enforcement of WARN act at the re-
quirement threshold, such as firms with more than 100 employees. This threshold setting allows me
to analysis the within state variations and are potentially more interesting and have more power.
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3.5.2 The Impact on Displaced Workers’ UI Take-up and Exhaustion
Rates
Using Equation 3.3, I estimate the reduced form impact of the mini-WARN Acts
on two main outcome variables: UI take-up rate and UI exhaustion rate. Figure 3.4
plots the UI take-up rate and UI exhaustion rates from 1995 to 2015 for states with
mini WARN Acts and states without mini WARN Acts. Visually, we cannot see any
notable difference between these two groups after 2003.
Table 3.3 displays the regression results for the UI take-up rate and UI exhaustion
rate. Each column presents a linear model of the outcome variables on state and year
dummies and the REGIME dummy. I find a significant increase in the UI take-up
rate associated with being displaced in states with stricter WARN acts. Specifically,
the displaced workers affected by the mini WARN Acts are 3% more likely to claim
UI. This is intuitive, as the WARN act often also require the firms to notify a Rapid
Response team. The Rapid Response team is a government agency which provides a
range of services to workers prior to the layoff, such as job search assistance, applying
for unemployment insurance, information on health benefits and pensions, etc. 14
Note that the positive relationship of WARN and UI take-up rates is the opposite
to the naive association I found in section 3.3.2. However, it is important to keep in
mind that the first stage estimates are not very strong.
I also find that conditional on claiming UI, the displaced workers affected by the
mini WARN acts are less likely to exhaust UI benefits. However, the impact is not
significant. Interestedly, even though the coefficient is not significant, the negative
sign is consistent with job search theory. According to standard job search theory, the
effect of advance notice on unemployment duration should be either zero or negative.15
14Rapid Response: Solutions for Business
15Table C.2 displays the naive old regression results. The results suggest that receiving a two-
month affiance notice is positively associated with UI exhaustion rate among the UI claimers. This
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Again, I investigate the dynamic of impacts by adding leads and lags into equa-
tion 3.3. Figure 3.6a and Figure 3.6b plot the estimated coefficients and confidence
bands on the UI takeup and UI exhaustion rate. Each of the 11 dummy variables
which equal one for 5 years before the reform, year of the reform, and 5 years after
the reform. The results do not support the parallel trend assumption for the DID
setting. In fact, the impacts on UI take-up rates one year and four years before the
reform are significantly negative. Conditional on being UI claimers, the impacts on
UI exhaustion rate are very noisy. The pattern suggests that one to two years prior to
the reform, the displaced UI claimers in mini WARN states are already having better
job search outcomes. The negative association of mini WARN with UI exhaustion
rate or unemployment durations could be caused by the pre-existing systematically
better labor market outcomes of those Mini WARN states.
3.5.3 The Impact on Displaced Workers’ Post-displacement outcomes
Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 list the regression results for the five post-displacement
labor market outcomes- log weekly earnings at current job, earnings loss at current
job, probability of being employed within 3 years of job loss, hours worked at the
current job, and number of jobs since the job loss. The impact of mini WARN Acts
on log weekly earnings at the current job and earnings loss at the current job are
significant. When I look at the probability of being employed within 3 years of job
loss, I find a significant negative impact of 3%. The effect on hours worked at the
current job is not significant as well. And I find that workers who are protected by
contradicts the standard job search theory. The impact of advance notice on unemployment duration
should be either zero or negative. One explanation for the positive sign could be market screening.
Workers in the unWARNed pool have less time to search for a job compared to the WANRed ones.
More capable workers escape faster from the unemployment pool if the labor market is competitive.
Therefore, the less capable ones are left over into the pool of UI claimers. The WARNed UI claimers
have been given longer time to search but failed to find a job. Jone and Ruhm (1995) points out
that advance notice systematically benefits the workers who are capable of finding a job prior to the
layoffs.
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stricter WARN acts have higher job turnover. They have worked at more jobs since
job displacement.
Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 show the impact on log weekly earnings at the current
job and probability of being employed within 3 years of job loss for UI claimers and
non-UI claimers, separately. I find a positive and larger impact on log weekly earnings
for the UI claimers. This suggests that advance notice affects labor outcomes via the
Rapid response team. Displaced workers with access to UI become pickier and have
higher reservation wages, and therefore have higher post-displacement earnings.
However, the workers who are protected by stricter WARN Acts are less likely to
be employed. The negative impact for UI claimers is larger. They are 5% less likely
to be employed within three years of displacement. The impact for non-UI claimers
is positive and insignificant. In terms of the number of jobs since displacement, the
impact of WARN Acts is twice as large for non-UI claimers as UI claimers. Table 3.8
suggests that among displaced workers who did not claim UI, the ones with advance
notice are more likely to switch jobs.
3.6 Conclusion
Many policymakers advocate for employment protections for displaced workers to
help them overcome the hardship of unemployment. Advance notification is one of
the separation benefits that buffer the shocks of job loss. However, most papers on
the impact of advance notice have focused on the effectiveness of the federal WARN
Act. Since the early 2000s, some states have started to gradually adopt stricter
WARN Acts. I explore the introduction of state WARN Acts and use a differences-
in-difference method. I examine the labor market outcomes of displaced workers. In
other words, I compare the displaced worker’s labor market outcomes in states and
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years under the regime of stricter WARN regulation, relative to outcomes in years
prior to the enforcement of the mini WARN Act in that state and relative to the
other states without mini WARN Acts during the same period.
Unfortunately, the state laws suffer from a weak first stage problem. This is
possible because I cannot target workers who are from firms and layoff events that
are directly protected by the WARN Acts, due to lack of information on firm sizes
and layoff sizes. Moreover, because in the DWS I cannot distinguish job loss and job
quits. It is plausible that the unobserved early leavers are also the ones who benefit
the most from the WARN Act. Therefore, I cannot detect a strong first stage impact
in my sample. With these concerns in mind, I find that the displaced workers affected
by the mini WARN acts are 3.3% more likely to claim unemployment insurance and
conditional on claiming UI, they are less likely to exhaust UI. Moreover, the displaced
workers affected by the mini WARN Acts have a lower probability of being employed
within 3 years of the job loss and have switched more jobs since the job loss.
In future work, I plan to obtain a more credible estimate of the impact of WARN
Acts by exploring the WARN eligibility cutoffs. The firm size thresholds and layoff
events magnitude cutoffs in Figure 3.2 provide more precise identifications. This
allows me to focus on within state variations and helps rule other confounding factors.
I plan to use the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics data (LEHD) to explore
this possibility. Moreover, states list all mass layoff events and plant closings with
advance notice online. The company names, plant address, number of workers affected
and reasons for the event are public information available online. This helps me to
verify the enforcement of the WARN Act using the government disclosure information
on WARN.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of WARNed and unWARNed characteristics
All Displaced t-test UI Claimers p-value
WARNed unWARNed WARNed unWARNed of
difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of observations 3304 25487 - 1487 11482 -
Panel A: Outcome variables
UI take-up rate 0.46 0.45 0.3325 1 1
(0.003) (0.008)
UI exhaustion rate 0.42 0.38 0.002
(0.004) (0.011)
Employed at time of survey 0.81 0.72 0.00 0.72 0.65 0.00
(0.006) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004)
Weekly earnings at current job 943.6 795 0.00 859.5 852.1 0.76
(16.03) (5.27) (23.8) (8.50)
Panel B: Demographics
Age 42.87 40.25 0.00 44.64 42.89 0.00
(0.174) (0.066) (0.250) (0.100)
Female 0.50 0.43 0.00 0.52 0.43 0.00
(0.007) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004)
Black 0.11 0.11 0.99 0.12 0.11 0.028
(0.001) (0.005) (0.007) (0.0026)
Married 0.59 0.51 0.00 0.61 0.55 0.00
(0.007) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004)
Education (in years) 13.73 13.15 0.00 13.4 13.31 0.098
(0.037) (0.013) (0.054) (0.019)
High school graduates 0.65 0.57 0.00 0.6 0.59 0.564
(0.007) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004)
College graduates 0.33 0.25 0.00 0.28 0.26 0.161
(0.007) (0.002) (0.010) (0.004)
Panel C: Pre-displacement vari-
ables
Tenure at lost job 8.40 4.40 0.00 9.60 5.36 0.00
(0.131) (0.033) (0.200) (0.050)
Union member (%) 0.14 0.07 0.00 0.18 0.10 0.00
(0.005) (0.001) (0.009) (0.003)
Part-time worker (%) 0.12 0.18 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.08
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002)
Plant closing (%) 0.62 0.31 0.00 0.65 0.30 0.00
(0.007) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004)
Had health insurance at lost 0.71 0.49 0.00 0.80 0.65 0.00
job (%) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004)
Weekly earnings at lost job 1000 849 0.00 1012.6 989.6 0.24
(12.96) (4.41) (18.33 (6.61)
Note: The sample includes all displaced workers from the survey year 1998 to 2016.
Weekly earning at the lost job and current job are inflation-adjusted. Standard
errors in parentheses. The p-value for testing the null hypothesis: the WARNed
and unWARNed have the same characteristics are reported in column 3 and 6.
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Table 3.2: The Estimated Impact of Mini WARN Acts on Receiving
Written Notice
Outcome > 2 months ≥ 1 month Any notice
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mini WARN Act 0.0098 0.0080 0.00465 0.00325 -0.0202∗ -0.0229∗∗∗
(0.0090) (0.0084) (0.0075) (0.0084) (0.0095) (0.0063)
Sample mean 0.11 0.22 0.34
(0.32) (0.42) (0.47)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 28791 28666 28791 28666 28791 28666
R2 0.009 0.104 0.007 0.139 0.007 0.120
Standard errors clustered at the state level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Table 3.3: The Estimated Impact of Mini WARN Acts on UI Take-up
and UI Exhaustion Rate
Outcome UI Take-up UI Exhaustion
variables rate rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mini WARN Act 0.0206 0.0303∗ -0.00958 -0.00821
(0.0142) (0.0115) (0.0214) (0.0209)
Sample mean 0.45 0.38
(0.50) 0.49
Controls No Yes No Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
State F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 28950 28821 12979 12927
R2 0.044 0.175 0.030 0.056
Standard errors clustered at the state level. † p < 0.10 ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
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Table 3.4: The Impact of Mini WARN Acts on Earnings at New Job
Outcome Log Weekly Earnings Earnings
variables at New Job Loss
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mini WARN Act -0.0167 0.00736 0.0480 0.0178
(0.0245) (0.0201) (0.0326) (0.0322)
Sample mean 6.35 [812] 0.92 [-78]
(1.01) [694] 1.74[560]
Controls No Yes No Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
State F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19201 19201 29058 29058
R2 0.050 0.050 0.021 0.021
Standard errors clustered at the state level. † p < 0.10 ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
Table 3.5: The Estimated Impact of Mini WARN Acts on the Prob-
ability of being Emoployed at Survey Date
Outcome Probability of being Hours worked Number of jobs
variables employed at current job since job loss
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mini WARN Act -0.0295∗ -0.0294∗∗ -0.260 -0.128 0.0885∗ 0.0921∗
(0.0123) (0.0101) (0.510) (0.538) (0.0367) (0.0383)
Sample mean 0.74 35.3 1.04
(0.43) (10.5) (1.21)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25924 25795 6560 6525 28269 28135
R2 0.057 0.093 0.030 0.145 0.025 0.040
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 3.6: The Estimated Impact of Mini WARN Acts on Log Weekly
Earnings at New Job
Groups All UI Claimers Non-UI Claimers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mini WARN Act -0.017 0.0075 0.057 0.045 -0.065∗ -0.003
(0.025) (0.020) (0.039) (0.031) (0.028) (0.030)
Sample mean 6.35 [812] 6.40 [853] 6.31 [787]
(1.01)[694] (1.02)[697] (0.99)[692]
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19201 19100 7679 7650 11437 11377
R2 0.050 0.277 0.061 0.228 0.049 0.333
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Table 3.7: The Estimated Impact of Mini WARN Acts on the Prob-
ability of being Employed at Survey Date
Groups All UI Claimers Non-UI Claimers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mini WARN Act -0.0295∗ -0.0294∗∗ -0.0518∗∗∗ -0.0513∗∗∗ 0.00309 0.00688
(0.0123) (0.0101) (0.0124) (0.0113) (0.0152) (0.0126)
Sample mean 0.74 0.66 0.81
(0.44) (0.47) (0.40)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25924 25795 11729 11684 14084 14012
R2 0.057 0.093 0.073 0.103 0.037 0.097
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 3.8: The Estimated Impact of Mini WARN Acts on Number of
Jobs since Displacement
Groups All UI Claimers Non-UI Claimers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mini WARN Act 0.0885∗ 0.0921∗ 0.0558 0.0657 0.129∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.0367) (0.0383) (0.0569) (0.0621) (0.0346) (0.0349)
Sample mean 1.05 0.93 1.14
(1.21) (1.1) (1.27)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 28269 28135 12723 12672 15447 15372
R2 0.025 0.040 0.036 0.053 0.022 0.037
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Figure 3·1: Count of states enacting more strict mini WARN Acts,
1995-2015
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Co
un
t o
f s
ta
te
s
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Layoff Years
Count of states enacting more strict mini WARN Acts, 1995-2015
Source: Author’s construction.
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Figure 3·2: Federal WARN Act and California WARN Act
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Figure 3·3: Probability of Receiving Advance Notice by Year and by
States
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Notes: Figure 3.3 plots the probability of receiving notice more than 2 months in
advance, at least 1 month in advance, and receiving any notice in advance for states
with mini WARN act and states without mini WARN acts. The dashed and dotted
lines are the 95% confidence intervals. The black vertical line shows the first year
when states started implementing mini WARN Acts.
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Figure 3·4: UI take-up rate and UI exhaustion rate by Year and by
States
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Notes: Figure 3.4 plots the probability of claiming UI for states with mini WARN
act and states without mini WARN acts. The dashed and dotted lines are the 95%
confidence intervals. The black vertical line shows the first year when states started
implementing mini WARN acts.
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Figure 3·5: Pre-reform and Post-reform Probability of Receiving
Advance Notice
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Notes: Figure 3.5 plots the estimated coefficients and confidence bands on the prob-
ability of receiving written notice more than 2 months in advance and probability of
receiving any written notice in advance and each of the 11 dummy variables which
equal one for 5 years before the reform, year of the reform, and 5 years after the
reform.
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Figure 3·6: Leads and Lags of the Estimated Impact of the Mini
WARN Act
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Notes: Figure 3.6 plots the estimated coefficients and confidence bands on the UI
take-up rates, UI exhaustion rate, log weekly earnings at current job and employ-
ment rate within 3 years after displacement The 11 scatter bins are the coefficient
for dummy variables which equal one for 5 years before the reform, year of the
reform, and 5 years after the reform.
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Appendix A
Appendix — Chapter 1
A.1 Additional details on institution
A.1.1 Example of Pension Benefit and Subsidy Calculation
Below is an example of a hypothetical pensioner who started contributing to the
system since 1983 and claimed a pension in 2015. Her contribution period is 33 years.
For each year of work, some earnings points are accumulated. For incidence, in 1985,
she earned 1200 euros per month, and the average monthly wage of all insured was
1200 as well. Therefore, 1 EP was credited. In 1986, her wage income was half of
the average. Therefore, 0.5 EP was credited. The sum of EP between 1983 and
2015 was 18.55. The average annual EP at retirement was 0.56. Pension value in
2015 was 30 euros. Her pension benefits without the subsidies were 556.5 euros per
month. The sum of EPs before 1992 was 5.75 EPs. The years contributed before
1992 was 10 years. Her average annual EP before 1992 was 0.575. I also assume this
hypothetical pensioner has one child. Therefore, the condition of 35 years credible
periods is satisfied. Because both her average annual EP before 92 and average annual
EP at retirement were smaller than 0.75, she was entitled to the subsidy for low pay
workers. The subsidy size was (0.75-0.575)*10=1.75, which was equivalent to 52.5
euros in 2015. Her total pension benefits was around 600 euros per month.
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An Example of Pension Benefit Calculation
 
Monthly Wage 500 750 1200 600 400 500 500 500 500 500 500 1000 800 1200
Average 
Monthly Wage 
of all Insured 
1000 1000 1200 1200 800 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1200
EP 0.5 0.75 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 10 1 0.8 1
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 … 2013 2014 2015
Sum of EP 18.55
Mean EP 0.56
AR in 2015 30
Monthly Pension Benefit 556.5
Monthly Pension Benefit + Subsidy 609
Sum of EP pre 92 18.55
Mean EP pre 92 0.56
Subsidy in EP 1.75
AR in 2015 30
Monthly Pension Benefit 52.5
A.1.2 Pension Reforms
The statutory retirement age in Germany for a regular old age pension remained
at 65 throughout our sample period, with the only prerequisite being 5 years of
contributions. Several alternate pathways make retiring before 65 an option. The five
main pathways to retirement are regular old-age pensions, old-age pensions for long-
term insured, old-age pensions for women, old-age pensions due to unemployment
(and, later, part-time work) and old-age pensions for severely disabled persons, see
for example Börsch-Supan and Wilke [2004]. We focus on the old-age pensions for
women pathway. Eligibility for this pension requires 15 years of contributions of
which at least 10 years have to be earned after the age of 40. All recipients in our
sample are eligible for this pathway. The early retirement age (ERA) via the women
pension pathway stayed at 60 for cohorts born before 1951. The 1992 pension reform
has increased the retirement age with full benefit, normal retirement age (NRA), and
introduced actuarial adjustment for claiming early. Specifically, for women pension
pathway, NRA increases to 65 by monthly step since cohort 1941. In the meanwhile,
beginning with cohorts born in January 1941, each year of early claim renders a 3.6%
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benefit deduction. The penalty to retire at 60 was phased in gradually in monthly
steps, up to 18%. The penalty stabled at 18% for cohort younger than 1945. The
1999 reform abolished the early retirement program for women in cohorts born after
1951. Female workers can no longer retire at age 60. They retire the earliest at age
63 via pension for long-term insured.
A.1.3 Information Revelation
Workers know the expected pension benefits they will get when they retire. It
is because letters with detailed pension information were sent to insured individuals
every 3 years from age 55 before 2005. Since 2005, letters have been sent annually
to workers who are 27 years old and have contributed to the public pension for at
least 5 years. Dolls et al. [2018] have shown that those letters inform workers their
pension entitlements in a salient fashion. The salience of information helps individuals
plan and allows individuals to take into account the additional pension benefits when
they make labor supply choices. In detail, the statement is a two-page letter with
a summary of the insurance record, including pension service year, full contribution
year, accumulated pension points and projected pension entitlement conditional on
future contributions. It also indicates warnings and risks, such as shifting of relative
income position.
A.1.4 Lifetime budget constraint
Here I describe a simple life cycle model to illustrate how the subsidy plays a role.
All individuals maximize lifetime utility subject to their lifetime budget set. I assume
individuals earn a constant (after tax and pension contribution) wage w at regular
jobs and v at marginal employment and at retirement receive total pension pb. Let
T be the last period of life, C be total consumption, Y be lifetime income, TE be
126
the year of exit from the labor force, TR be the year claim pension and workers start
work from period 0. I assume no discounting and that T is known with certainty.
Here I assume T is 80. The lifetime budget constraint takes the following form:
C = Y = w × TE + v × (TR − TE) + pb× (T − TR)
, where pb is the pension benefit per year and pb = w
w¯
× TE × AR + b. b is the
subsidy amount. I denote the pension replacement rate for each year of contribution
as p, where p = AR
w¯
. Therefore, pb = p ∗w ∗ TE + b. I also ignore the adjustment due
to early claiming.
For simplicity, I make the two assumptions: 1) If one leaves job before early re-
tirement age 60 ( TE < 60 ), then TR = 60. Worker claims pension immediately
as pension become available at early retirement age. In the sample, among the in-
dividuals whose leave employment before 60, half retire at 60. 2) If one leaves a job
after early retirement age 60, then worker claims pension immediately ( TE = TR).
In the sample, among the individuals who exit employment after age 60, 70% claim
immediately. The lifetime budget constraint is the following:
Y =

w × TE + v(60− TE) + (p ∗ w ∗ TE + b)(T − 60) TE < 60
w × TE + (p ∗ w ∗ TE + b)(T − TE) TE ≥ 60
The slope of the budget constrain is the following:
dY
dTE
=

w − v + p ∗ w(T − 60) TE < 60
w + p ∗ w(T − TE)− (p ∗ w ∗ TE + b) TE ≥ 60
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The implicit tax t on work is
t =
w − dY
dTE
w
The change of implicit tax rate due to pension subsidy b is zero if one exit employment
before age 60 and claim pension at 60. The change of implicit tax rate t due to pension
subsidy b is b
w
if one exit employment 60 and claim pension immediately afterwards.
dt
db
=

0 TE < 60
− b
w
TE ≥ 60
If workers bridge to retirement via marginal employment, the change of implicit
tax rate due to pension subsidy b is now − b
v
. Because | − b
v
| > | − b
w
| and v < w,
I expect to see the workers bridge to retirement via marginal employment are more
affected by the subsidy program.
A.1.5 Parameters in the illustrated budget constraint
The taxable wage income is after social security contribution (SCC) and child
allowance. Healthcare insurance is almost always 100% deductible during the sample
period. Before 2005, pension contributions were 100% tax-free. As of 2005, to balance
the changes in pension income tax, 60% of pension contributions were tax-free, and
it increased by 2% each year. In 2025, 100% of contributions will be taxed. For
simplicity, I assume all SCC are tax deductible.
The social security contribution (SSC) includes contributions to healthcare in-
surance, long-term care insurance, unemployment insurance and pension insurance.
The average SSC is around 20% of gross wage income. The baseline budget set is
constructed for the sample of the married female without dependent children. Given
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that in the sample, around 90% have non-dependent children, it is representative
to construct the lifetime budget constraint for the married couple without children.
According to online tax calculator 1, the average tax rate of the married individual
with average wage income and whose spouse makes zero income is 0.12.
The public pension benefits are calculated on a complex formula of individual
career earnings, average pay, revaluation, and insurance periods. The main determi-
nant of pension payments is the sum of individual accumulated earnings points. Some
periods without contribution also count as insurance periods after the age of 17, such
as years of further education, time spent in military service, and time spent in raising
children. The annual pension wealth of a worker who claims old age pension without
financial adjustment and insured for TE − s years is the following:
pbgross =
T∑
t=TR
ARt ×
TE∑
τ=s
wτ
w¯
, where ARt is aggregate pension base of year t, w is gross annual individual income
τ , w¯ is the average income of all insured people in the pension system. If we assume
constant wage and take the mean of ARt, the total pension wealth is
PBgross = (T − TR)AR
w¯
(TE − s) = pw(TE − s)(T − TR)
, where p is the gross pension replacement rate per year of the pension contribution.
The interest portion (Ertragsanteil) of pension is subject to income tax. The taxable
portion depends on retirement age. It is 27% if one retires at full retirement age 65.
The taxable rate of pension is around 30%. Because the taxable portion of pension
on average falls into the zero tax bracket, we assume that pension is not subject to
income tax.
1The tax rates are obtained from https://www.bmf-steuerrechner.de/ekst
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A.2 Additional details on sample construction
A.2.1 Construction of average earning points before 1992
The assignment variable is average monthly pension points accumulated from full-
value contribution. In the VSKT dataset, we observe 624 months of pension-related
biographies. Respondents enter the data set in January of the year they turn 14
until the December of the year they become 65 years old. I use the birth year and
birth month to back out the corresponding year and month when the contribution
was made. Additionally, I also observe the socioeconomic status associated with the
recorded pension contribution. To calculate average EP from full-value contribu-
tion before 1992, I sum up EP and number of months with " gainfully employment
with pension contribution obligations." Because in the data, I observe the number
of months before 1992 used to calculate the subsidy amount, I compare this variable
with the constructed number of months contributed before 1992. This way I can test
for the accuracy of the variable construction. I have estimated the regression kink
estimates using the policy-defined cutoff 0.5 as the kink point. I find the impacts on
pension claim age is around 5 months and on hazard rate to claim at age 60 is around
9%.
A.2.2 Sample construction
Since the personal identification number varies over time in the VSKT data, I can
not guarantee that the same individual won’t be surveyed again over different waves
of VKST. Following the method used by ?, For the baseline sample, I take cohorts
that are at least as old age 63 from each wave. That corresponds to cohorts 1935,
1936, 1937, 1938 and 1939 from 2002 wave, cohorts from 1937 to 1941 from 2004 wave,
1938 to 1942 from 2005 wave, and so on. I further use time-invariant information,
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such as kids’ birth months, total pension points, pension periods, birth month, etc.,
to jointly rule out potentially duplicated individuals. I have also compiled samples
using individuals who are at least as old as 60, 61, 62 and 64 years old from each
wave.
A.3 Additional Figures and Tables
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Figure A·1: Average subsidy before 1992 as a function of average
monthly earnings points before 1992
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(a) Average subsidy before 1992
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(b) Scatter plots: average subsidy per year before 92
Notes: Figure A1 (a) shows the slope of average subsidy per year before 92 changes from 0.5 to -1 at
the kink, as Equation 2 suggests.Figure A1 (b) plots the distribution of average subsidies per year
before 1992. It should change from 0.5 to -1 as in Figure A1 (a). However, the slope to the left is
smaller than 0.5. Those deviations are measurement errors coming from constructing aep92 in the
data.
132
Figure A·2: Density of Female and Male Population
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Notes: Figure A2 shows the density of female workers in West Germany and male workers in West
Germany.
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Figure A·3: Global Kink Points
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(b) Estimates at Placebo Kinks
Notes: Figure A3a shows the R-squares and adjusted R-squares of the baseline model when the kink
is placed at "placebo" locations around the kink. This method follows Landais [2015]. Both the
R-squares and adjusted R-squares are maximized at the real kink. Figure A3b shows the estimates
as a function of the placebo kinks.
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Figure A·4: Scatter plots around the kink using placebo forcing
variables
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(a) Average EP 1 year after employment
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(b) Average EP 2 year after employment
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(c) Average EP 3 year after employment
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(d) Average EP 4 year after employment
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1.
2
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Distance from Kink Point
Subsidy (in 100 euro)
60
61
62
63
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Distance from Kink Point
Retirement age
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Distance from Kink Point
Hazard at age 60
(e) Average EP 5 year after employment
Notes: The figures show bin scatter plots using post-employment EPs as placebo forcing variables.
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Figure A·5: Scatter Plots of Age of Claiming Pension around the
Kink for Workers with less than 35 credible years
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(a) Bin plots: Age of claiming pension
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(b) Bin plots: hazard to claim pension at age 60
Notes: Figure A5 shows the relationship of age of claiming pension with average earnings points
before 1992 for non-recipients. It shows that the estimated impact on age claiming pension is not
caused by the quadratic functional form of age claiming pension.
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Table A.1: RKD Estimates of the effect of pension subsidies: by different
measure of treatment variables
Pension claiming age Hazard rate at 60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First-stage Subsidy Subsidy Total Subsidy Subsidy Total
Size Share pension Size Share pension
∆ dB
dr
(2) -521.4∗∗∗ -0.674∗∗∗ -525.6∗∗∗ -521.4∗∗∗ -0.674∗∗∗ -525.6∗∗∗
(14.99) (0.0292) (18.35) (14.99) (0.0292) (18.35)
Means at the kink 112.2 0.20 669.9 112.2 0.20 669.9
Sample means 89.2 0.16 672.4 89.2 0.16 672.4
Reduce-Form
∆ dY
dr
(1) 4.489∗∗∗ -0.927∗∗∗
(1.217) (0.230)
Means at the kink 60.86 0.43
Sample means 61.35 0.38
RKD estimator
dY
dB
(1)
(2)
-0.0086∗∗∗ -6.660∗∗∗ -0.0100∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗
(0.0022) (1.61) (0.0004) (0.0022) (0.30) (0.0008)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cohort Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5605 5605 5605 5750 5750 5750
R2 0.048 0.007 0.173 0.001 0.091 0.061
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Treatments are
subsidy size measured in 2010 euro, subsidy as a share of total pension and total pension
size in 2010 euro. The results are from local linear regressions with a bandwidth of
0.2 EP around the kink for the baseline specification. Means at the kink are obtained
when aep92 is within 0.1 EP around the kink.
Table A.2: Impacts of pension subsidies on employment exiting age
Age of exiting regular employment Age of exiting employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First-stage
∆ dB
dr
(1) -5.6240∗∗∗ -5.6296∗∗∗ -5.3798∗∗∗ -5.6240∗∗∗ -5.6296∗∗∗ -5.3798∗∗∗
(0.2940) (0.2808) (0.1993) (0.2940) (0.2808) (0.1993)
∆ dY
dr
(2) -0.4023 -0.3019 0.1865 4.3494 4.2372 4.8460
(5.001) (4.9841) (4.6512) (4.4284) (4.4111) (4.1229)
RKD estimator
dY
dB
(2)
(1)
0.0715 0.0536 -0.0347 -0.7734 0.7527 -0.9001
(0.8886) (0.8848) (0.8648) (0.7928) (0.7894) (0.7718)
AIC 35776 35788 32547 31927 34907 34928
BIC 35795 35906 32723 32102 35025 34948
AICc 21020 21021 21021 21021 21021 21020
Means at the kink
Subsidy size 108.74 108.74 108.74 108.74 108.74 108.74
Outcome variable 56.71 56.71 56.71 57.53 57.53 57.53
Sample means
Subsidy size 90.29 90.29 90.29 90.29 90.29 90.29
Outcome variable 56.83 56.83 56.83 57.75 57.75 57.75
Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Cohort Fixed Effect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 5218 5218 4912 5218 5218 4912
R2 0.0002 0.0036 0.1683 0.0023 0.0120 0.1183
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.Subsidies are measured
in e100. The results are from local linear regressions with a bandwidth of 0.2 EP around
the kink for the baseline specification. The standard error for RKD estimator is obtained
from delta method.
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Table A.3: Heterogeneous RKD Estimates
Outcome variables Age of claiming pension Hazard to claim pension at 60
∆B = e100 dY
dB
p-value dY
dB
p-value Obs.
Subgroups
Subsidy Size High -0.7172∗ 0.0971 0.2732∗∗∗ 0.0012 2634
(0.3441) (0.0800)
Low 0.3225 -0.1178 2269
(1.444) (0.3066)
T92 High -0.5849∗ 0.6732 0.1758 ∗∗∗ 0.1069 2312
(0.2367) (0.0628)
Low -1.4618 0.2227 2600
(0.8007) (0.1667)
Sick period Yes -1.0307∗ 0.6036 0.2272 ∗∗ 0.3603 1869
before age 50 (0.4372) (0.0975)
No -0.7498∗∗ -1.3009 3043
(0.2971) (0.0722)
More than 1 child Yes -1.0258∗∗∗ 0.1694 0.1925∗∗∗ 0.1185 3702
(0.2865) (0.0664)
No -0.1122 -0.0055 1210
(0.3610) (0.0841)
Cohort Fixed Effects YES YES
Controls YES YES
Standard errors are in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The RKD
estimates are the changes in outcome variable in response to an 100 eadditional
pension income from the subsidy. Subsidies are measured in e100. The results are
from local linear regressions with a bandwidth of 0.2 EP around the kink for the
baseline specification.The high subsidies group are recipients with subsidies above
average (82 euro/month). High T92 group are recipients who contributed more
than 20 years before 1992. I define the healthy group as workers who have never
experienced any sick leave before age 50. Lastly, I look at recipients have more
than one child. All regressions control for predetermined covariates and cohort
fixed effect. The p-values are from a test of the hypothesis that the coefficients are
equal within a category.
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Table A.4: RKD estimates by polynomial orders
Pension claiming age Hazard rate at age 60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
dB
dr
(1) -5.3798 ∗∗ -3.3285∗∗ -2.6433∗∗∗ -5.3798 ∗∗ -3.3285∗∗ -2.6433∗∗∗
(0.1993) ( 0.7031) (1.722) (0.1993) ( 0.7031) (1.722)
dY
dr
(2) 4.6032∗∗ 13.1436∗∗ 30.5413∗∗∗ -0.9202∗∗∗ -2.6966∗∗∗ -4.1251∗∗∗
(1.3416) ( 4.9678) (11.9833) (0.3104) (1.1473) (2.7888)
dY
dB
(2)
(1)
-0.8556∗∗∗ -3.9487∗∗ -11.5541 0.1710∗∗∗ 0.8101∗∗∗ 1.5606
(0.2436) ( 1.4978) (7.7411) (0.0567) (0.3489) (1.2990)
AIC 21020.485 21020.486 21020.9 6188.4008 6188.3959 6191.8902
BIC 21194.796 21207.709 21221.035 6362.769 6375.6802 6392.0907
AICc 21020.785 21020.832 21020.883 6188.7004 6188.7426 6192.2875
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cohort Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs. 4912 4912 4912 4912 4912 4912
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Subsidy is measured
in 100 ein this regression. The bandwidth is 0.2 around the kink point 0.45. r stands for
aep92, the running variable.
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Table A.5: Placebo tests using average EP five years after exiting
employment as the forcing variable
Pension claiming age Employment exiting age Hazard rate at age 60
(1) (2) (3)
Average EP 1 year after employment
dY
dB -1.0375 5.4465 2.1327
(7.9755) (20.0896) (5.2783)
Average EP 2 year after employment
dY
dB -0.0808 -0.0655 0.5217
(2.1288) (4.2719) (0.6693)
Average EP 3 year after employment
dY
dB -1.9119 -2.5791 1.0317
(2.9564) (5.7393) (1.0544)
Average EP 4 year after employment
dY
dB -2.3722 -3.8350 1.4814
(3.4679) (7.3996) (1.4893)
Average EP 5 year after employment
dY
dB -2.2762 -2.0570 1.2687
(3.7713) (7.2694) (1.4869)
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Subsidy
is measured in e100. The bandwidth is 0.2 around the kink point 0.45 with
1st order polynomial. The table explores the robustness of the RKD results by
using average EP after exiting employment as placebo forcing variables. Post
employment EPs are correlated with post employment wage incomes, thus
lifetime earnings but are not correlated to aep92 strongly. The results show
that there are no effect in these placebo specifications.
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Table A.6: RKD Estimates of the effect of pension subsidies by
cohort groups
Pension claiming age Hazard rate at age 60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
≤ 1940 1941-1944 ≥ 1945 ≤ 1940 1941-1944 ≥ 1945
dY
dB -0.5718 -0.6518 -1.2579
∗ 0.1649∗ 0.1743∗ 0.1420
(0.3187) (0.4108) (0.5670) (0.0907) (0.0986) (0.1160)
Obs. 1372 1574 1784 1390 1598 1792
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Subsidy is measured in e100. The results are from local linear regressions
with a bandwidth of 0.2 EP around the kink for the baseline specification.
The standard error for RKD estimator is obtained from delta method.
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Table A.7: Effect on SES before pension claim
Status before Regular Marginal Unemployment
pension claim Employment Employment (UI+UA)
(1) (2) (3)
dY
dB
-0.004 -0.0224 0.090†
(0.0569) (0.0261) (0.052)
Sample means 0.43 0.05 0.29
Observations 924,059
Individuals 5,763
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Cohort Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses† p < 0.10. Subsidies are measured in e100. The
results are from local linear regressions with a bandwidth of 0.2 EP around the
kink for the baseline specification. The standard error for RKD estimator is
obtained from delta method.
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Appendix B
Appendix — Chapter 2
B.1 Data
The Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) in Germany contains information
on all social security reliable employment periods and periods of UI receipt between
the years 1975 and 2013. The employment information comes from the employers
who are required to report information on all their employees annually, with the ex-
act duration of the employment periods and corresponding individual information. A
new employment period starts with a new year, the beginning of a new job or changes
at the current job that require notification, such as a switch of the health insurance
or from minor employment to social security reliable employment. For each of those
periods, individual characteristics such as the birth date, gender and nationality and
employment information such as daily gross wage, occupation, educational status and
several employer characteristics are reported. The data on UI receipt stems from ad-
ministrative UI records which are used in the local UI agencies to determine eligibility
and to govern the payment process to the UI recipients. It entails information on the
exact duration of UI-receipt, the daily benefits.
Due to the daily character of our data, we can exactly determine, whether an
individual is regularly employed, on UI benefits, or – when currently not in the
data – non-employed. The structure of the data allows furthermore constructing
detailed biographical information such as experience or tenure or past exposure to
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unemployment. We select all UI-entries between 1980 and 2010, which qualify based
on their working history for their age-specific maximum PBD. The period-specific
calculations are shown in table B.4.
B.2 Life Cycle Model and Budget Set Construction
Life Cycle Model
Here we describe a life cycle model as in Brown [2013] and how it can be used to
estimate how UI entries vary with maximum PBD duration P (dgt
dP
). We assume that
all workers maximize lifetime utility subject to their lifetime budget set. In particular,
let T be the last period of life, C be total consumption and E be the year of exit from
the labor force (which equals total years of work S plus years of schooling s). We
assume no discounting and that T is known with certainty. We assume the lifetime
utility function take the following function form:
U(C,E) = C − a
1 + 1
e
(
E
a
)1+ 1
e
where e is the labor supply elasticity and a is ability. The heterogeneity is captured by
a a density distribution µ(a). This quasi-linear, iso-elastic utility function rules out
income effect. This model predicts perfect consumption smoothing over the lifecycle:
ct =
C
T
.
We assume individuals earn a constant (after tax) wage w and at retirement receive
total pension payments yR(S) and UI payments yUI(S) which both will depend on
years worked (in potentially discontinuous and non-differentiable ways). Note that
this yields a budget constraint: C = w(E − s) + yUI(E) + yR(E).
Note that we can write the elasticity of exit age with respect to the change in
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effective net wage of working an additional period is e = dE
E
× wnet
dwnet
where wnet ≡
w + ∂y
UI
∂E
+ ∂y
R
∂E
. This elasticity will be obtained by a bunching estimator.
The FOC of this problem is given by
E = a[wnet]e
If the distribution of ability µ(a) is smooth, this implies a smooth distribution of
exit age with density h0(E). We know that a constant potential benefit duration of
P induces a convex kink at age TR − P where the slope of the individual’s budget
set exhibits a discrete decline from wnetH to wnetL . Bunching at this kink can be used
to recover the elasticity e [see e.g. Saez, 2010, Kleven, 2016]. In particular, under
the given utility function, we can use the fact that the marginal buncher with ability
a∗+∆a∗ is indifferent between locating at her optimal point under wnetabove and locating
at the kink to get an exact formula for the elasticity of
e = − ln
(
1 + ∆E
∗
E∗
)
ln
(
wnetAbove
wnetBelow
)
The total amount of observed bunching B is given by B =
∫ E∗+∆E∗
E∗ h0(E)dE.
Thus, observed bunching and an estimate of h0(E) can be used to recover e and
µ(a).
Budget Set Construction
We assume individuals earn a constant (after tax) wage w and at retirement receive
total pension payments yR(S) and UI payments yUI(S). This yields a budget con-
straint of the form
C = w(E − s) + yUI(E) + yR(E)
Here we detail how we compute the budget set. We denote p as the gross pension
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replacement rate per year of pension contribution1. In other words, Each year of
work with wage of w will increase pension benefits yR(E) by pw. We also denote UI
provides income support of 0.68w. Each year spent on UI increases pension benefits
yR(E) by 0.8× pw. We assume individuals take their full UI duration upon exit and
then rely on UA retire, this too can be modified. For illustration purpose, here we
assume UA provides zero income. In the simulation, we assume UA yields 0.30w and
workers spend TR − E − P on UA.
The budget constraint is thus given by:
C = w(E − s) + bD + 0.8× pwD × [T −max{TR, E − s+ Tu]︸ ︷︷ ︸
yUI(E)
+ pw(E − s)× [T −max{TR, E − s+ Tu}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
yR(E)
Where D is UI duration, T u is unemployment duration, P is maximum potential
UI duration, b is UI benefit level, m is the UA benefit level. The retirement type r,
by definition, T u = D ≥ P .
Therefore,
C = Y =
w(E − s) + bP + pw × (E − s+ 0.8P )× [T − TR] if E < TR − Pw(E − s) + bP + pw × (E − s+ 0.8P )× [T − (E − s+ Tu)] if E ≥ TR − P
The stylized budget sets in Figure 2 make an assumption that worker always retire
at the earliest possible retirement age. Lets take as example the 1924 cohort (where
P = 1 and TR = 60). Therefore, the budget set is
C = Y =
w(E − s) + bP + pw × (E − s+ 0.8P )× [T − 60] if E < 60− Pw(E − s) + b(60− E) + pw × (E − s+ 0.8 ∗ (60− E))× [T − 60] if E ≥ 60− P
dY
dE
=
w + pw[T − TR] if E < TR − Pw − b+ pw(1− 0.8)[T − TR] if E ≥ TR − P
1On average, the net pension replacement rate for an average earner with 45 years of insurance
is 70%
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Parameters in the budget sets
The baseline busget set by cohort is constructed for the sample of married couple
without dependent children. Given that in our sample, around 80% are married
and around 15% have dependent children, it is representative to construct the life
time budget constrain for married couple without children. We use the following
parameters: s = 20, T = 80, a = 0.8 and B = 0.68w. The tax rate of married
individual with average wage income and whose spouse makes average wage income
for cohort 1924, 1929, 1935, 1941, 1949 and 1951 are 0.22 0.24, 0.22, 0.22, 0.22 and
0.18, respectively 2. The gross average wage are 19456, 17779, 24886, 24886, 22477
and 22423; and the pension replacement rate p also varies by cohorts. Moreover, we
use a linear approximation to the curved budget set to measure the changes in slope
at the kink point.
The pension replacement rate p
The public pension is calculated on a complex formula of individual career earnings,
average pay, revaluation, and insurance periods. The main determinant of pension
payments is the sum of individual accumulated earnings points (Entgeltpunkte). One
pension earnings point (EP) represents annual pension contributions made by a con-
tributor earns average income. The gross lifetime pension income of a worker who
claims old age pension without financial adjustment3 and insured for E − s years is
the following:
Y Rgross =
T∑
t=TR
ARt ×
E∑
τ=s
wτ
w¯τ
where ARt is aggregate pension base of year t, wτ is gross individual income in year
τ , w¯τ is the average income of all insured people in the pension system. ARt also
2The tax rates are obtained from https://www.bmf-steuerrechner.de/ekst
3See section for detailed pension calculation when pension types and financial adjustments are
considered.
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represents the pension value of one EP4. If we assume constant wage and take the
mean of ARt and w¯τ ,
Y Rgross = (T − TR)
AR
w¯
(E − s)wgross = (T − TR)(E − s)pwgross
where p = AR
w¯
is the gross pension replacement rate per year of pension contribution.
A person with 45 years of contribution year has a gross pension replacement rate
around 50%.
Prior to 1982, gross pension is the same as net pension benefit. After 1982, pension
is subject to health care contribution (KVdR). This percentage of contribution ranges
between 6.8% and 8.5%.5
Y Rnet = Y
gross(1−KV dR) = (T − TR)(E − s)p(1−KV dR)wgross
' (T − TR)(E − s)p(1− 8%)wgross
pnet =
AR
w¯
(1−KV dR)
Each additional year of S increases life time income by wnet and p(1−KV dR)wgross.
The p(1−KV dR) of married individual with average wage income is 0.01128, 0.01077,
0.01173, 0.00969, 0.00953, 0.00945 of the six cohorts, respectively.
B.3 Additional Tables
4Both ARt and w¯τ are public available information. Table lists ARt and w¯τ of our sample period.
5This contribution includes health care insurance contribution and long term care contribution.
From April 1, 2004 pensioners have to pay the full contribution (1.7%) for long-term care insurance
instead of only half of it.
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Table B.4: Period Specific Restrictions on Working Histories
Periods New Eligibility: Full Eligibility:
contributions* >= 12 months during ... contributions* >= ... during ...
1980-1984 previous 4 years 60 months, previous 7
1986-1987 previous 4 years 72 months, previous 7
1987-1999 previous 3 years 72 months, previous 7
1999-2006 previous 3 years 64 months, previous 7
2006-2007 previous 2 years 48 months, previous 5 years
2008-2010 previous 2 years 48 months, previous 5 years
*As contribution duration we count all regular social security reliable employment relationships. For
simultaneous employment relationships, we take the one with the highest earnings.
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Appendix C
Appendix — Chapter 3
C.1 CPS-DWS’s Questionnaire form
Displaced workers are workers who lost or left jobs because their plant or company
closed or moved, there was insufficient work for them to do, or their position or shift
was abolished. Those workers are older than 20 years old and receive wages, salaries,
commissions, tips, payment in kind, or piece rates (Displaced Workers Technical Note
2016).
SD1: During the last 3 calendar years, that is, January 2013 through Decem-
ber 2015, did (name/you) lose a job, or leave one because: (your/his/her) plant or
company closed or moved, (your/his/her) position or shift was abolished, insufficient
work or another similar reason?
• (1) Yes
• (2) No (Skip to ST1LCK)
SD2: Which of these specific reasons describes why (name/you)(is/are) no longer
working at that job? If (name/you) lost or left more than one job in the last 3 years,
refer to the job (you/he/she) had held the longest when answering this question and
the ones that follow.
• (1) Plant or company closed down or moved
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• Plant or company operating but lost or left job because of: (2) Insufficient work
(3) Position or shift abolished
• (4) Seasonal job completed (Skip to ST1LCK)
• (5) Self-operated business failed (Skip to ST1LCK)
• (6) Some other reason (Skip to ST1LCK)
SD5: Had (name/you) been given written advance notice informing (you/him/her)
that (the plant or business would be closed) ((you/he/she) would lose (your/his/her)
job)?
• (1) Yes (go to SD6)
• (2) No (go to SD7)
SD6: How long before (name/you)(were/was) to have lost (your/his/her) job did
(you/he/she) receive that notice?
• (1) Less than 1 month
• (2) 1 to 2 months
• (3) More than 2 months
C.2 Additional Tables and Figures
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Table C.1: Comparison of displaced and non-displaced workers
Displaced Workers Nondisplaced Workers P-value
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Outcome variables
UI take-up rate 0.45 (0.5) 0.48 (0.5) 0.005
UI exhaustion rate 0.38 (0.49) 0.17 (0.38) 0.00
Employed at time of survey 0.74 (0.44) 0.75 (0.43) 0.002
Weekly earnings at current job 803 (688) 730 (667) 0
Panel B: Recived notice
Less than 1 month 0.112 (0.31) 0.102 (0.11) 0
1 to 2 months 0.107 (0.31) 0.01 (0.08) 0
more than 2 months 0.117 (0.32) 0.052 (0.22) 0
No notice at all 0.664 (0.47) 0.790 (0.41) 0
Panel C: Demographics
Age 40.56 (11.94) 39.03 12.26 0
Female 0.44 (0.5) 0.311 (0.5) 0
Black 0.106 (0.31) 0.0873 (0.32) 0.005
Married 0.522 (0.5) 0.505 (0.5) 0
Education (in years) 13.21 (2.44) 12.55 (2.56) 0.008
High school graduates 0.58 (0.49) 0.56 (0.5) 0.003
College graduates 0.255 (0.44) 0.35 (0.43) 0.141
Panel D: Pre-displacement
variables
Tenure at lost job 4.87 (6.41) 3.64 (5.33) 0
Union member (%) 0.08 (0.27) 0.23 (0.42) 0
Part-time worker (%) 0.17 (0.38) 0.18 (0.38) 0.83
Plant closing (%) 0.35 (0.48) 0.03 .(0.17) 0
Had health insurance at lost 0.52 (0.50) 0.40 (0.49) 0
Weekly earnings at lost job 856.2 (706) 833.9 (676) 0
No. of observations 29,978 23,308
Note: The sample includes all displaced and non-displace workers from survey year
1998 to 2016. Those workers have lost or left their jobs within 3 years of the survey
time. Weekly earning at lost job and current job are inflation-adjusted. Standard
deviations are in parentheses. The p-value for testing the null hypothesis: the
displaced and non-displaced workers have the same characteristics are reported in
column 5.
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Table C.2: The Impact of Advance Notice - A Naive OLS Results
Outcome Variables WARNed UI Take-up UI Exhaustion Rate
(UI Claimers)
Variables S.E. S.E. S.E.
WARNed - - -0.0580*** [0.0087] 0.0193 [0.0200 ]
Age -0.0002 [0.0011] 0.0118*** [0.023] 0.0024 [0.0021]
Female 0.0284*** [0.0034] 0.0745*** [0.0082] 0.02478* [0.010]
Black 0.0107 [0.0066] 0.0404 [0.0165] 0.1080*** [0.016]
Married 0.0116** [0.0042] 0.0035 [0.0070] -0.0284* [0.0097]
Education(in years) 0.0007*** [0.0001] -0.0002 [0.0002] -0.00057 [0.0003]
High school graduates 0.0110 [0.0057] 0.0074 [0.0075] -/0.0004 [0.0123]
Tenure at lost job 0.0106*** [0.0013] 0.0051* [0.0020] 0.0039 [0.0024]
Tenure Squared -0.0001* [0.0000] -0.0002* [0.00006] -0.00002 [0.00008]
Union member(%) 0.0521*** [0.0111] 0.0659*** [0.0129] 0.0368* [0.0172]
Part-time worker(%) 0.0014 [0.0054] -0.1792*** [0.0099] 0.0070 [0.019]
New worker(%) -0.0115 [0.0044] -0.1052*** [0.0116] -0.0209 [0.018]
Plant closing(%) 0.1286*** [0.008] -0.0208*** [0.0069] -0.01203 [0.0100]
Had health insurance 0.0448*** [0.0043] 0.1753*** [0.0085] -0.0204 [0.0149]
Hourly wage at lost job 0.0008 [0.0006] 0.0018 [0.0010] -0.0033* [00.0015]
State fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
No.of observations 26322 26013 11,724
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Figure C·1: Kernal Density of Job Tenure, Age, Wage at Lost Job
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